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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the issue of gender equality in the Canadian criminal justice system.
It dissects two specific issues, the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's therapeutic
or counselling records and the prosecution of domestic assault charges. Withui these two
issues it is argued that the criminal justice system has failed to treat female victims of
violent crime fairly and equally. Moreover, it is suggested that this failure is anchored in a
neglect of the appreciation of the unique gender issues connected to these matters within
a contextual fiamework.
With regards to the disclosure issue, a fundamental tenet, the presumption of innocence,
and the accused's right to full answer and defence c o d i c t with the complainant's rights
to privacy and equaiity before the law. It is noted that where these rights conflict the
courts have "balanced" the male accused's rights above those of the female complainant.
The legislation enacted to address this issue and the courts' response to its
constitutionality is examined to reveal the rationales relied upon by the courts to support
their positions. As well, the evolution of female rights is presented through the treatment
of sirnilar issues within the jurisdiction of Canadian civil law.
Related to the matter of the prosecution of domestic assault charges, two recent initiatives
in Ontario are presented. The conventional criminal justice system's response to the
realities connected with these type of offences has failed to appreciate the context in
which these transgressions take place. The numerous potential causes and consequences
of domestic violence are reviewed to depict the complexities associated with the issue
and to stress that there is no simple solution to the potentially fatal crimes.
Lastly, any meanuigfil reform must begin with a contextual appreciation of the gender
components of the issues. Regarding the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's
cowiselling records it is wged that the courts must recognize the harrn that f'lows f?om the
breach of privacy of these highly sensitive materiais. Judicial notice, based on the
principle of distinction between legislative facts and adjudicative facts, is suggested as a
key to fair and equal Uiterpretation of the legislation enacted to guide the courts on these
applications. As for the reforms set out for equality improvements for the prosecution of
domestic assault charges, it suggested that the answer to meaninfil rectification to
improved access to justice for the victims of domestic violence is a better appreciation of
the causes and consequences of the behaviour, including the nature of the cycle of
violence.
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I would like to take this opportunity to thank a number of individuals who helped make
this project a reality. First of al1 to Bruce Archibald and Richard Devlin, my faculty
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They both were quite patient with a young middle-aged dog trying to leam a few new
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reading this work to consider the Canadian women harmed a d o r killed by intimate male

violence. It need not affect you directly, as it did our famiiy through the tragic death of

Ms. Susan McArthur (who was shot and kilied by ber husband in Hamilton, Ontario
shortly afler she attempted to separate from him) to appreciate the temble suffering and
waste of human life connected with this type of behaviour. We should al1 feel as if we c m
make a difference by recognizing the inequalities that exist within the criminal justice

system and then discussing them openly. Much work is needed in the field so that
meaniagfûi refonns can be commenced and carried out-

PREFACE
(A) Perspective and Outline

The goal of my thesis work is to apply my practical experiences and insights that 1

experîenced as an Assistant Crown Attorney in a large urban centre in Brampton, Ontario
to the recent scholarly revelations that 1have made since my return to the campus. In this
project 1 have included a signifiant level of perspective distilled fiom some of the
frustrations that 1 re-darly worked through as an officer of the court and a quasi minister
of justice in the judicial district of Peel. Looking back on my practical experiences as a
criminal prosecutor, 1 recall the two areas of my work that 1 found to be the most
frustrating were the prosecution of sexual assault cases and the general level of
dissatisfaction 1 had with the way that the criminal justice system dealt with the victims of
domestic vioknce. And to be specific, many of the fnistrations 1 felt were grounded in
female witnesses' unwillingness to participate in the fact finding missions of a trial.

(B) Nature of the Problem
With regard to the issue of sexual violence, 1 had the unique opportunity to be delegated

as Our office's sexual assault CO-ordinator.in addition to meeting with countless victims
of such offences to prepare thern for trial, 1 was also able to regularly meet with other
prosecuting crowns, victirn support persons, investigating officers and other involved
professionals. 1 was also routinely required to enter the adversariai arena to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that these tembly destructive and criminal acts transpired in the ways
that these vulnerable complainants described. Al1 too ofken, 1 became frustrated by the

inadequate d e s of evidence and criminai processes that seemed to prevent the
cornrnunity fiom obtaining its fair access to justice. By fair access to justice 1 mean
systemic factors that seemed to dissuade female witnesses fiom willingly wishing to have
their cornplaints tested and prosecuted in the criminal courts. 1 also had the distinct
pleasure of working with the members of the Peel Rape Crisis Centre to develop a Rape
Cisis Protocol. The purpose of this Protocol was to allow al1 of those individuals corning
into contact with sexual assault complainants a better appreciation of the implications
associated with the overall system and some of the very unique rights and needs of these
predorninately female complainants. As well, the Protocol highlighted the impact that
those individuals interacting with the complainants could have on the eventual criminal
court process. 1 found these involvements to be professionally rewarding. They now act

as a starting point for what 1 hope will be M e r advancements in the criminal justice
response to the sexual assault complainant's needs.

On the domestic assault front, again in addition to king directly involved in the routine
j O b requirement of the prosecution of these cases, 1 was assigned the duty of k i n g a

dornestic assault CO-ordinator.Such a position required many of the same public liaison
h c t i o n s and resource contacts as outlined above for the sexual assault CO-ordinator.This
assignment was enough to give any right thinking person a temble sense of
dissatisfaction, particularly because not enough was k i n g done to protect the women and
children trapped in these dangerously violent and abusive relationships. Yet my
experiences took me even M e r in recognizing a problem. 1 was also regularly assigned
xii

as our provincial court's "duty crown." One of the responsibilities of the "duty crown"
was to meet with women wishing to have Wei? charges dropped. Every weekday
aftemoon fiom 2:00 until4:30, in 30 minute intervals, 1 was required to meet with
domestic assault complainants, al1 of whom had one unifjing request: that the charges
against their husbands or boyfiends be dropped. Regardless of the distinctions in culture,
religion, socioeconomic status, the number of children hiding behind their mother's legs
or, fiom tirne- to-*he, the type of make-up used to mask the physical signs of abuse, they

al1 came with a common hope that 1 could save their mariage and their lives by ignoring
the situation that they found themselves in. It was the most remarkable and disturbing
social phenomenon that 1 have ever witnessed.

...
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

(A) Introduction

Currently, a debate is being waged about the need and the forrn of reforms required to
improve the Canadian criminal justice system. Much of this debate is focused on the
rights of female victims of crime and their access to a fair, impartial, effective and an

equal social systern of justice. Some believe that there is very little if anything that can be
salvaged fiom a system based on historical and antiquated traditions that no longer have a

place in our modem society.' Others would suggest that although reforms are warranted. a
wholesale change in the way we protect the public fiom the harm caused by criminal acts
and the way that we deter those individuals inclined to cause such h m would fail to

accomplish those goals.' This project aligns itself with the latter camp. Much
improvement is required to maintain a just, fair. efficient and impartial criminal justice
system. The purpose of this thesis is to establish how the Canadian criminal justice
system has failed to treat female v i c h s of crime fairly and equally. The core premise of

this work is that the cnminal justice systern has failed these women because it has failed

IL. Berzins, '"Restorative' Justice on the Eve of a New Century: the need for social
context and a new imagination" ( April 1997) [unpublished, text delivered at the
Canadian lnstitute for the Administration Justice, Montreal].
'B. Archibald, "A Comprehensive Canadian Approach to Restorative Justice: The
Prospects for Fair Alternative Measures in Response to Crime" in D. Stuart, R. Delisle,
and A. Manson, eds., Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminul Reports
Forum (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1999).

to appreciate (within a contextual fiamework) the gender issues linked to two unique
matters that bring women before the courts. In Chapter One this thesis is developed by
examining some of the basic principles and goals of our criminal justice system. To
present a perspective, the work aiso provides discussion on the nature of the adjudication
process. its parties and their respective roles. The two central issues presented here that
test o w criminal justice system's ability to treat female victims of crime equally, fairly

and irnpartially are (1) the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's therapeutic or
counselling records, and (2) some recent responses to the prosecution of domestic assault
charges. With regard to the disclosure issue, we observe the fbndamental tenet of the
presumption of innocence and the accused's right to M l answer and defence corne into
direct conflict with the right's of sexual assault complainants to privacy and equality
before the law. These matters are dissected in chapter two. The issues connected to the
prosecution of domestic assault charges, particularly the shortcomings of the conventional

criminal justice system's responses to the broader contextuai realities, such as the cycie of
violence. are reviewed in chapter three. Solutions to these problems are canvassed in
chapter four, where it is argued that any meaningfül reforms will require a deeper
contextual appreciation of the issues. This premise holds true regardless of the direction

in which these improvements move - either the modification of the existing conventional
approaches within the realm of due process, or the community based restorative justice
paradigrn.

To effectively accomplish these tasks a definitions and terminology section has been
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included in this introductory chapter. As well, a discussion regardhg the prevalence and

scope of these two issues is set out. This is done for two reasons. First, to establish the
societal significance of sexual and domestic assaults, and second to identifjr some of the
cornpiexities comected with the issues so as to further the argument that any
improvements proffered by the reformers must include a contextual understanding of the
issues. It is the goal of this project to suggest that a contexnial understanding of the issues
will promote a greater level of equaiity and justice for femaie victims of crime. The
frarnework for the development of the importance of contextualism and the parameters

for reforrn. are set out in the theory section of this chapter.

(B) Definitions and Terminology

Complainant, witness, victim or sexual assault survivor? The task here is to examine

certain definitions and explain the choices for some of the terminology used throughout
this thesis. This is an important component of the work for two reasons. The first reason

is that the terms used to describe the witnesses to be scrutinized in this project wili carry

with them certain connotations on at least two distinct levels. On one level, the choices
that are made will eventually create a tone and an inferred perspective on the subject
matter that is discussed. In short, the terms used to describe the female witnesses will
have an impact on their treatrnent and, therefore, their social realities. A s well, the terms

used will condition the readers' contexhiai perceptions of the issues outlined in this work.
On a different level, the terms used will also suggest inferences about the author. The

second reason that language is a significant component of this work is that it will be
argued that certain inferences should be drawn fiom the language used by the courts as
revealing a reluctance within some ruihgs to treat femaie witnesses equally. This
highlights a broader contextual reality of women's inequality, than that merely identified
in the criminal justice system. This position is premised on the notion that the words used
are deeply connected to rationales used by the judges interpreting legal principles. As a

result, the selection of tenninology should not be under-taken without some reflection.

Many legal scholars have recognized the importance that Ianguage used in legai studies
has for both the subject matter being discussed as well for the author theorizing on the

subject matter. For example, G. Matoesian, studying the interaction among law, language
and power identified this perspective and wrote:

In very tacit and taken-for granted fashion, language categorizes and
legitimates our interpretations about social reality, sustaining some
versions while disqualifiing others and conceals the hierarchical
arrangements and sexual differences between men and women. Language
is a system of power for those who control it, and, in the context of the
rape trial, talking power transfomis the subjective violation of the victim
the victim's experience of sexual terror - into an objectivity : namely,
consensual se^.^

-

Also J. Thompson applied a similar importance and complexity to language, as he

contemplated:

The analysis of ideology is fùndamentally concerned with Ianguage, for
language is the principle medium of meaning (signification) which serves
to sustain relations of domination. Speaking a language is a way of acting.

' G. Matoesian, Reproducing Rupe, Dominotion rhrough Talk in the Courtroom (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1993) at 2.

emphasized Austin and others; what they forget to add is that ways of
acting are infused with forms of power. The utterance of the simplest
expression is an intervention in the world, more or less effective, more or
less endowed with institutional authority. 'Language is not only an
instrument of communication or even knowledge' writes Bourdieu, 'but an
instrument of power. One seeks not only to be understood but also ta be
bel ieved, O beyed, respected, d i ~ t i n ~ u i s h e d . ' ~
An analogy that helps to interpret these passages is the art of painting. Language is much
like the paint selected to depict the image or convey the imagery of the painter's desire,

more so than the brush that is used to apply the medium. It is the paint, particularly its
colour and texture, that creates the thoughts and mernories c o ~ e c t e dto the work for the
person observing and absorbing the painting. The brush merely helps the artist complete

the process. Similady, the language used by an author creates imagery and context for
their subject matter.

Applying these principles to this study, one must consider the potential impact that the
tenns selected to describe those females who have complained to the authorities about
being sexually assaulted and find themselves before the criminal courts as witnesses wili
have on their contextual situations and reaiities. For exarnple. some of the literature

4

Ibid.at 220. See also J. Thompson ,Studies in the Theory of ldeology (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1984) at 131. Further reference to L.J. Austin's position is explained at page
6. It is emphasized that speech is a way of acting and not simply reporting or describing.
As such an adequate account of language must take into consideration the author's
experiences to appreciate his or her "speech-acts."The reference to Bourdieu was noted to
P. Bourdieu, "L'econornic des echanges linguistiques,"Langue Francaise (mai 1977) at
30. For a review of Bourdieu's contribution to the sociology of culture see N.Garnham
and R. Williams, "Pierre Bourdieu and the sociology of culture: an introduction," (1 %O),
2 Media Culture and Society at 209-223.

reviewed to date suggests that the term "sexual assault survivor'" is appropriate, as a
positive tenn recognizing the strength required to live with an experience of sexual
assault. It is a term which suggests that although the individual victim had no control over
the assault, they are empowered to have options in their responses and are actively
involved in the process of reclairning their personal lives. This term would seem at first
glace to be preferred to "sexual assault victim" that infers much less ernpowerment.

However, the difficulty that arises with both ternis is that they presuppose that the
transgression complained of occwred in fact, prior to there being a court disposition. This
approach violates our criminal justice system's fundamental tenet: the presurnption of
innocence.

A related problem of language applies to the terms of "domestic assault," "family

violence" and "wife assault." Each of these ternis bring with them certain connotations
and IeveIs of societai acceptance. Similarly, when attempting to choose a term to descnbe

instances of physical violence perpetrated by a male person on a female partner's person,
one might argue that the tenn wife assault is inappropnate because the term "wife"

connotes an antiquated notion of relationships grounded in a tradition of proprietary
interests and inequality. Others might suggest the ternis "domestic assault" and "family
violence " are inappropriate because they do not accurately describe the nature of the

M. Whalen, Counseling fo End Violence Againsr Wornen: A Subversive Model
(Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996) at 5 1. See also the Region of Peel (Ontario)
Sexual Assault Emergency Response Protocol (October 1996) [unpublished, available at
the Rape Crisis Centre, Mississauga Ontario] at page 10.

abuse that flows almost exclusively fiom the male party towards the female victim.

Having contemplated the potential impact that the terms selected rnight have on the
female witnesses, the second issue to be addressed is the recognition that the tenns
selected also reflect back ont0 myself and my own life experiences. This notion was
eloquently e'rpressed by L. Bersianik when she wrote:
Language is not the product of spontaneous generation. We cannot
separate what we are from how we speak, ourselves fiom language, tongue
fiom speech. Language reftects the mentality of the individuals who speak
it, and who are spoken by it!
This sarne theme composed the centrai assumptions of C. Gilligan's research that
examined human psychological developmental theories built exclusively on observations
of men's lives by male scientists. In her work she recognized that "the way people talk
about their lives is of significance, that the language that they use and the connotations
that they make reveal the world that they see and in which they act."'~his notion is
accepted as true and explains why, in some detail, my professional experiences that have
impacted upon my scholarly orientations are set out in the preface to this work.

6L.Bersianik, "Women's Work" in A. Dybikowski, V. Freeman, D. Marlatt, B. Pulling &
B. Warland, eds., In the Feminine: Women and Words / L e s Femmes et les Mots
(Edmonton: Longspoon Press, 1983) at 157.

%. Gi Il igan, In a Differenr Voice Psychological Theory and Women 's Developmenr
(London: Harvard University Press, 1982). In her work she theorizes that psychology's
developmental theories have been established on the observations of men's lives. Here
she attempts to correct psychology's misperceptions and refocus its view of female
personality. This work attempts to reshape our understanding of human experience.

The third reason that these terms need to be addressed is that 1 am a male discussing and

analysing issues that may affect al1 members in our society, but directly impact women. 1

am cognizant that some feminist theorist~have examined the significance that language
selection has on the effect of assisting in the control and oppression of women by men.'
This has been explained, in part, by Carol Gitligan by the fact that women have
historically been lefi out of the debate and not been allowed to contribute to the evolution
of the language that is used to explain the theories related to human development. She

suggested reform that would allow for women's direct involvement in the debate. Her
hope was that:

The interpretation of women's experience in terms of their own imagery of
relationships thus clarifies that expenence and also provides a
nonhierarchial vision of human connection. Since relationships, when cast
in the image of hierarchy, appear inherently unstable and morally
probiematic, their transposition into the image of web changes an order of
inequality into a structure of interco~ection.~
Having outlined these three components of the relationship between language and
schoIarship. the choices made as to the terms used and the rationale behind those

selections will now be reviewed.

8

H. Eisentstein, Contemporary Feminist Thot@ (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984).In

this work, on the issue of the symbolic language of pornography she suggested that one
effect was the inference of the right of men to control women (at page 1 18). Also, she
suggested another exarnple of the gender division of labour in Western culture, "that
artificially assigned language, culture and authority to men, and nature, sexuality, and
feeling to women."(at pages 1 19 to 120). See also A. Dworkin Pornography: Men
Possessing Women (New York: Pengee / G.P. Putnam's, 1981).
9

C. Gilligan, supra note 7 at 62.

The Canadian courts have traditionally described fernale witnesses who come before the
criminal justice system to testifL about criminal acts of sexual violence or interference as
'-sexual assault cornplainant~."'~
The cases that are reviewed in Chapter Two al1 use the
term '-sexual assault complainant." Still, it is a tenn that has been established in the

jurisprudence without great influence fiom the women who have come to the criminai
justice system seeking nothing more than fairness and justice. As such, some femaie
authors suggests that sexual assault survivor is a more contextually accurate descriptor.
However, as indicated earlier, this title presupposes the finding of fact. Thus, given that
the applications for disclosure discussed in this thesis occur ptior to determination of
guilt, coupled with the fact that a fundamentai tenet of our criminal justice system is the
presumption of innocence, the term "sexual assault complainant" has been retained. It is
presented as a "credibility neutral" term that has been selected to describe the female
parties who corne before the courts as Crown prosecution witnesses. This is done with the

recognition that a legitimate criticism of this choice is that it falls into the same traditional
obstacle of disallowing the women directly impacted by sexual violence a voice in the
debate. Still, it is hoped that as these issues develop over time, the wornen who survive

violent sexual violations are given the oppomuiity to have direct and meaningful input in
the determination of a term that they find most acceptable.
' O The first reported case in the Canadian Criminal Cases journal that deals with sexual
assault or "rape" charges is R. v. Graham (1899), 3 C.C.C. 22 (Ont. H.C.). In this case
that Court used the term "complainant." A review of cases afier 1899, selected at random,
up to the pre-Charter year of 1981, found that al1 used the term complainant to describe
the female witnesses that testified about sexually assaultive criminal acts. For example,
see R. v. Landry(1935), 64 C.C.C. 104 (N.B.S.C.); R. v. Blondheim (1980), 54 C.C.C
(26) 36.
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With regards to the instances involving male partners physicaily assaulting" their female
partners, the terni "domestic assault" has been used, pnmarily because it is the term used
most frequently in the literature to describe the specialized courts established to deal with
some of the criminal charges that are examined here. It is, as M. Whalen observes,
probably the most popular and widely used phrase to refer to the phenornena, even though
it

obscures the social and gender dimensions of the behaviour." This choice has been

made, in part, to avoid confusion and in full recognition of the statistics fomd and
reported by the Canadian Panel on Violence against Women, specifically that based on
420 in depth interviews conducted with women between the ages of 18 and 64, al1 of the

physical violence reported by the women were perpetrated by their "male intimates.""
This choice has also been made in fiil1 appreciation of the fact that it is tenn that is far

' ' Although other forms of abuse are recognized by the author as significant, they are
outside the purview of this work. The discussions within this work are limited to acts of
physical violence between domestic partners. The tenn "assault" is defrned by section
365 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C.1985 c. C-46 as "A person commits an assault when
(a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other
person, directly or indirectly;
(b) he attempts or threatens, by act or gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has .
or causes that other person to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to
effect his purpose; or
(c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts or
impedes another person or begs."
"M. Whalen, supra note 5 at 18.
" ~ h eCanadian Panel on Violence Against Women, Changing the Landscape: Ending
Violence Achieving Equafity (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993)
mereinafier, The Panel].

from being universally accepted as appropriate or ideal?

Also, the terms "stereotype" or "stereo~pical"and "myths"are used in references and in
some of the analysis sections of this thesis. No attempt has k e n made to interpret
rneaning into the terms used by others. However, if used within the realm of analysis,
these t e m s should be interpreted by their ordinarily defmed meanings. These include:
"n~yth"as "an ill-founded belief held uncritically, especially by an interested group,"and
"stereotype" as "something conforming to a fixed or general pattern, especially a
standardized mental pictue that is held in comrnon by members of a group and that
'~
represents an oversimplified opinion. affective anitude, or uncriticai j ~ d ~ e m e n t . "The
essence intended in the use of these words is to suggest that factuai inferences or
conclusions have not been drawn fiom evidence tendered at a hearing but rather represent
unreasonable conjecture and suspicion, rooted in uncritical judgement.I6 The distinction
between these concepts and those comected to the determination of facts through the
principle of judicial notice are important. This is discussed in chapter four, where it is
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Other alternatives have been selected by scholars writing in the area. For exarnple, M.
Steinman prefers "woman battering" as defined as "violence by men against women
intimates regardless of their marital status of living arrangements."M. Stienman, Wornen
Batrering: Policy Responses ( Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co. and Academy of
Criminal Justice Sciences, 1991). Compare this term with "wife assault" as discussed in
Hilton N., Legal Responses ro Wijé AssauZt Currenf Trends and Evoltrtions (Newbury
Park,California: Sage Publications Inc., 1993). See also M. Whalen, supra note 5 at f 8.
Websters.' New Collegiate Dicfionary, 8th ed., (Toronto: Thomas Allen and Son
Limited, 1980) S. v. "myth" and "stereotype."
l5
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See R. v. Morrissey (1 995),97 C.C.C. (36) 193 (Ont. C.A.) at 209 for a review of legal
inferences.

argued that the principles underlying the doctrine of judicial notice are grounded in
broadly accepted truths as compared to uncriticai judgements.

(C) Thesis Development

As noted earlier, the goal of this project is to assess the effkctiveness of the criminal

justice system's fair and equal treatment of femde witnesses in two very specific
instances: first, the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's therapeutic or counselling
records; and second. the prosecution of domestic assault charges. The purpose of this
thesis is to determine whether the criminal justice system is treating female witnesses.
community and male accused fairly and equally. given the unique features of these two
specific issues. The perspective of this work is that more needs to be done to balance the
competing interests of the parties and witnesses to ensure faimess, equality and access to
justice for al1 interested parties. Specifically, it is suggested here that a contextuai
appreciation of the issues is the key to meaningfùl refonn. The meaning of "context" and
the role it plays in interpreting Iegal poIicy is discussed below in the theory section of this

chapter. Nonetheless, sorne basic explanation is warranted at this point.

R. Devlin describes contextualism in law as "the process of locating phenornena in their
relational afinity to other influentid f~rces."'~For
the purpose of this work contextualism
I7R. Devlin, "The Charter and Anglophone Legal Theory" (1997) 4 Review of
Constitutional Studies 19 at 23 .This article demonstrates that "Charter-driven
jurisprudence has had a significant impact. both quantitatively and qualitatively, on

attempts to identifi the interrelationships between social variables and how one
cornponent connects to another within the realm of the law. J. Stubbs recognized this
position as she contemplated some of the modem legal responses to the issue of violence
against women. She wrote:
Wornen's lives are complex, multi-dimensional and inter-connected with others.
Any singular measure of the outcome and the resort to the law to deal with
violence risks misrepresenting this cornplexity, and misunderstanding the context
in which the law is involved."
This thesis contrasts the competing interests of a maie accused person with female

victims of violent crime and then locates these issues within their relational 1in.k to other
influences within our society. Likewise, with regards to the phenornena of domestic
assault. both the conventional responses and the two recent criminal justice initiatives

created to improve the problem are examined fiom their position within the criminal
justice system as well as a nurnber of other relational forces. For example, the possible
causes and consequences of this form of physical violence are discussed so that the
effectiveness of the new initiatives can be appreciated within the broader comected
societal influences. The desired outcome of this approach is meaninglùl and effective
reforms.

Anglophone Canadian legal scholarship." (at 78). See also S. Sugunasiri,
"Contextualism: The Supreme Court's New Standard of Judicial Analysis and
Accountability" (August 1998) [unpublished, available at Dalhousie University, Halifax
Nova Scotia].
"J. Stubbs, "'Cornmunitarian' Conferencing and Violence Against Wornen: A Cautionary
Note" in M. Vaiverde et al, eds., Wijie Assault and the Canadian Criminal Jusfice System:
Issues and Policies (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1 995) at 265.
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To begin to fully appreciate the parties' interests in a broader context, one f m t needs to

examine the adversarial process and the general nature of the adjudication procedure of
the criminal justice system. To start, the basic function of a contested law suit should be

considered. Hart and McNaughton describe such a social formal dispute resolution
mechanism as "society's last line of defense in the indispensable effort to secure the
peacefùl settlement of social conflict~."'~
Clearly, it is generally accepted that a certain
and organized manner of dispute settlement is required to allow for a functioning society.

This is so not only for the specific parties involved in the conflict but also for al1
members of a comrnunity so that they c m work, live and function in an organized,
predictable and safe manner on a daily basis. A critical component of this dispute
settlement system is public confidence, without which people would attempt to resolve
conflicts themselves, which would lead to unpredictability, injustices and perhaps social
chaos. Two significant ingredients in public confidence are impartiality and fairness in
the process of resolution. Regarding these ingredients Hart and McNaughton concluded:

In judging the law's handling of its task of fact-finding in this setting, it is
necessary always to bear in muid that this is a last-ditch process in which
something more is at stake than the truth oniy of the specific matter in
contest. There is at stake also that confidence of the public generally in the
irnpartiality and faimess of public settlement of disputes which is essential
if the ditch is to be held and the settlements accepted peaceably [emphasis
theirs].'O
l9 Hart and McNaughton, Evidence and lnference in the Law, D. Lemer ed., S. Schiff,
Evidence in the Litigution Process, 3rd ed., (Toronto: The Carswell Company Limited,
1988) vol. 1 at 9.
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Obviously, this social system is not perfect. Nor does the public confidence demand it to
be. Still, it is important that court is correct in its finding of facts. It is also important that

the court makes its determinations of issues based on the evidence presented by the
parties and through the application of legal principles. However, complete certainty in
this process is both "impracticable and undesirable.""

The unique feature of the conflicts that *se between individuals within the sphere o f
criminal conduct is the role of the state. First principles describe a system that codifies
certain harmfül conduct. If a member of our cornmunity conducts him or herself in a way
that contravenes the Criminal Code" then the state first becomes involved in the
investigative stage of the fact finding inquiry. The police, having received certain
information fiom either a complainant or a third Party, attempt to gather evidence in an
effort to deterrnine if the conduct brought to their attention, or obsewed directly, breached
the codified law. If the police make a determination that they have reasonable grounds to
believe a criminal act has occurred, they may lay an information on behalf of the state
indicating that breach. Once this is done, any individual(s) specifically harmed by the
conduct in question, now forfeit(s) control over the transgression to the "litigant party,"
narnely the state. However, the complainant still retains the right to pursue legal remedies
as a direct litigant in the civil justice system. These avenues are beyond the scope of this

thesis. Within the criminal justice system the state's interests are, in theory, those of the

"lbid. at 9.

"Criminal Code, R.S.,c. C-46.
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comrnunity. The harmed individual or victim is considered a member of that cornmunity,
but not a direct litigant. The harmed individual's interests are represented by the Crown
Attorney and protected by the court. The discretion to proceed or not, and in what
fashion, is lefi to the Crown Attorney, acting as an agent for the provincial Attorney
General, whose authority in principle can be traced to the British Sovereign, her Majesty
the Queen." In theory, the accused person is now prosecuted on behalf of the -te.

because the conduct alleged to have taken place, at least potentially, effects the entire
cornmunity. The individuals specifically harmed now become Crown witnesses and, as
indicated above. are no longer direct parties to the proceeding.

The other litigant in this criminal process is the person charged with the criminai offence.
The fundamental tenet of our criminal justice system is that they are presumed innocent
until the Crown has met its onus of proving each essential element of the offence(s)

charged beyond a reasonable doubt. He or she is also entitled to due process and a
number of procedural satèguards that reduce the possibility of a wrongfül conviction.

The conventional method of establishing this proof within these safeguards is called the
criminal process and has been described by H. Packer as a:
compendious term that stands for al1 the complexes of activity that operate to
bring the substantive law of crime to bear (or keep it fiom coming to bear) on
persons who are suspected of having comrnitted crimes. It can be described, but
"For a M e r review of Crown discretion see B. Archibald, "The Politics of
Prosecutorial Discretion: Institutional Structures and the Tension between Punitive and
Restorative Justice" (1998) 3 Can. Crim. L.R. 69.

only partiaily and inadequately, by referring to the d e s of law that govem the
apprehension, screening and triai of persons suspected of crime."

To examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal process H. Packer created two
models; the "Due Process Model" and the "Crime Control Model." He explained the
purpose of the two models:

The nvo models merely afEord a convenient way to taik about the operation of a
process whose day-to-day functioning involves a constant series of minute
adjustrnents between the competing demands of two value systems and whose
normative fûture likewise involves a series of resolutions of the tension between
competing claim~.'~
The Canadian criminal justice system is premised on the phiIosophy of the due process
model. To appreciate the purpose of o w system both models need to be explored.

At the core of the crime control model is the pnmary hnction to be performed by the

criminal process. specifically the repression of criminal behaviour. The failure of a
criminal justice system that is unable to enforce cnrninal Iaws and decrease, if not
prevent. criminal conduct is that society will develop a general disregard for the
restrictions on their conduct as established in Iaws. As a result, the crime control model
has as it's primary focus the eficiency with which the criminal process works to

investigate, determine guilt and properly sentence persons that have been convicted of
criminal conduct. H. Packer suggests that an extension of this is a de facto "presurnption

"H. Packer, The Limifs of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1968) at 149. This work explores the shortcomings and imperfections of the criminai
process as a means of social control. As well, the relationship between the cnminai
process and the substance of the criminal Law is explored.

of guilt" that operates against accused persons who are not screened out of the
investigative stage of the pro ces^.'^

On the other hand, the due process model rejects the phiiosophy that investigators and
prosecutors are well suited to accurately establish the facts of the alleged criminal
conduct. Rather, an adjudicative fact-fmding process is preferred that incorporates the

possibiIity of error. Therefore, equally important goals of this process are the protection
of the "factuaily innocent" and the conviction of only the "factually guilty."" These goals

are balanced by factual determinations within a procedure that safeguards the integrity of
the process, including the nght to Iegd counsel and the exclusion of reliable but illegally
obtained evidence." At it's core is the presumption of innocence.

Another important distinction between the two models are their respective vaiidating
power sources. H. Packer surnmarized the differences:

Because the Crime Control Model is basically an affirmative model, emphasizing
at every turn the existence and exercise of official power, its validating authonty

is ultimately legislative (aithough proximately administrative). Because the Due
Process Model is basically a negative model, asserting limits on the nature of
official power and on the modes of its exercise, its validating authority is judicial

"See the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, sections 10(b) and 24(2). See also R. v. Oakes
(1 986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.); afirming (1983) 2 C.C.C. (3d) 339 (Ont. C.A.)
regarding the limitations on the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Charter. The
significance of due process and other procedural safeguards is also examined.
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and requires an appeai to supra-legislative law, to the law of the Con~titution.'~

Therefore, when we examine the Canadian criminal justice system we find the person
entrusted to assess the many trial issues, including the protections of due process, the
determination of facts, guilt or innocence, in a fair equal and impartiai manner is a judge.
In some cases these responsibilities are separated, with the fact finding responsibilities

being delegated to a jury." The jury is created frorn members of the comrnunity in which
the offences are dleged to have transpired in." Except for the application of certain legal
doctrines, such as judicial notice, al1 of these detenninations are made on the formal
presentation of evidence by the parties to the litigation to the judge, who is not an expert
to the specific issues in dispute. Hart and McNaughton point out imperfections in such a

sy stem, particutarly that:

No doubt the rnethod of forma1 presentation of evidence before an
impartial but uninformed tribunal, subject to the rules which such a
presentation seems to require, will not always prove to be the best method
of ascertaining the truth about past happenings. The law makes no
assumption that it will. It deliberately sacrifices some aids to the
ascertainment of the tmth which might be usefùl in particular cases in
order, partly, to serve what are deemed to be more nearly ultimate social
values. It is an important question whether these sacrifices are justified whether, granting the possibilities of improvement in peripheral matters of
detail, the main outlines in the law's approach to the task of determining

Packer, supra note 24 at 173.

2 9 ~ .

'OCriminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Part XIV s.471.

"lbid. S. 626. Each provincial jurisdiction outlines the qualifications of potential jurors,
see for example Jwies Acr, R.S.O. 1990, c. 5.3.

questions of this kind are not entitied to general a~ceptance.~'

Relating this somewhat simplified ovewiew of the basic goais and interests back to our
specific issues, this thesis will review and analyze in chapter two how the courts and
legislative branch of governinent have attempted to reconcile the opposing interests of the
accused person right to fidl answer and defence and the rights of the cornplainant to
privacy and equality before the law, related to the specific issue of the disclosure of the
complainant's therapeutic or counselling records. In chapter three, this project will
examine the conventional approach to the prosecution of domestic assault charges and in

doing so point out the many unsatisfactory fiailties comected to this process. The
conventional criminal justice response to these type of offences is then compared to the
goals and processes of the restorative justice paradigm. The distinctions between the two

processes are examined to ascertain if a community based restorative system is better
equipped to resolve these conflicted domestic relationships. Following this,
improvements are postulated that stress the need to contextualize these issues to advance
increasingly fair and equal treatment and access to justice for both the community and the
victims of both sexual and domestic assaults.

(D) Scope of the Problem
1. The Numbers

To commence this section it must be noted that it is more than a mere CO-incidencethe

''HM

and McNaughton. supra note 19 at 10.

failings within the criminal justice system related to the disclosure of a sexual assault
complainant's records and to domestic assaults, are anchored around a gender component.
Sesual violence, other than those incidents involving children, almost always involves a
femaIe cornplainant and a male accused. The Canadian Panel on Violence Against
wornen3' reported the following statistics related to the sexual abuse of fernales under the
age of 16:

* More than one half (54 percent) of the women had experienced some
form of unwanted or intrusive sexud experience before reaching the age of
16.
*24 percent of the cases of sexual abuse were at the level of forced sexual
intercourse.
* 17 percent of women reported at l e s t one experience of incest before the
age of 16.
* 34 percent of women had been sexually abused by a non-relative before
age 16.
* 43 percent of women reported at least one experience of incest and/or
extra familial sexual abuse before the age of 16.
* 96 percent of perpetrators of child sexuai abuse were men."
Regarding the sexual abuse of females over the age of 16, The Panel reported the

f o l l o ~ l n gstatistics:

* 5 1 percent of women have been the victim of rape or attempted rape,
* 40 percent of women reported at l e s t one experience of attempted rape.
* Using the Canadian Criminal Code definition of sexual assault (this
includes sexual touching): two out of three women, have experienced what
is legaily recognized to be sexual assault.
8 1 percent of sexual assault cases at the level of rape or attempted rape
+

The Panel, supra note 13. In the absence of nationally maintained statistics on the
scope of the violence suffered by femdes in Our society, The Panel partially b d e d a
community based study in Toronto, Ontario. In the study 420 women were selected at
random. On a one-to-one basis, in-depth interviews were conducted by trained
interviewers. The results of these interviews were tabulated as set out above.
'j

reported by women were perpetrated by men who were known to the
w~rnen.~~
Similady, incidents of domestic assaults brought to the attention of investigative agencies
almost always involve allegations of a male partner physically abusing his female partner.
The Panel found the following disturbing statistics related to îhe issue of incidents of
physical assault in intimate relationships:

* 27 percent of women have experienced a physical assault in an intimate
relationship.
* In 25 percent of the cases, women who were physically assaulted
reported the their partners explicitly threatened to kill them.
* In 36 percent of the cases, women reporting physical assault also
reported that they feared they would be killed by their male intimate.
* 50 percent of the women reporthg physical assault also experienced
sexual assault in the context of the sarne relationship
All of the physical assaults on women were perpetrated by male
+

intima te^.^^
These numbers provide us with some insight as to the scope of the victimization of
women in our society. Still, it is but one study that has limited application to an
assessrnent of the national picture. One national survey that did definitively address the

j51bid.at 9.Note "sexual assault" is not a defined term within the Criminal Code,
although section 27 1 creates the offence and provides for punishments. "Sexual assault"
is an assault as defined in section 265 of the Criminal Code committed in circumstances
of a sexual nature. The test to be applied by a judge or jury to determine if the conduct in
question is of a sexual nature is objective. The entire set of circurnstances must be
considered to make a determination of conduct amounting to a sexuai assault. The intent
or purpose and motive of the accused are factors that should be considered to deterrnine
whether or not the conduct in question is of a sexual nature. R. v. Chase (1 987),64
C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Moreau (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 359 (Ont. CA.); R.
v. Cook (1 98S), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 18 (B.C.C.A). Section 15 1 of the Criminal Code does set
out the conduct included in the offence of "sexual interference," specifically as "every
person, who for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with apart of the body or
with an object, any part of the body of a person under the age of fourteen years."
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most estreme form of violence was the Homicide Survey." It revealed that in 1991. 270
women in Canada were murdered. Investigative agencies reported that of this number,
225 were classified as solved. From this categorized number, it was determined that 210
of the women were killed by men and 121 were killed by their intimate partnen.

The other significant Canadian study that attempted to determine the prevalence of
violence suffered by women on a national basis was Statistics Canada's Violence Against
Women Survey conducted in 1993." The purpose of this s w e y was to elicit information
on the full range violence, both sexual and physical assault abuses, that women
cxperience in al1 types of relationships. R. Gartner and R. Macmillan explained the
process used in the survey:
Women reporting incidents of victimization were asked a series of detailed
questions about the characteristics of the incident. the effects of the
victimization on them. and the actions they took as a consequence of their
\rictimi~ation.'~

"Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, The Homicide Survey. 1991 (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada. 1993). These numbers c m be compared to the 1988 rates wherein 65% of the
homicides victirns were men and 35% were women. A total nurnber of 70 women were
killed by their husbands. See "Homicide" in Canadian Social Trends Vol. 2, (Toronto:
Thompson Educational Publishing Inc., 1994) at 4 19-420.
" ~ h esurvey took place between February and June 1993; see K. Rodgers, iWife Assault
in Canada" Canadian Social Trends (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1994) at 3, and K.
Rodgers, "Wife Assault: The Findings of a National Survey," Juristat. March 1994, Vol.
14, No. 9 Cat. 85-002, as cited in the Final Report. From Rhetoric to Reality Ending
Domestic Violence in Nova Scotia, Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia February
1995.
39R.Gartner and R. Macmillan, "The Effect of Victim - Offender Relationship on
Reporting Crimes of Violence Against Women," (1 995) 37 Canadian Journal of
Criminology Volume 393 at 40 1.

The survey found that:
Violence against women by their spouses is widespread in Canada
According to the 1993 Violence Against Women Survey, 29% of the
women or 2.7 million who had ever been married or lived in a cornmon
law had been physically or sexually assaulted by their partner at some
point in the relationship. Such assaults included only incidents where the
violent partner could be charged under the Canada's Criminal code. Of
women who had been abused by their spouse, 3 12,000 had experienced the
violence in the year before the ~urvey.'~
The survey revealed that 25% of the women were victimized by strangers and the
remaining 43% were victimized by boyfriends. dates, relatives or other men known to the
victirns. The form of the violence was divided equally between sexual assaults, sexual
touching and physical assaults."

The most recent statistics on domestic violence in Canada reveal that little has changed
since these studies were published. In a statistical profile released on June 11, 1999 by
Stats Canada, it was reported that:

According to police-reported data, women were more likely to be victimized by a
spouse, either married or cornmon law, then were men. About 3 1% of al1 females
victims of violence in 1997 were attacked by a spouse, compared with only 4% of
al1 male victims of violence. As a result, 88% of spousal assault victims were
women."'

'O

Final Report, supra at note 38 at 2.

"' R. Gartner and R. Macmillan, supra note 39 at 405.
'"1. Kulik, "Family Violence: A Statistical Profile 1997," Stats Canada Daily, June 1 1,
1999, avaiIable at Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics.

As explained in Chapter Three, we are also aware that violence which occurs within
domestic relationship bas nwnerous possible causes and consequences, including an
increasingiy violent cycle of abuse. This, coupled with the ciramatic under-reporting that
is associated with this forrn of criminal behaviour, helps create an alarming pictwe.

The Panel reported a concern for the nurnber of incidents of violence that are brought to
the attention of the authorities. Without refemng to any specific studies the report

concluded:
Despite a wealth of research in the area, we have only educated estimates
of the prevalence of violence against women in Canada today. No matter
what methodology is used, the figures are consistently alarming and most
researchen point out, underestimate the incidence of vi~lence.~'
This is a complicated and multi-dimensional problem. To begin to understand these
complexities. the reasons that attempt to explain the phenornena must explored. One
study attempted to examine the factors that affect under-reporting. Rosemary Gartner and

Ross Macmillan studied the significance of the parties relationship on the reporting of
violent crimes against w ~ r n e nBased
. ~ on the data from the 1993 Canadian Violence
Against Women Survey they found that al1 forms of violence perpetrated against women

"'The Panel, supra note 13 at 8.

"4R.Gartner and R. Macmillan, "The Effect of Victim - Offender Relationship on
Reporting Crimes of Violence Against Women" (1 995) 37 Canadian Journal of
Crirninology 393. See also C. Bumis and P. Jaffe, "Wife Abuse as a Crime: The Impact of
Police Laying Charges" (1983) 25 Canadian Journal of Criminology 309.

were under-reported with only 15% of incidents brought to the attention of the
authorities" and that "violence by known offenders is much less Iikely to come to the
attention of the authorities than is violence by strangerdA6This position was explained
by the nature of the questions asked by the survey. Specifically, the researchers

highlighted that respondents were asked about their victimization and not about a
particular incident. They noted that, as revealed in the survey, 63% of the women reported
that they had been victimized more than once and 30% reported that they had been

victimized four or more times.'" These numbers lead to the conclusion that the estimates
of under-reporting could be significantly more substantial. For example. the researchers
esamined the survey's estimate of 23.7% of the women whose victimization ever
becomes known to the authorities. Regarding this percentage. they noted:
It does not tell us the percentage of incidents of spousal violence that
police learned about, because some woman are victimized many tirnes by
their spouses. If we assume that on average each victim of spousal
violence was victimized five times, the percentage of spousal incidents
reported to the police could be as low as 5%, or less than the percentage
for any other victim-offender relati~nship.'~

The explanations for this under-reporting are numerous. They include the victims fear of

"Ibid. at 406. Note that estimate of 5 times was acknowledged by the researchers as a
crude estimate based on data fiom the survey. They were also able to determine fiom the
survey that only 7% of the women reported only one incident and contacted the police
(see notes1 1 and 12 at 424 and tables 1 and 2 at 405 and 407 respectively).

reprisal fiom the male batterer, feelings of shame and degradation, feelings of
responsibility and low self esteem, a sincere hope that the male's behaviour can and will
be changed' the economic factors that make the victims feel trapped in the relationship
and they worry that they will not be believed."'

A sociological explmation was proffered by D. Black. It was his view that because of the

nature of ongoing relationships between people they are less likely to get the police
involved. This was theorized because of the continued need for interaction and intimacy
between the parties as well as the availability of less expensive and less formal options.
These options included extended familiai groups. These same restrictive principles
obviously do not apply to strangers and thus explains why stranger - victim offences are
more likely to be reported to the a~thorities.'~

A ferninist Framework analysis of the under-reporting disagrees with the sociological

presumption "bat the behaviour of law can be studied apart from the motivations or
interests of individuals and without reference to the purpose, value, or impact of law.
Feminist perspectives are aiso at odds with what are seen as de-gendered and de-

" ~ h ePanel. supra note 13 at 8.

'OD.Black, The Behuviour of L m (New York: Academic Press, 1976); and D.Black,
"Social Control as a Dependent Variable" in D. Black ed., Toward a General Theory of
Social Confrol(New York: Academic Press, 1984) as cited in R. Gartner and R.
Macmillan, supra note 44.
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contextualized rational choice models of victim decision making."" Thus, feminist theory
would explain the likelihood of decreased reporting in intimate relationships for two
reasons. The first is that victims of domestic violence are less likely to perceive the
assaultive behaviour as criminal conduct. This recognition results from a specific male
dominated construction of knowledge about intimate relations and a more general male
dominated construction of reality."

From these constmctions it is postulated: that both men and women perceive domestic
violence as less serious than stranger violence; that domestic relationships are private and
intimate by nature' so to brhg the violent abuse to the attention of the authorities would
result in smbarrassment, sharne and a termination of the relationship." As well. if a
woman was to consider contacting the police and thereby making the incident a public
matter. a second process discourages this option for help. R. Gartner and R. Macmillan
suggest other life expenences are considered and a conclusion is reached about the costs
of such public action. Regarding this rationale these two researchers proposed:
These costs and benefits reflect gender differences in power, not simply
inevitable and gender-neutral costs of resorting to the law. Feminist
analysts argue that women choose not to cal1 the police because they know
(from their own life experiences) that they may not be taken seriously. may
be blamed for their victimization, may incur the wath of their victimizer,
farnily, or friends, may not be able to control the legal process once it

5'R. Gartner and R. Macmillan, supra note 44 at 397.

"Ibid. at 397. See also C. MacKimon, "Feminist, Marxism, Method and State: Toward a
Feminist Jurisprudence, " 1983, 8 Journal of Women in Culture and Society at 635 - 658.

decides to treat the incident as a "real crime," may lose their home and
children, and, ultimately, may not be protected fiom fùrther violence."
Therefore, aithough the two theories differ in their supporting rationalet they both predict
the sarne outcorne, specificaily that female victims of violence incurred in an intimate

relationship are less likely to become involved in the criminal justice system than other
female victims of stranger violence.

More importantly, through this review of potentiai explanations, a need for a contextual
appreciation of the interrelationship of the variables that have been Iinked to the underreporting of domestic assaults is highlighted. Efforts have been made in this work to
depict components of the crirninal justice system that continue to create hurdles for

Lvomen who wish to turn to the justice system for a fair and just dispute resolution but fail
to do so for a nurnber of reasons. Regardless of these reasons, it is argued in this thesis
that a refusal by physically abused women to access the criminal justice system is an
indication cf its M u r e to adequately respond to the unique problems of domestic assault
victim. It is postulated that access not exercised for systemic reasons is access denied.
Furthemore, denied access to justice is a primary example of a gender based inequality.
These issues are exarnined in both chapters three and four of this thesis.
"lbid. at 398. See also R.E. Dobash and R.P.Dobash, Wornan Violence and Social
Change (London: Routledge, 1992); J. Hanmer, J. Radford, and E. Stanko, Women,
Policing and Male Violence ( London: Routledge, 1992); P. Pincard, The Omitted
Reality: Husband - Wife Violence in Ontario and Policy Implications for Education
(Maple, Ontario: Learners Press, 1982); L. Rouse, R. Breen, and M. Howel, "Abuse in
Intimate Relationships: A Cornparison of Married and Dating College Students," 1988. 3
Journal of Interpersonal Violence at 414 - 429. Al1 as cited in R. Gartner and R.
Macmillan, supra note 44.

(E) Theory

As outlined above, this thesis examines the criminal justice system's treatment of fernale
witnesses as they corne before the courts as complainants of h m caused to them by the
alleged criminal conduct of another party. What is it about the gender of sexual assault
and domestic assault complainants/witnesses that comects them to an unequd access to
justice? Perhaps it has less to do with any particular thing about these individuals that
warrants careful review, but rather it has more to do with how the criminal justice

system's rules of law and court processes consider the situations that bnngs them to court
in the first place. It is the hypothesis of this project that a component of the problem is

that the courts have failed to adequately consider the legal issues set out above within
their proper context. That equal treatment of these witnesses and their demands for

criminal justice requires the courts to contextuaiize their issues, and not necessarily
exclusively within an envelope of gender, but also within broader social, psychological
and economic contexts.

For exarnpte, with regards to the rights of privacy that al1 members of our community
have to their counselling a d o r therapeutic records, the courts have failed to give
sufficient weight to the affect that an intrusion into a complainant's therapeutic records
has on both the witness as well as society as a whole. More specificdly, the potential
harm which flows fiom such an intrusion to the individuals directly involved and to the

public generally must be considered. There is a chiIling effect connected with such

invasions of privacy, in addition to a decreased effectiveness of o u . criminal justice
system's ability to determine facts and, if appropriate, deter those criminally responsible
from harming again. To improve women's access to justice and equality these matters
must be addressed. Moreover, the reforms required to improve this situation will warrant

a contextual appreciation of al1 the issues, before the courts can effectively embark on a
balancing process to give effect to the irreconcilable rights of the accused to full ansver
and defence and the complainant's right to privacy. More importantly. once the potential

harms are at least addressed, it will be postulated that there is no room for the

considerations of stereotypical myths and beliefs as relevant factors when determining
whether or not records should be opened, reviewed and then disclosed to the very
individud(s) alleged to have caused the harm that created the need for counselling in the
first place.

Similarly. with regards to occurrences of domestic assault, the criminal justice systern
needs to contextualize the complicated nature of the problem so that a witness's
recantation of a complaint can be considered in the most complete light as is possible.
This will allow for an extension of the t'undamentals created in the case law that have
adopted a more principIed approach in the assessing of the relevance and admissibility of
reliable and necessary evidence that was once described as inadmissible hearsay by our
courts. Or, in the alternative, if one believes that the forcing of the trial process against

the wishes of the complainant may be inappropriate in some instances, then o w cnminal
justice system needs to create other options. The alternatives provided for within a
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community based restorative justice scheme are examined in chapter four. It is argued
here that drarnatic improvements are warranted, such as the educating and counselling of
the parties to ensure the abuse, oppression and violence against al1 women cornes to an
end.

It is stressed that the one underlying theme in the conventional response of the crimulai

justice system to these two problems is a failure to contexnialize the unique issues that
affect female victims of violent crime within their broader social realities. But what is
meant by the term contextualize? As well, if it is argued that any meaningful reforms
implemented must be cognizant of these matters and account for the interrelationships of
the factors that create the problems identified, how then does one place the issues within
their proper context?

The Canadian courts have, in the past, relied on the notion o f context in their attempts to
interpret legai policy, particularly in their efforts to set constitutional legal principles. For
example. in R. v. Big M Drug Marr" the corporate respondent tested the constitutional
validity of the Lord's Day Act? The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislation in
question did infringe upon the respondent's section 2 (a) Charter right, the guarantee of
the fieedom of conscience and religion. In its determination of the issue, the majority of
the Court. considered the broad legislative history of the law, the language used to

55(1985).18 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).

56R.S.C.1970, C. L-13.
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articulate the right, other international jurisdictions treatrnent of the matter, and attempted
to reveai the law's purpose and efTect." Dickson J., writing for the majority, declared that
purpose of the legislation could only be ascertained by examining "the character and the
larger objects of the Charter itself." Moreover, with regards to the Charter itself he

emphasized that it was not enacted in a "vacuum" and as such it must be placed "in its
proper linguistic, philosophical and histoncai c o n t e ~ t s . "This
~ ~ analysis established a test

that wouid require courts interpreting statutes to contemplate the particular law in
question within a broad context, that would, over time, push judges beyond an abstract
approach to determining legislative meaning.

This principle was advanced fUrther in the case of Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney
General).59 In this case the Supreme Court of Canada held that section 3O(1) of the
hdicatrtre ~ c t . " that limited the rnatters that could be published about court proceedings

involving matrimonial disputes and civil proceeding pre-trials generally, contravened the
publisher's freedom of the press. The Court went on to hold that such a lirnit was an
unreasonable one under section 1 of the Charter- Wilson J., concumng with the majority,
noted that there were two possible approaches that could be taken to ascertain the

Charter's application to a challenged piece of legislation; the "abstract approach" or the

57R.V. Big M Drlrg Mart Lfd,supra note 55 at 403 to 4 17.
58?bid.
at 424.
"(1 989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577.

60R.S.A. 1980, C.J- 1.

-*contextuala p p r ~ a c h . ' ~For
' either test the anaiytical strategy was the same; a court
would be required to identiQ the "underlying value which the right alleged to be violated
was designed to be protected.'"'

Also, both approaches mandated that an interpreting

court had to establish the legislative purpose of the irnpugned law. Praising the values of
the contextual approach Wilson J. wrote:

One virtue of the contextual approach, it seems to me, is that it recognizes that a
particular right or fieedom may have a different value depending on the context. It
may be, for example, that the tieedom of expression has greater value in a
political context than it does in the context of disclosure of the details of a
matrimonial dispute. The contextual approach attempts to bnng into sharp relief
the aspect of the right or fieedom which is truiy at stake in the case as well as the
relevant aspects of any values in cornpetition with it. It seems to be more sensitive
to the reality of the dilemma posed by the particular facts and therefore more
conducive to finding a fair and just compromise between the two competing
values under section one.63

Since its advent into the Canadian courts judicial process," scholars have theorized about
contextualism and its role in the promotion of women's equality. For example, C. Boyle
lias urged judges and lawyers to adopt a more contextual approach to better familiarize

themselves with the situations and experiences of women so that laws can be formulated

6'lbidat 58 1 . Wilson J. identifiers the approach taken by Cory J., Dickson C.J-C. and
Lamer J. concurring, as an abstract analysis of the issues.

"lbid. at 584. The values in conflict in this case were the right of the public to an open
court process and the freedom of the press to publish what transpires in those courts and
the rights of the litigants to the protection of their privacy in matrimonial cases.
64

For an excellent review of the Canadian's courts use of contextualism see S. Sugunasiri
"Contextualism: The Supreme Court's New Standard of Judicial Anaiysis and
Accountability" [unpublished] Dalhousie University, Halifax Nova Scotia, August, 1998.

in a manner that more accurately reflects the conditions of women in a violent ~ociety.~'
On the topic of a feminist approach to criminal defences, specifically regarding expert
evidence, she speaks of the need for courts to "make themselves familiar with the
individual situation, the societal context, and with perspectives that challenge their own
intuitive view of the fa~ts.'*~
Similarly, on her analysis of the "imminent attack" doctrine
connected with the principle of self defence within the reaim of domestic violence she
urges a contexnial understanding of the broader issues, writing that:
A feminist analysis in contrast would encourage the asking of the Whynok'
non-questions in an attempt to understand the redistic choices faced by a
women in such a situation, before a decision was made about criminal
responsibility. This relates to the method by which that [sic] dificult
questions should be approached. When a feminist analysis is used, it is
possible to see as relevant things that we know about the experiences of
battered women, the responses of the police, the comparative sizes and

"Boyle. C.. "A Feminist Approach to Criminal Defences" as cited in R. Devlin, ed.
Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications
Ltd.. 1991).

6iR. V . Whynot (1983) 9 C.C.C. (3d) 449. Jane (Whynot) Stafford killed her husband
while he was asleep in his truck. She was charged with murder. Pnor to this act, the
deceased had made a number of threats to Stafford. At the trial evidence was called to
support the position that he had been a very violent man and was capable of canying out
his threats to kill Stafford's fmily if she ever lefi him. The trial judge left with the jury
the option of self defence. She was acquitted. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
overturned the acquittai, holding that at the time of the killing there was no imminent
danger of attack and therefore self defence should not have been left with the jury. At the
second trial Stafford pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 6 months in
custody. In R. v. Lavallee 119901 1 S.C.R.852, the Supreme Court of Canada specifically
disapproved the imminent attack requirement. The Court allowed expert testimony to be
considered to determine the reasonableness of a "battered wife's" belief that the only way
to Save her own life was to kill her batterer. The expert evidence was determined to be
relevant, although not determinative of the issue reasonableness relating to an accused's
self defence perceptions and actions.

strengths of men and women, and the redistic economic choices of women
[ernphasis h e r ~ ] . ~ '
It is submitted here that the same concepts that C. Boyle writes about in ternis of self

defence can be applied to some of the issues associated with female prosecution
witnesses who come before the courts alleging they have been violently victimized by
their male partners. For example, it is argued that the entire abusive experience should be
considered by the court in determining issues of reliability if, at the time of the trial, the

witness recants her earlier recollections of the orïginally alleged domestic violence. An
appreciation of the entire abusive experience will require the criminal justice system to
Iocate the violence and its effects in its relational affinity to a number of different possible
causes and consequences.

In a similar vein, M. Eberts promotes the need to establish a female perspective within

trial advocacy. She describes it as '?he work of putting before the courts the facts of
women's [ives as women see them.'*9 This process of contextualization to support
equality encourages exposing in the legal system "unseen maleness, and attempt to
deconstmct it, in order to make room for the view points, the concerns and the
experiences of ~ o r n e n . " ' To
~ m e r her position she reviews a passage fiom R. v.

"M. Eberts, "New Facts for Old: Observations on the Judicial Process" in R. Devlin, ed.,

Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications
Ltd., 1991) at 469.

Even women lawyers who believe in women's equality c m be
caught up in the affinnation of the male vision of the world. As
Madame Justice Wilson points out in R v. Morgentaler. the more
recent struggle for women's rights has k e n a struggle to eliminate
discrimination, to achieve a place in a man's world, to develop a
set of legislative reforms in order to place wornen in the same
position as men. It has not, she points out, been a struggle to define
the rights of women in relation to their speciai place in the social
structure and in relation to the biological distinction between the
hvo sexes. The contemporary move, by contrast is to translate
'women's needs and aspirations' into protected rights and assert
'her dignity and worth as a hurnan beingTZ
It is her position that a modem liberal notion of equality, particularly that al1 individuals

should simply be treated the same, does not promote tme fairness and irnpartiality. As
such. she proposes that as judges and lawyers attempt to create an "official version of
reality" they should do so without submerging the redities of women's lives into
stereotypes and uniquely male perspective^.^ Building on this perspective. it is argued
here that. in instances of applications for the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's

therapeutic or counselling records the courts need to fully and contextually appreciate the
broader societal and the gender specific issues interconnected with the legal issues placed
before them. For example, the courts must not only consider the amount of individual
h m caused to the complainant whose private counselling record are opened. but they

must also consider the chilling effect that such invasions will have on other victims of

'IR. v. A4orgentaIer, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
"M. Ebens, szipra note 69 at 469.

"lbid. at 473 and 490.
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sexual violence willingness to corne forward to the criminal justice system with their
complaints.

Support for this theory can be found in Canadian jurisprudence assessing equality rights
as established in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.'' In
Andrews v. The Law Society of British Columbiaïsconsidered the constitutionality of

section 42 of the Barrisrers and Solicitors ~ c t that
' ~ imposed a citizenship requirement
for admission into the legal profession. Andrews was a permanent resident in Canada and
met ail the other requirements needed to practice law. Being prevented fiom practicing
law by the citizenship requirement, he challenged the law arguing it violated his
guaranteed right to equality. The Court agreed and held the rule that barred an entire class

t

of persons, specifically non-citizens, fiom certain forms of employment violated section
15 of the Charter. In their determination of the issue as to whether or not a member of the

public fell within a group of persons enwnerated in section 15, the Court established a
two-fold test. Courts would be required to consider both the law subject to the challenge.

and the place of the group within the social, political and legal fabric of society
challenging the law. In other words the Court was concerned with the application of the

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982. being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 1 1 Fereinafter "Charter"].

"

7 5 ~ n d r e wv.s Law Socieîy ofBritish Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4'h) 1 (S.C.C.).
76

R.S.B.C. 1979, C. 26, s.42.

la^.^ Wilson I.. wrote for the majonty in it's final determination of the issues, but agreed
with Mclntyre J.'s position as to the way that section 15 of the Charter should be
interpreted and applied." On the issue of equality McIntyre J. wrote:
It is a comparative concept, the condition of which may only be
attained or discerned by comparison with the condition of others in
the social and political setting in which the question arises. It must
be recognized at once. however, that every difference in treatment
between individuals under the law will not necessarily result in
inequality and, as well, that identicai treatment rnay frequently
produce serious inequalitym

Furthemore. he rejected the classic modem liberal notion of equdity, that al1 people
should be treated the sarne. stating that:
It is. of course obvious that legislatures may - and to govern
effectively - must treat individuals and groups in different ways.
Indeed, such distinctions are one of the main preoccupations of
legislatures. The classifiing of individuals and groups, the making
of different mies regdations, requirements and qudifications to
different persons is necessary for the govemance of modern
society. As noted above, for the accommodation of differences,
which is the essence of tme equality, it will fiequently be necessary
to make distinction^.^^
Approximately three months later, the Supreme Court of Canada was able to revisit the
interpretation of section 15 of the Charter. In R. v. Turpin.'' Sharon Turpin and two other
-

-

- -

771bid.at 10.

781bid.at 3 1.
791bid.at 10.
"Ibid. at 1 3 .

'IR. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.

individuals were charged with first degree murder in the province of Ontario. The
sections of the Criminai Code" that required the accused to be tried by a judge and jury,
were challenged as unconstitutional, in part because the province of Aiberta allowed for a
j udge alone trial in similar circumstances. The trial judge allowed the application, and the

trial was conducted before a judge alone. Turpin was acquitted and the other two coaccused were convicted of second degree murder. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that
the trial judge conducted the trial without jurisdiction and set aside ail three verdicts and
ordered a new trial for al1 three parties. The Supreme Cowt dismissed the appeai, holding
that the accused were denied equality before the law as they were treated more harshly
than those individuals charged with the same offences in Alberta. However, the Court
went on to proclaim, such a distinction was not discriminatory in its purpose o r effect
and. therefore. the legislation that rnandated a trial by judge and jury did not violate an

accused's rights as guaranteed by section 15 of the Chi~ter.~'
On the issue of context and
the notion of equality. Wilson J., wrïting for the Court stated:
If the larger context is not exarnined, the section 15 anaiysis may
become a mechanical and sterile categorization process conducted
entirely within the four corners of the impugned legislation. A
determination as to whether or not discrimination is taking place, if
based exclusively on an anaiysis of the law under challenge is
Iikely, in my view, to result in the same kind of circularity which
characterized the similarly situated similarly treated test clearly
rejected by this Court in ~ n d r e w s .

"Criminal Code, R.S., c. C-46, sections 427,428 and 429.
"Ibid. at 133 1.
BJlbid.at 1332.
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More recently in the Eldridge Casessthe Supreme Court of Canada assessed the Charter's
section 15 equality guarantees within the context of equal access to medical services. in
particular, three deaf individuais brought an action against the British Columbia
provincial govemment for failing to provide funding for sign language interpreters for the
deaf while receiving medical services. They argued that failing to provide such services
impaired their ability to communicate with their doctors and this effectively equated to an
unequal level of medical services. The Suprerne Court agreed and held that the legislation
that did not accommodate equally for the deaf was unconstitutional and could not be
j ustified as a reasonable limit within a !tee and democratic society. The Court referred to

much of it's earlier reasoning articulated in Andrews, including the need "to look not only
at the impugned legislation .. but also to the larger social, political and legal ~ o n t e x t . "In~ ~

Chapter Two. this thesis will examine to what level and to what extent the courts have
analysed the issues surrounding the disclosure of female cornplainants' therapeutic or
counselling records within such a contextual framework. Sirnilarly, in chapter three
prosecutorial responses to domestic assault charges will be scrutinized to review the level
of contextualization that is employed by the criminal justice system, when deding with
these types of charges.

Also, the Court voiced a concem for the fonn of discrimination based in stereotypical
thinking. Although the Court was specifically referencing societal biases against the
85~Zdridge
v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (l997), 15 1 D.L.R. 577 (S.C.C.).

861hid.at 6 13.

disabled, it is suggested that the principles articuiated are universally applicable to any
form of discrimination anchored in inaccurate stereotypical thinking. Specifically. the
Court considered the broader sociai context that the disabled m u t face daily:
It is an unfortunate tmth that the history of disabled persons in
Canada is largely one of exclusion and marginalization. Persons
with disabilities have too often been exciuded fkom the labour
force. denied access to opportunities for sociai interaction and
advancement. subjected to invidious stereoty-ping and relegated to

institution^."^'

Most recently. the Supreme Court of Canada has had an opportunil to review these
priiiciples. In Lrnv v. ilfirzisferofHirrnan Resotrrces Developrnent, a 30 year old woman.
n.ithout dependent children or disability. was denied survivor's benefits under the

Canadian Pension Plan. For persons such as Ms. Law, the Plan gradually reduces the

survivor's pension by l/lSOth of the full rate of the return for each month that the
claimant's age is less than 45. as deterrnined at the tirne of the contributor's death." The

appellant argued that sections of the Plan that limited her arnounts payable based on her
age violated her section 1 5 equality rights. as guaranteed by the Cheer. The Supreme
Court of Canada disagreed with the appellant and, in the process, established a detailed

guideline for iower courts to assess the validity of alleged section 15 Charter violations.

88FiIeNO.: 25374, judgement March 25, 1999. The constitutional question in this case
was whether sections 44(l)(d) and 58 of the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C., 1985. c. C-8.
infnnged section 15(1) of the Charter on the g o n d that they discriminate on the b a i s of
age against widowers and widows under the age of 45? The Court held that the sections
did not create a Charter infnngement.
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Iacobucci J., writing for the majority, set out 10 points to be followed in such inquiries.
These guidelines included a discussion of the general approach to these types of inquiries,
their purpose, and the requirement for the courts to embark on both a comparative and a
contextual analysis of the issues.

With regards to the general approach, Iacobucci J. determined that the nature of a section
15 equality detemination could not be fixed in an exact formula. He c o d n n e d the

Court's earlier rulings and held:
In accordance with McIntyre J.'s caution in Andrews, supra, 1 think that it is
sensible to articulate the basic principles under S. 15(1) as guidelines for analysis,
and not as a ngid test which might risk being mechanically applied. Equality
analysis under the Charter must be purposive and c o n t e x t ~ d . ~ ~

Next. he reiterated the purpose of the equality guarantee. On this issue he wrote:
It may be said that the purpose of S. I5(1) is to prevent the violation of essential
hurnan dignity and fieedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping,
or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which al1 persons enjoy
equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society.
equally capable and equally deserving of concem, respect and c o n s i d e r a t i ~ n . ~
Helpfullg. the notion of human dignity was expanded upon. Specifically, Iacobucci J.
noted that:

Human dignity within the meaning of the equality guarantee does not relate to the
status or position of an individual in society per se, but rather concems the
manner in which a person legitimately feels when confionted with a particular

I~W.~'
As well, the Court re-emphasized that the equality guarantee is a comparative concept,

that requires a court to establish one or more relevant comparators. The recognition of a

cornparison group requires the court to examine the subject matter of the law and its
effects within a full appreciation of its "contextual factor^."^'

The Supreme Court articulated four such contextual factors, although they are presented

as esarnples of an open category. Any one factor may suffice in the determination of an

inequaiity. The first factor is a "pre-existing disadvantage." This ciassification of a
contextual factor includes a vulnerability. stereotyping or prejudice experienced by the
specific group or an individual.'' The Court stressed the importance of the need for the
supreme Law of the land to protect vulnerable. disadvantaged, or members of minority
groups. The second factor is the "relationship between the grounds and the claimant's

characteristics or circumstances." The focus of this factor is the relationship between the
ground on which the claim is made and the actual need. capacity or circumstance of the

claimant. An example presented within this category is the gender of the ~lairnant.~"
The

" ~ b i dat
. 15. A stereotype was defined as "a misconception whereby a person or, more
ofien, a group is unfairly portrayed as possessing undesirable traits. or traits which the
group, or at least some of its members, do not possess."
'%id at 16. See also IVeatheraZZ v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872; and
Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd, (1 9891 1 S.C.R. 1219.
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third factor described was the "arneliorative purpose or effects" of the law in question
upon a disadvantaged person or group withïn society. This improvement factor was
described to be potentially more relevant in circumstances where a claim is brought by a
'-more advantaged member of society?

The last factor outlined was the "nature of the

interest affected." To eiaborate on this classification Iacobucci J. relied on the rationale
and words used by L'Heureu.u-Dube J. in Egon v. Canadu,%particularly :

if al1 things are equal, the more severe and localized the ... consequences on the
affected group, the more likely that the distinction responsible for these
consequences is discriminatory within the meaning of S. 15 of the Cl~arrer.~'
He went on to conclude:
that the discriminatory calibre of differential treatment cannot be fully appreciated
without evaluating not only the economic but also the constitutional and societal
siçnificance attributed to the interest or interests adversely affected by the
legislation in question.98

Thus, from a theoretical perspective, the notion of assessing the issues comected to
claims of inequality within a broad social context has significant scholarly and judicial
support. It is suggested that the c o ~ e c t i n gtheme in these materials is that a fair, just and
equal appreciation of these legal issues requires that the judges deciding the fate of the
litigants must consider not only the impact that their decisions will have on the claimants

'llbid. at 16. See also Vriend v. Alberta, [ 19981 1 S.C.R. 493.
96[1 9951 2 S.C.R. 513.
97

Law v. Mirtister of Human Resources, supra note 88 at 17.

98

Ibid 17.
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that bring these matters fonvard. but also social realities of those claïmants. It is the goal
of this thesis to test how, if at dl, the criminal justice system has done at contextualizing

women's lives as they corne before the courts as prosecution witnesses. This is
accomplished by applying this theoretical framework to two critically relevant problems
found within the criminal justice system; firstly. the disclosure o f femaie complainants'

therapeutic records in cases involvins ailegations of sexual assadt and secondly, the
prosecution of domestic assault cases.

(F) Rcview of Methodology

1. Sesual Assault Complainant's Therapeutic or Counselling Records

Understanding of the current state of the law as it relates to the topic of the disclosure of a

sesual assault complainant's therapeutic and or counselling records is criticai to this
work. The evolution of this Iegal process will be discussed in a chronologicai manner.

starting with the O 'Connor

The laws reactions to this case. including the

legislative responseIw and the constitutional challenges that followed it's advent are
reviewed. In a effort to further analyse the extent to which the Canadian courts have
contextualized this issue, this thesis examines the compendium case to R. v. O 'Connor.

9 9 ~ .W.

O 'Connor ( 1 994), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 109 (B.C.C.A.).

'OoBillC-46, An Act fo amend the Criminal Code fproduction of recordr in sexual ofence
proceedings), S .C. 1997, c.30.

L.L.A. v. BeharrielZ.'O' As well. a brief review of the Supreme Court of Canada's
response to a civil law challenge by a respondent for a plaintiff s counselling records is
undertaken.'" Throughout this work efforts will be made to focus on the state of the iaw
within the theoretical h e w o r k of equality as described within a contextual back drop.

Part of this discussion will include two components of societal hann. The first is the harm
suffered by the individu& whose therapeutic records are opened and their counselling
treatrnent is interfered with. The Court's treatment of the reports filed in the Mills
Case. 'O3 that speak to the issue of complainant ham that flows fiom an invasion of their
private counselling records are discussed. Through these reports it is argued that, in large

measure. the courts have to date failed to properly contextualize the applications for this

type of disclosure, prirnarily within a gender view point and secondarily within a victim
of crime perspective.

The second matter explored is the societal harm that flows fiom the chilling effect that

the opening of such records might have on other women who have been sexually attacked
but decide not to come forward to the authorities to have their cornplaints investigated. If

women are deterred fiom accessing justice through the criminal justice system, it is

pointed out that there are at least two ramifications that flow from this. The first is that it
-

-

-

-

-

"'L.L.A. v. BeharrieZZ(1995), 103 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.).
'"Ah? v. Ryan Cl9971 1 R.C.S. 157 (S.C.C.).

Io3R. v. Miiis (1997), 205 A.R. 321; 207 A.R. 161 (Alta. Q.B.). On appeal to the S.C.C.
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effectively denies sexual assault victims and the community with access to justice. The
second is that if the women that have k e n injured in this way do not corne forward an
opportunity is lost to deter this form of criminal behaviour that helps to oppress and
violate al1 women's rights to equality.

As well, it is important to note that this matter has a relevance beyond just the
constitutionality issues of the legislation dealing with the issue of disclosure of these
records. that may manifest itself in two ways. One is that if the Supreme Court declares
Bill C-46 as unconstitutional then the drafters of the replacement legislation will need to
continue to assess these issues as they grapple with the balancing of competing interests
of the parties comected to these types of motion. In the alternative, if the legisiation is
upheld, Canada's courts will continue to ïnterpret Bill C-46 to assist them in their just

application of the law. This practical application of the law will require a contextual
appreciation of al1 of the issues involved with these motions for disclosure.

2. Domestic Assault

To properly assess the methodologies used to examine the area of domestic assault, the

proposals for refonn must first be reviewed. In short, it is postulated that the criminal
justice system does not effectively deal with the problem of domestic violence. Provincial
governments charged with responsibility of administering justice have two options to
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improve the srarzcs quo. The first is to increase the effectiveness of the triai's process to
search for the tmth by implernenting vigilant investigative techniques that preserve
evidence as clearly as possible. One such technique could be the immediate videotaping
of a complainant's statement. This could eventually assist prosecutors in the presentation

of reliable evidence that could allow for the expansion of the prlliciples articulated in a
series of cases deahg with the issue of the admissibility of hearsay e v i d e n ~ e . ' ~

This option is examined through a doctrinal approach of the current state of the law and
an analysis of it's principles which leads to an argument for the expansion of the

principles outlined above. As well, this position is supported in both empincal and nonempirical interdisciplinary forms of research, that will help explain not only the scope of
the problem from a sociological perspective, but also from some psychological theories
that help explain the phenornena of the reluctant or recanting witness. This is examined
so that the gender issues unique to domestic violence can be better understood within
their complicated and layered context. For example, this work has reviewed a series of
articles on the symptoms of the cycle of domestic violence to support the argument that
there is a need to push for the contextualization of the hwnan behaviour patterns
associated with domestic violence, so that the trial process of the search for the tmth can
be balanced with the concepts of due process and an accused right to fundamentai justice.

I0%ee R. v. Khan (1990), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.); R. v. Smith (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d)
257 (S.C.C.) ;R. v. KGB, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740'79 C.C.C. (3d) 257 ;R. v. U(F.J),
(1995) 101 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
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In this thesis an alternative to the conventional approach of the criminal justice system
towards domestic violence is also examined. The philosophies of a community based
restorative justice scheme, allowing for the principles of shaming, education and
counselling to replace punishment as a deterrence to this reprehensible male behaviour,

are also reviewed. Following a discussion of the possible causes and consequences of this
form of violence, an effort has been made to suggest a comparative effectiveness between
the ttvo options, given the power imbalances and safety risks unique to incidents of

domestic assault.

CHAPTER TWO: THE DISCLOSURE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
COMPLAINANTS' RECORDS

(A)Introduction

This chapter examines the law in Canada as it relates to the disclosure of sexuai assault
complainants' therapeutic and counselling records in the possession of third parties. Tt also
reveais some of the complexities connected with one method of how a criminal law is
created in Canada. This topic has been selected to advance the position that the criminal
justice system has failed to treat female complainants equatly. It is argued in this chapter
that this inequality is anchored in a failure to contextualize the consequences for women
that flows fiom the disclosure of these types of materials.

To begin, a straightforward prernise is suggested: our society must create laws to prwent

the harm that flows fiom sexual violence and abuse. Once such laws are established, a
procedural process must be implernented to ensure that those persons alleged to have
breached such laws are dealt with arnd treated fairly by our criminal justice system. This is
one of the protections ensured through the principle of due process. Yet, as we
contemplate the niles associated with the disclosure of a sexuai assault complainant's
therapeutic records to an accused person, we quickly see the dilemma that afises because

of the competing interests and guaranteed Charter rights of those individuals involved.
The classic liberal notion of minimal state intervention that is balancecl against the
potential for societal harm is revealed, except in this case,the potential hann cuts in two
different directions. The first inherent h m is obvious; the wrongfbl conviction of an
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innocent person. The second likely harrn is the subject matter of this chapter. It examines
the harm that flows fiom the invasion o f one's highly personal records, as well as the
effect this law has as a disincentive for al1 victims of sexual assault to access justice
through the criminal courts. This denied access represents a serious f o m of inequality that
directly acts to oppress female victims of violent sexual offences and indirectly d l women.

Related to this issue, we are able to observe the two different branches of govenunent
authorized to create laws and apply laws in conflict over the appropriate balance to be
stmck between these competing interests. In the O 'Connof Case we see the courts
responding to a specific fact situation, in the absence of applicable legislation, and
determining legal policy in the process. Next, the legislators, who in the meantime had
been contemplating a legislative response to this disdosure issue, with extensive input and
consultation with a number of non-legislative bodies, conclude there are certain
shortcomings with the Supreme Court majority's viewpoint and therefore introduce a
section in the Criminal Code to readjust the balance between the competing interests. This
begins a continuing checks and balances process as the courts scnitinize the
constitutionality of the new legislation. This engagement will corne to a head in the MiII'
Case. In this case,the legislation enacted to deal with the issue of an accused person's
right to obtain the therapeutic records of a cornplainant in a sexual assault case and the

IR v. O'Connor (1996), 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
IR v. Mill' ( 1 997), 205 A-R 32 1; 207 A-R 16 1 (Q.B.),on a p p d to the Supreme Court
of Canada.
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corresponding rights and issues of privacy and equaiity before the law of the complainant,
is tested predorninately because the legislators relied on portions of the Supreme Court's
minority view in the O 'Conmr case that was directly rejected by the majority.

To fùrther complicate matters, at the very heart of this whole process is a gender conflict.

This gender component plays a large part in the formation of this law creatd to address
the disclosure of a female complainant's therapeutic records, as evidenced by the language
used by the courts to assess the issue. Specifically, as one closely reviews the language
used by the courts, a troubling pichire is revealed: that some of the same biases and

stereotypes debunked in the rape shield legislation,J continue to be assessed and relied
upon in tipping the balance in favour of the male accused person's right to tùll answer and

defence over the female complainant's right to privacy, equality and security of person.

Finally, to advance the argument that women's equaiity nghts have not aiways been

decideû at
thoroughly assessed within a contextuaiized framework LLA v. Behz~rieli,~
the same time as the O 'Connor Case, will also be examined. This case reviews the

Supreme Court's policy consideration of one solution to the potential harm that flows
from the disclosure of these materials, specifically a class privilege for counselling records.
As well, both of these procedural and substantive criminal law cases will be wmpared to

the Canadian civil jurisprudential treatment of the disclosure of therapeutic or counselling

3CriminalCode, R.S., c. C-46, sections 276 and 277.

' LL A . v. Behamiell (1 995). 1O3 C.C.C.(3d) 92 (S.C.C.).
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records issue. This will be done to assess the Supreme Court's contemual considerations
of the competing rights of the accused and the sexual ossault complainant. Additionally,
these cases mark the wolution of the equality rights of the complainants co~ectedto
these disclosure applications.

(B) R v O'Connor
O'Connor, a Roman Catholic bishop, was charged with a number of sexual offences,
alleged to have occurred when he was a priest at a First Nations residential school. The

allegations dated back some 15 years prior to the charges king laid and involved a
number of students at the school. Prior to the trial date, counsel for the accused applied to
the court for an order demanding that the complainants authorize ail therapists,

psychologists, and psychiatnsts who treated them to produce copies of their complete
records. O'Connor also requested al1 school and medical records fiom the school where
the sexual assaults were alleged to have taken place. Neither the complainants nor their

care providers were given notice of this application. The application was granted and a
disclosure order was made. The case was then adjourned several months.

On the next triai date, counsel for the accused brought a second series of motions and
applied for a stay of proceedings. The stay application was dismissed. However, during
the course of the testimony it became clear that other material related to the original order
existed and had not been disclosed. Counsel renewed their stay application and, on this

occasion, it was granted.'

1. British Columbia Court of A p p d

The matter was appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeai. The Court ailowed the
Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial. For perspective, this chapter will briefly review
the Court's rulings related to the Crown's failure to disclose the complainant's therapeutic

records.
Counsel for the accused asserted a section 7 Canadian Chmer of itights and Freedorns6
violation, and argued that the appropriate remedy flowing fiom such a violation would be

stay of proceedings under section 24 of the Charter. On the issue of disclosure, the Court
held that the Crown has an obIigation to disclose and that the accused has a right to all

that which the Crown is obligated to disclose. Under the guarantees of section 7 of the
Charter, the accused had a right to al1 information that could reasonably and possibly

assist him in making full answer and defence. Still, a violation in this regard will only be

made out where the accused establishes that the non-disclosure has probably prejudiced or
had some adverse eRect on his ability to make tùll answer and defence. Here the accused
failed to lay before the Court an evidentiary foundation to assess the relevance of the

'R v. O 'Connor (1994), 89 C.C.C.(3d) 109 (l3.C.C.A).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s.7, Part 1of the Constitution Act. 1982,
being Schedule B to the C a d a Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. l l [hereinafter "Chmrer'7.

requested records.
Within two months, the sarne panel of the British Columbia Court of Appeal estabiished a
procedure for the production and disdosure of therapeutic records in semal assuit cases8
A two step process was developed. The first stage required an accused person to show

that the information contained in the medical records is && to be relevant either to an
issue in the proceeding or to the competence of the witness to testie. They held that if the
accused can satise this test, then the records are to be disclosed to the
At this second stage, the court then reviews the records to determine which of thern are
relevant to the defence. If the court were to determine that any ofthe records fa11
into the category of "required by the accused to make fiill answer and defence," then the
records are to be disclosed to the defence, subject to any conditions that the court deems
appropriate.I0 To establish a finding of ükely relevance the accused would be required to
lay an evidentiary foundation. With regards to the initial onus the Court held:

The test to be met by an applicant on the initial application to have the
medical records produced to the court is necessarily lower than the test to
be applied by the court in deciding whether to release any of those
documents to the parties. A less stringent test is appropriate at the first
stage since, at the point in time when the application is first made, it is
unlikely that anyone other than the witness and the physician, psychiatrist

7

R. v. O 'Connor, mpra note 5 at 134- 149.

'R v. O'Connor (No.2) (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (B.C.C.A).
'lbid, at 26 1 and 267.
l0lbid, at 267 - 268.
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or therapist d l know what is in the records."
The Court premised its decision on the societal neeâ to deguard and protect the privacy
interests of a witness, and then balanceci those needs against the rights of an accused to
make full answer and defence.l2
Of particular importance was the Court's rejection of the accuseci's argument for the

disclosure on the basis that the documents may be relevant and went on to suggest
factors that, on their own, would not be a sufficient foundation for the production of
records. The Court held:
The submission that medical records should be produced because they may
be relevant to the credibility of a cornplainant is patently inadequate to
justie their production, in the absence of evidence indicating that there is
likely to be something in those records relevant to the a particular issue in
the case. Invoking credibility at large is not sufficient to justie such an
interference with the privacy interests of a ~omplainant.'~
In coming to this conclusion the Court relied on the cornments of Madam Justice

Heureux-Dubé, in the case of R v. O ~ o l i nand
' ~ Madarn Justice McLachlin's reasoning set
out in the case of R v. Seaboyer." The principles set out in these defisions will be

discussed in the analysis portion of this chapter.

"Ibid at 26 1.
'*Ibid at 26 1 - 262.
l3lbid, at 265.

"R.

v.

O s u h [1993] 4 S.C.R.595; (1991)' 86 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.).

15Rv. Seaboyer [1991] 2 S.C.R.
577; (1991)' 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).

2. Supremt Court o f Canada

In the Supreme Court, the same competing issues are assesseci, specifically the accused's

rights to h l 1 answer and defence and the complainant's rights to privacy and equaiity
before the law. The majority considered the potential h m s connected with the conflicting
rights of a witness to privacy and an accused person's right to fûll answer and defcnct and

-

aligned the latter with the findamental tenet of the criminal justice system that an
innocent person must not be wnvicted. The majority did not address the section 15
equality right issue. Their conclusions have the effect of ranking the accused person's
rights over those of the complainant's. It is proposed that, although they do not explicitly
endorse such a position, when one carefblly reviews the language used to balance the
competing interests, coupled with the end result, an argument can be made that a
hierarchy of rights does exist. This theme is also elaborated upon in the Constitutionai
Challenges section of this chapter.
\

On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed a number of issues, but for the purpose set out in

this chapter, I will only discuss those that are c o ~ e c t e dto the therapeutic records of a
cornplainant. In a 5 : 4 Split, Lamer C.J.C. and Sopinka J., wrote for the majority.16
They held that the intensely private nature of therapeutic records did not affect the

Crown's obligation to disclose such materials to the defence, where those materials were

16R Y. O 'Connor (1 W6), 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). Regarding therapeutic records,
Larner C.J. C., Sopinka, J., Cory, Iacobucci, and Major JJ., concurring; L'Heureux-Dubé,
J., La Forest, Gonthier and McLachlin J I , concurring in dissent.

already in the possession of the Crown. They reasoned that once the records had been
revealed to the Crown, there was no pnvacy interest to be balanced against the nght of the
accused to make fùll answer and defence. Further, if the Crown were to advance that such
records contained nothing relevant, they would have the burden to prove the irrelevance
of the records on an application for disclosure by the accused. In other words, once in the
hands of the Crown, the records d l be presumed relevant and mua be di~closed.'~
The minority view on this matter was that the case did not raise the issue of the general
extent of the Crown's disclosure obligations regarding a complainant's private records in
its possession and, as such, did not feel the need to comment on the issue."

On the issue of the procedure for the production and disclosure of therapeutic records in
the possession of the third parties, Lamer C.J.C. and Sopinka J. wrote for the majority.
They determineci that the balance had to fa11 in the favour of the accused Party.
Specifically, they held that the competing daims of a cornplainant to a constitutional right

" lbid at 15 - 16,78 and 91. However, one issue not fully developed by the Court was
the issue of consent, and its impact on how the Crown came to be in possession of the
records. R. v. Stinchcombe (1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), sets out disclosure
principles related to crown obligations and exceptions. The Crown has a discretion to
withhold information which may be subject to privilege and may delay disclosure so as not
to impede an investigation. Also, the Crown is not required to disclose what is clearly
irrelevant. The general principle is that idonnation should not be withheld if there is a
reasonable possibility that the failure to disclose will negatively Sêct the accused's right
to make h l l answer and defence, unless the non-disclosure is required by the law of
privilege. L. Stuesser, in "Reconciling Disdosure and Privilege" (1994) 30 C.R (4") 67 at
79, discussed the expansion of Stinchcombe mandated Crown disclosure to the right of an
accused person to pre-trial "discovery".
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to pnvacy in the information held within the recurds maintained by a third party mua give
way to the constitutional guarantees of an accused petson to make tùii answer and
defence. The cornmon Iaw that supported this position w u set out in R v. Stim:k~m&e,,'~
and R v. Seab~yer..'~
including " the ftndamentd tenet of our judiciai synem that an

innocent person must not be wnvicted."

The Court agreed with the Appellate Court that a two stage process was wamuited to
process an accused' s request for a cornplainant 's therapeutic records. However, the
majority and the minority of the Court differed in their respective views as to the threshold
of relevance, as well as the factors that a trial judge would need to assess such issues.

At the first stage, Lamer C.J.C., and Sopinka J. proclairneci an accused need not establish
an evidentiary foundation in every case. In some cases oral submissions by counsel may

suffice. At the end of the day, an accused must persuade the judge that "likely relevant"
information is contained in the records. They stated:
the presiding judge must be satisfied that there is a reasonable possibiiity
that the information is logically probative to an issue at triai or the
cornpetence of a witness to testie. When we speak of relevance to an
"issue at trial" we are refemng not only to evidence that may be probative
to the material issues in the case (Le., the unfolding of events) but aiso to
the evidence relating to the credibility of witnesses and to the reliability of
other evidence in the case?
The Court continued and held that the "likely relevance" initiai hurdle should not be

19R v. Stinchcomb [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; (1991)' 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).

'OR v. Seaboyer, supra note 15 at 32 1.
R v. O'Connor. supra note 16 at 19.

interpreted as an onerous burden on the accusexi but rather a "requirement to prevem the
defence fiom engaging in speculitive, fuiafùl, disruptive, unmeritorious, obstructive and
time consurning request for production.""
Additionally, the Court provided furiher guidance suggesting a timing factor that should
be considered when assessing likely relevance. They held:

There is a possibiiity of materiality where there is a reasonabiy close
temporal co~ectionbetween the creation of the records and the date of
the alleged commission of the offence ...or in cases of historical eventq as
in this case, a close temporal comection between the creation of the
records and the decision to bring charges against the acaised."
Beyond this, the Court went on to set out a number of examples, by way of illustration
only, in which third party records may be relevant:
1 . they may contain information concerning the unfolding of events
underlying the criminal cornplaint.
2. they may reveal the use of therapy which influenced the complainant's
memory of the alleged events.
3. they may contain information that bears on the complainant's
"credibility, including testimonial factors such as the quality of their
perception of events at the time of the offence, and their memory since.""

Once the accused has satisfied the court on the threshold question of likely relevance, the
records in question are then tumed o v a to the trial judge. The role of the triai judge at
this stage is to assess whether, and to what extent, the records should be disclosed to the

accused. The majority recognized the potential for harm to be suffered by a cornplainant

but determined that this potential harm must be weighed against the abïdity of the accused
to make tùll answer and defence. To assia the court in their balancing process, they set
out a number of factors for consideration, including:
1.the extent to which the record is necessary for the accused to make fi111
answer and defence;
2.the probative value of the record in question;
3 .the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation of privacy vested in
the record;
4.whether production of the record would be prernised upon any
discriminatory belief or bias; and
5-the potential prejudice to the complainant's dignity, privacy or security of
the person that would be occasioned by production of the record in
question."

It is important to note that they specifically rejected L'Heureux-Dubé J. 's two additional
factors, that a trial judge must also consider. These included:
1. the extent to which production of records of this nature would frustrate
society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences and the
acquisition of treatment by victims; and
2. the effect on the integrity of the trial process of producing, or failing to

produce, the record, having in mind the need to maintain consideration in
the o u t ~ o r n e . ~ ~

Eventually, the majority established "the societal interest is not a paramount consideration
in deciding whether the information should be provided."

*'

'%id. at 24. The majority of the COU^ held that this second factor was more

appropriately dealt with at the admissibilty stage of a hearing rather than at the disclosure
stage.
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The Court preferred other means to support society's interests in the reporting of sexual
assault offences, such as publication bans, closing court rwms to the public and the
application of a relevancy test regarding evidence generaily.28However, as an aside, it is
suggested that these types of arrangements merely protect against general public scrutiny.
They do very little to prevent the invasion of privacy that goes dong with the opening of
records, and they do nothing at al1 to reliwe the stress and anxiety that sexual assault
complainants often feel once confionted by an accused's counsel in cross examination,
particularly on information connected with their therapeutic records.
In L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s rninority judgement, a number of basic principles are reviewed
prior to her addressing the procedure for the production of a wmplainant's therapeutic

records. She recognized additional considerations at the first stage of the process. These
included a recognition of some of the broader Charrer values. More specifically, she
noted,

"

the principles of fûndarnentaljustice, including the faimess of the trial, necessarily

reflects a balancing of societal and individual right~."'~These nghts are tied into section 7
C h e r guarantees t hat create presum ptions against the production of private records.
The balancing of an accused's right to make fiil1 answer and defence cannot be interpreted
so widely so as to allow a "fishing expeditior~"~~
into the private records of a complainant.

"fiid at 24. Also note that the rejects L'Heureux-Dubé, J. 's inclusion of these additional
factors, prefemng the avenues discussed by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R v.
Ryan (1991), 69 C.C.C. (3d) 226 at 230. These approaches do not prevent disclosure, but
focus on privacy fiom a public scrutiny perspective.

In fact, she questioned the relevancy of the records generdly when isccuing the equahy

rights of a complainant. She would place the burden on the accused to establish a basis
t hat there is in existence material which may be usehl to an accused person in making ttll
answer and d e f e n ~ e . Regarding
~'
the nature of the records she added:
Similady, the mere fact that a witness has a medical or psychiatrie record cannot
be taken as indicative of the potential unreiiabiiity of his or her testimony. Any
suggetstion that a particular treatment, therapy, illness, or disabiiity implies
unreiiability must be informecl by cogent evidence, rather than stereotype, myth or
prejudice."
She concluded that there was a need for the courts to protect such rights that rnust coexist along side o f those rights g u a r a n t d an accused person.

The minority view proposed certain criteria to be applied to determine the production of a

complainant's records, including:
First, production should only be granted when it is shown that the accused
cannot obtain the information sought by any other reasonably available and
effective alternative means. Second, production which infnnges upon a
right to pnvacy must be as limited as is reasonably possible t o fiilfill the
right to make fùll answer and defence. Third, arguments urging production
must rest upon permissible chains of reasoning, rather than discriminatory
assumptions and stereotypes. Finally, there must be a proportionality
between the salutary effects of production on the accused's right to make
hl1 answer and defence as compared with the deleterious effêcts on the
party whose pnvate records are being produced."
It should be noted that this last component addresseci the needs of the individual

complainant, as compared to the general needs of society. Notably absent in this passage is
any reference to the potential chilling effect that such invasions of privacy might have on

sexual assault victims' willingness to corne forward and access justice through the criminal
courts. Still, the rninority did factor into the consideration process the potential negative
side effects that the opening of such records rnight have on the complainant's course of
therapy, in addition t o the potential psychological h m that such similar invasions into
privacy might have?
Tuming now to the issue of the minority's view of the two nage process, it s p e c i n d y

disagreed wit h the rnajority's tinding, that the standard of "likely relevance" should not
be interpreted as an onerous burden. They prefened to classifi the burden on the accused,

at this stage, to be a "significant one" and went on t o highlight a number of factors that

shou1d not be considered as sufficient, on their face, to cause the trial judge to review the
records. The assertions that would fa11 below the mark at the first stage include:
1 . An unsupported assertion that the records might impact on "recent
cornplaint" or the "kind of person" the witness is.
2. The applicant cannot invoke credibility at large but must show that
there is Iikely to be information in the impugned records which would
relate to a complainant's credibility on a particular material issue at trial.
3. That a prior inconsistent statement might be revealed, or that the
defence wishes to explore the records for allegations of sexual abuse by
other people.
4. The mere fact that a witness has a medical or psychiatnc record cannot
be taken as indicative of the potential unreliability of his or her testimony.
5 . Tt must not be presumed that the mere fact that a witness received
treatment or counselling aEter a sexual assault indicates that the records will

at 67. The minority of the Court a h held that given that these records are
profoundly intimate, their opening alone can have senous consequences for the dignity and
treatment course o f a complainant.
%id.

contain information that is relevant to the defencdS
If the evidentiary foundation presented by the defence falls below the threshold of

relevance, then that is the end of the application. However, if the application succeeds p s t
the first stage, then the mai judge must embark on a balancing process. Again the two
competing interests, the accusecl's right to make tùll answer and defence and the
complainant's privacy and equality rights, are assesseci. At this pint, the court should
review the records and order the disdosure of those records, or parts thereof, that have a
signifiant probative value that is not substantially outweigheci by the danger of prejudice
to the proper administration of justice. As weU, the wurt mua consider the potentid of
h a m to the privacy rights of the witness or to the privileged relation that witness has with

a c o ~ n s e l l o r In
.~~
the end, the minority sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that should
be considered in the detennination of this process, as discussed earlier in this paper.
On the specific issue of the complainant's right to equality without discrimination as
guaranteed by section 15 of the Charter, L'Heureux-Dubé J. pointed out three relevant
~'
she referenced a
factors. First that W !of al1 sexual assault victims are ~ o r n e n . Second,
study that suggested between 50% and 8û% of women institutionalited for psychiatric
disorders have pnor histories of sexual abuse." Third, it is a comrnon event in today's

"Ibid at 57; Osolin. supra note 14 at 521 per Cory S.
381bid at 57; T.Firsten, "An Exploration of the Role of Physical and Sexuai Abuse for
Psychiatrically Institutionalized Women" (1990), [unpublished research paper] available
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Canadian society that those who have been sexually assaulted obtah treatment because of
their victimizati~n.'~

This assessrnent represents the minonty's enort to contextualize the harm component of
sexual assault offences into its larger social contact. Indirectly, it also positions the victims
of such crimes within an enumerated group as envisioned by section 15 of the ClrrvfererQ
This analysis consistent with the jurisprudence enunciated in the Law case (decided post

O 'Connor).In Law the purpose of section 15 was set out by Iacobucci J.:
It may be said that the purpose of S. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of
essential human dignity and fieedom through the imposition of
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote
a society in which al1 persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human
beings or as members of Canadian society, equaily capable and equaliy
deserving of wncem, respect and consideration. Legislation which effects
differential treatment between individuals or groups will violate this
fundamentai purpose where those who are subject to differential treatment
faIl within one or more enumerated or analogous grounds, and where the
differential treatment reflects the stereotypical application of presumed
group or personal characteristics, or othenivise has the effect of
perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable, or
less worthy of recognition or value as a human king or as a member of
Canadian ~ociety.~'

fiom the Ontario Women's Directorate.

''Supra note 6, section 1S(1) "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has
the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability".

"Law v. Cana& (Uinister of Entpoymenf mtd Immigration) (1 999), File no.: 253 74
(S.C.C.) at 13.
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Thus, it is suggesed here that the perspective of the minority, regarding the complainant's
equality rights as balanced against the accused's rights to fil1 answer and defence, should
be given additionai weight in the interpretation of the current or any fbture legislation in

the area.

L'Heureux-Duôé J. also reflects on past evidentiary mles such as those addresseâ in
section 276 of the Criminal Code. It is her position that to allow an unwarranted fishing
expedition into a complainant's past sexual histories as recorded in her therapeutic records
may ailow an accused person to circumvent the protections created in the rape shield
legislation."

Moreover, she highlights another antiquated legal notion to support her position,
specifically the requùement for corroboration before a woman's or a child's allegations of

sexual assault could be brought before the courts. She challenges that such a provision
could no longer withstand Charrer scnitiny. This notion is comected to a sexual assauit

complainant's therapeutic record, as she wrote:
In my view, a legal system which devalues the evidence of complainants to
sexual assault by defacto premming their uncreditworthiness would raise
sirnilar concerns. It would not reflect, far les promote "a society in which
al1 are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human
beings a equaily deserving of concern, respect and consideration.""

42RV. O 'Connor, supra note 1 at 66.

"Ibid

at 58; Andrews v. Lmu Society of British Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R (4"') 1 at 15
per Mclntyre 1.

From this point she extends her rationale to examine stereotypical reasoning or
conclusions based on speculations that would affect equality principles in the threshold
requirement of providing a 'court with a relevance evidentiary foundation. T o
automaticaliy expose a complainant's personal backgrounds, such as those contained
within therapeutic records, has the potentiai to reflect a systernic bias in the criminal
justice system against victimited women. On the routine request for disdosure without
establishing a threshold of relevance L'Heureux-Dubé 1. wrote:
Such requests, in essence, rest on the assumption that the personal and
psychological backgrounds and profiles o f complainants of sexual assault
are relevant as to whether or not the complainant consented t o the sexual
contact, or whether the accused honestly believed that she consented.
Although the defence must be fiee to demomtrute, without resorting to
stereotypical reasoning, that such is relevant to a live issue at trial, it would
mark the tnumph of stereotype over logic if courts and lawyers were
simply to asnrme such relevance to exist, without requiring any evidence to
this effect whatsoever." [emphasis hers]
Finally, L'Heureux-Dubé J. discussed the potentid application o f the law as it related to
the victim of a sexual assault and the community rights to have these matters detennined
by a court. The impact on the woman who must choose between "accusing their attacker

and maintaining the confidentiality of their records" was acknowledged. To make this

point she relied on the words of Hill J. in R v. Burbosa:
In addressing the disdosure of records, relating to past treatment, analysis,
assessrnent or care of a complainant, it is necessary t o remember that the
pursuit of fùll answer and defence on behalf of an accused person should be
achieved without indiscriminately or arbitrarily eradicating the privacy of
the complainant. Systemic revictimization of a complainant fosters

disrepute for the criMnid justice system4' [emphasis hers].

( C ) Bill C-46
The cornrnon law position developed by the majority in O 'Connor was superceded by
legislation. One critical feature of this legislation is the way in which it was drafted. The
Iegisiators, drafting Bill C-46, adopted the reasoning fiom both the m a j o ~ t yand the
minonty from the O 'Connoor decision, including the views of L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s, that

considered the rights of a sexual assault complainant, despite the fact that some of those
views were specifically rejected by the majority.

The relevant sections of this legislation need to be reviewed at this stage. This examination

is important to the advancement of my analysis of this subject in four ways. Fust, it

provides the reader with some insight into one method of Canadian law making. It
examines the consultation process and a number of the considerations reviewed by the

legislators in the process. Secondly, it provides a comparison to the goals and objectives
of a similar piece of legislation, comrnoniy referred to as the rape shield laws. Through this
comparison some of the principles behind the new disclosure provisions are legitimized
and bolstered. Thirdly, it provides a template for the analysis of the process whereby the
courts test the constitutionaiity of Bill C46. Fourthly, as the courts scrutinize its
constitutionality, the language used to interpret meaning, reveals a great deal about the
-

-

451b~d
at 59; R

--

V.

Barbosa (1994), 92 C.C.C. (3d) 13 1 at 141 (Ont. Gen Div.).
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rationale used by the courts to they balance the competing Chraier guaranteed, but
irreconcilable, rights.
On M a y 12, 1997, Bill C-46 was proclaimeci. This was a legislative response to the issues
surrounding defence applications for the disclosure and production of a semal assault
complainant's private records held by a third party. This legislation was enacted as
sections 278.1 to 278.9 of the Crinriml

This legislation govems disdosure

applications in cases relating to charges of semai assault. Approximately one year prior to
the proclamation, the Minister of Justice indicated the intended purpose of the new
legislation was to "strengthen protection for complainants of sexual offences and to
enhance privacy and equality nghts for dl complainants." "
A review of each section of the legislative response is beyond the parameters of this

thesis. Rather, this project will focus on the portions of the statute that endorse and
expand upon those factors considered in the O 'Connor decision.
As established in O 'Connor,a two stage process is mandated. At the first stage, the trial

judge must assess whether or not the records in issue should be reviewed by the court.

The test at this threshold is "likely relevant.""

'6CriminalCode. R.S.,c. C46. [hereinafter CriMnal Code].
"Depanment of Justice, News Release, June 12, 1996.

'8CriminalCode. S. 278.3(3).
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To assist in the determination of likely relevance, section 278.3(4) codifies a number of
assertions that are insufficient on their own to estabtish the requisite threshold:
that the record exists;
that the record relates to medical or psychiatric treatment or counselling
that the complainant or witness has received or is receiving;
that the record relates to the incident that is the subject-matter of
the proceeding;
that the record may disclose a pnor inconsistent statement of the
complainant or witness;
that the record may relate to the credibility of the complainant or
witness;
that the record may relate to the reliability of the testimony of the
complainant or witness merely because the complainant or witness
has received or is receiving psychiatric treatment, thetsrpy or
counselling;
that the record may reveal allegations of semai abuse of the
complainant by a person other than the accused;
that the record relates to the sexual activity of the complainant with
any person, including the accused;
that the record relates to the presence or absence of a recent
complainant;
that the record relates to the complainant's sexual reputation; or
that the record was made close in time to the cornplaint or to the
activity that h s the subject-matter of the charge against the
accused.'9
The first three subsections are consistent with the majority's view in O 'Connor,with one

exception. The Court maintained as a relevant consideration the issue of a temporal
connection between the creation of the records and the date of the alleged commission of
the offence. Also, in cases of ''historical" accusations, a temporal connedon between the

creation of the records and the decision to bring charges against the accused was set out
as a pertinent factor. It is important to note that this temporal comection is specitically
- ---

-

--

-

49Criminu/Code. S. 278.3 (4).

m e d out as an insufficient ground in subsection (k) of the legislation.
In conjunction with issue of timing, subsection (i) deals with the issue of recent complaint.
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, courts have traditionally maintained that the

timing of the complaint is still a factor to consider in assessing the validity of the
allegation.'* Therefore, this new component of the legislation seems to ovemim a
historically relevant consideration. Ta my knowledge, this specific factor has not yet b a n
challenged.
Section 278.3(4)(e), deals with the credibility of the complainant in general. It might be
argued that this may be in conflict with the majority's assertion that the information

contained in the complainant's records may be relevant if it "bears on the complainant's
credibility, including testimonial factors such as the quality of their perception of events at
the time of the offence, and their memory since.""
In subsection (f) reliability, as distinguished fiom credibility, is addressed. n i e potential
for unreliability merely because the complainant is seeking treatment is specifically deemed

inappropriate.
Subsection (g) incorporates the anti-myth reasoning set out in R v. SeaboyeP and
eventually codified in section 276 of the Criminal Code. This issue will be elaborated on in
--

'OR V. Henrich (1996), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A).

"R v. O 'Connor.supra note 16 at 23.
V.

Seaboyer. supra note 1S.

74

the analysis section of this chapter. Still, it should be noted that this section marks that a
cornplainant's sexual history is an irrelevant consideration. Similady, in subsection (h) and

a), which do not include the word "may" could be interpreted to absolutely prohibit the
pret rial discovery of information conceming sexual activity or reputation. These sections
appear to support section 277 of the Crimiml Code. Section 277 deals with the issue of
reputation evidence, specifically making such evidence inadmissible for the purpose of
challenging or supporting the credibility of a sexual assault complainant.
Furthemore, a trial judge must also consider the provisions of section 278.5(1) and (2)
prior to ordering the person in possession or control of the record to produce it to the

court for review. Section 278.5(1) requires a trial judge to reconsider subsections
278.3(2) to (6), that set out the accused's onus to establish the threshold requirement of

IikeIy relevant and finally to establish that "the production of the record is necessary in the

interests ofjustice." Arguably, this last provision adds an additional flexibility for a trial
judge attempting to balance the competing interests of the parties.
Section 278.5(2) also sets out specific factors that the trial judge must take into account in
determining whether or not the records should be produced for the purposes of judicial
review. These factors to be considered are in addition to "the salutary and deleterious

effects of the determination on the accused's right to make firll answer in defence and on

the right to privacy and equality of the complainant." It is important to compare the
words used in this section with those used by Lamer C.J.C., and Sopinka J. in O 'Conmr,
specifically:

We also agree that in making that determination, the judge must examine
and weigh the salutary and deleterious eff'éctsof a production order and
detennine whether a non-production order would constitute a reasonable
limit on the ability of the acaised to make hiIl answer in defence."
They do not endorse a right to privacy and equality on behalf of the complainant.
Aiso of significance are the factors set out in section 278.5(2Xa) through (h)." It is
important to note that added to the majority's list of relevant factors, the section also
incorporates L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s two additional factors that appear in subsections (f),
(g) and (h)." It is this specific inclusion of the dissent's additional factors that have causeci

sorne members of the defence bar to challenge the constitutionality of Bi11 C-46, rnost
notably in R v. Mills?

13R v.

O 'Connor,supra note 16.

" In determining whether to order the production of the record or part of the record for
review pursuant to subsection (l), ... the judge shall take the following factors into
account:
the extent to which the record is necessary for the accused to make a fiIl answer
and defence;
the prohibitive value of the record;
the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the
record;
whether production of the record is based on a discriminatory belief or bias;
the potential prejudice to the personal dignity and right to privacy of any person to
whom the record relates;
society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences;
society's interest in encouraging the obtaining of treatment by complainants of
sexual offences; and
the effect of the determination on the integrity of the trial process.

'IR v. O 'Connor,supra note 16 at 23 and 69.

%R. V. MilZs(1997) 205 A.R. 321; 207 A.R. 161 (Q.B.), on appeal to S.C.C.
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Once al1 of these factors have been considered at the first nage and the trial judge is
persuaded, he or she should review the records in issue, then sections 278.6 (1) ta (3)
apply. Effectively the review is done in the absence of the parties. During this review, the
trial judge is guided by section 278.7. The wording in this section parallels that of section
278.5 already reviewed. Section 278.7 specifically demands the same factors considered
at stage one be re~nsideredagaîn at this stage of the process. At this stage. the judge
must be satisfied that the record, or patt thereof, is likely relevant to an issue at trial or to
the competence of a witness to testie and its production is necessary in the interest of
justice. The factors that are to be considered in such a balancing process are set out
specifically in section 278.7(2), as the trial judge ernbarks upon the mission of balancing
the competing interest of the accused's right to make fidl answer in defence and the nght
of privacy and equality of the complainant. As stated earlier, those considerations are set

out in section 278.5(2)(a) to (h).'7
Once satisfied that the record, or any part thereof, is likely relevant to either an issue at
trial or the competence of a witness to test@, and its production is necessary in the

interest of justice, the trial judge may impose certain conditions on its production. Again,
this statute requires that the interests ofjustice be protected as well as "to the greatest
extent possible, the privacy and equality interests of the ~ m p l a i n a n t . "As
~ ~such, the
records may be edited, restricted fkom either duplication or publication, or fiom k i n g

" Criminol Code,

sections 278.7(1) and (2).

"'lbid. at section 278.7(3).

disclosed to any other third ~ a r t y . ' ~
@)

Analysis

1. Origins and Policy

Prior to the drafking of Bill C-46, Parliament was aware of a growing dissatisfaction with
the criminal justice systern's treatment and response to women and children. The 1992
legislators drafied amendments to the Criminal Code to redress credibility issues,
stereotypes and myths often connecteci to fernale and children witnesses testiFng U?
matters charging sexual offences. Bill C49, wdified as sections 276 and 277, withstood
constitutional challenge in R v. Seaboyer? McLachlin, J., speaking for the majority,
addressed the probtems which courts have traditionally been confionted with relating to
issues of relevance in charges of senial assaults. Specifically, the Court stated:
The main purpose of the legislation is to abolish the old common-law rules
which permitted evidence of the compIainant7ssexual conduct which was
of little probative value and calculated to mislead the jury. The cornmonlaw pennitted questioning on the prior sexual conduct of a cornplainant
without proof of relevance to a specific issue in the trial- Evidence that the
complainant had relations with the accused and other was routinely
presented (and accepted by judges and juries) as tending to make it more
likely that the wmplainant had consented to the alleged assault and as
undermining her credibility generally. These inferences were based not on
facts, but on the myths that unchaste women were more likely to consent
to intercourse and in any event, were less worthy of belief. These twin

19SeeS. Chapman, "Third Party Records7' [unreported] a paper presented at the National
Criminal Law Program, University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C., July 1998, for an excellent
review of Bill C-46.
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W.

Seaboyer, sttpra note 1S.

myths are now di~credited.~'

Also in the Seaboyer decision, L'Heureux-Dubé, dissenting in part, discussed the concept
of relevance in the context of senial assault charges and traditional misconceptions
surrounding relevance. Specifically, on the test of relevance, she stated:
Whatever the test, be it one of experimce, common rnse or logic, i? is a
decision particularly vulnerable to the application of private beliefs.
Regardless of the definition used, the content of any relevancy decision will
be filled by the particular judge's experience, cornmon senw andlor logic.
For the most psrt, there will be generd agreement as to that which is
relevant and the determination will not be problematic. However, there are
certain areas of inquiry where experience, common sense and logic are
informed by stereotype and myth. As 1 have made clear, this area of the
law has been puiicularly prone to the utilkation of stereotype and
determinations of relevance and again, as was demonstrated earlier, this
appears to be the unfortunate concomitant of a wciety which, to a large
measure, holds these beliefs. It would also appear that the recognition of
the large role that stereotype may play in such detenninations has had
surprisingly little impact in this area of the iaw."

Further, L'Heureux-Dubé, J., again questioning the bais of the doctrine of recent
complaint and the historical rules relating to the corroboration in sexual assault trials,
commented that:
Application of the relevance concept was not the only way in which the
common-law integrated stereotype and myth into trials of sexual offences.
Also part of the unique body of evidentîary law surrounding m a l
offences were, among other things, the doctrine of r e n t complaint and
corroboration niles. These evidentiary concepts were also based upon
stereotypes of the female cornplainant requiring independent evidence to

support her evidence and, in addition, evidence that she raised a "hue and
cry" f i e r her assault. It is noteworthy that both recent cornplaint and
conoboration rules fonned exceptions to general rules of evidencd3

Thus, in these three passages, the judicial branch of the state (in a dissenting judgement)
recognizes an inequality issue, encapsulatecl in many stereotypes. The Court upheld the
legislative branch of the state's legai rheme to address a component of the problem."
The Court recognized inappropriate, sexist and discriminatory beliefs that had no place in
the assessment of a female witness's credibility and upheld the legislative scheme that
addresseci the issue. However, the case law interpreting sections 276 and 277 of the

Criminal Code failed to address the issue of access by accused parties to the therapeutic

records of complainants in sexual offence prosecutions. That specific issue was brought
to the attention of the Minister of Justice in June of 1994, dunng the annual consultation

of violence against women syrnp~siurn.~~
In November of 1995, an Issues and Options Paper was distributed by the Executive

Branch, highlighting addressing this void in the legislation. Between January 1995 and
Febmary 1996, an extensive series of consultations were conducted across Canada.

"See S. Bond, "Psychiatnc Evidence of Semal Assault Victims: The Need for
Fundamental Change in the Determination of Relevance" (1983) 16 Dalhousie L.J. 4 16,
for a review of sexist myths and their impact within the criminal justice system.
6sL.C. and Brian Mills and The A tfomey Generd of Alberta and The Attorney General of
Canaab, AEdavit of Catherine Kane, Supreme Court of Canada, File Number 26358, at
page 2, paragraph 4.

Representatives fiom the Federal Department of Justice met with ''Provinciil Attorneys
General, representatives fiom the Defence Bar, representatives of the Canadian Bu
Association, acadernics, sexual assault victim service providers, women's groups and
others to solicit their views on criminal law reforrn initiatives in this area."

''

After the O 'Connor decision was rendered, the Department of Justice conducted fùrther
consultations with members of the Defence Bar, feminist academics, Crowns and service
providers for sexual assault complainants. This consultation process helped to establish a
range of viewpoints sunounding the disclosure of a complainant's therapeutic records. At
one end of the continuum were those that advocated an absolute privilege for al1
counseling and related records. This position was rejected, but a goal was established.
Specifically, Catherine Kane, an employee of the Federal Department of Justice, Criminal
Law Policy Section, States in her affidavit filed in the Supreme Court that:
There was a consensus that the right of an accused person to make fil1
answer in defence required the production of relevant information.
Participants in the consultation process emphasized that legislation should
include the following essentiai elements: dari@ that a wide range of
personal records commonly sought by defence counsel would be subject to
the codified procedure; dari@ that applications for production of records
should be brought at trial, not at the preliminary inquiry; clari@that the
accused must establish, with reference to specific grounds, that the records
sought would be likely relevant to an issue at trial or to the cornpetence of
a witness to test@; to require the judge to consider the Charter rights of
both the accused and complainant or witness before or in production to the
judge and/or to the accused; to dari@ that a subpoena issued to require a
record holder to bring records to the court would not circumvent the
production regime and result in the recipient of the subpoena providing the
records directly to the counsel for the accused and to clarifL that record
hotders (particularly senice providers), should not be punished in costs for
b6Zbid at page 2, paragraph 5.

asserting their rights and their cüents rights to privacy in the records sought
and for insisting that the acaised establish the relevance of the particular
records. [emphasis h e r ~ ] ~ ~
Due to this consultation process, legislative options were revised to create Bill C 4 6 . This
Bill was introduced by the Minister of Justice and received first reading in the House of

Commons on June 12, 1996. Next, this Bill was exaMned by the Standing Cornmittee on
Justice and Legal Affairs. This process included hearings wherein over 20 witnesses
appeared and represented a broad range of interests, including women's groups,
academics, the Canadian Mental Health Association, and representatives fkom both the
defence bar and the Crown. Bill C-46 received royal assent on A p d 25, 1997 and was
proclaimed in force and effect on M a y 12, 1997. 68
Further insight into the intent of the legislation can be gamered fiom news releases

associated with the new legislation. On June 12, 1996, the Department of Justice issued a
news release, indicating the aim of the new legislation was to "strengthen protection for

complainants of senial offences" and to "enhance privacy and equality nghts for al1
complainants." The amendments were "intended to correct a problem that has arisen
almost exclusively in sexud assault cases, which is the unwarranted invasion of a

"lbid. at page 3, paragraph 8. Note that written briefs were also submitted to the Standing
Cornmittee on Justice and Legal AfEairs by the National Association of Women and the
Law, the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, Canadian Mental Health
Association (Legal Issues Task Force), the National Council of Women of Canada,
Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres, Action ontarieme centre la violence faite aux
femmes, CALACS, METRAC and Canadian Council of Criminal Defence Lawyers.

Ibid at page 4, paragraph 9.
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complainant's private and confidenti d records for improper purp~ses."~~
As well, the intent of the legislation is clearly set out in its pre-amble. It addresses

concerns about sexual violence and abuse in our comrnunity. It also outlines the
detrimental affects of compelling production of intensely personal information, particularly
information associated with counseling and therapeutic records. The wording of the
legislation is strikingly similar to the pre-amble ponion of Bill C-49," now commonly
referred to as the rape shield provisions as set out in section 276 of the Crimiml Cd.''
As reviewed earlier, the rape shield provisions prohibit the couris nom relying on myths
and stereotypes that have historically pervaded the trial processes determination of sanial

assault complainant's credibility. They have attempted to restore some level ofdignity to
a fair trial process.
Beyond the pre-amble, it is argued that the new legislation continues to advance some of
the same themes as established by the rape shield provisions. In Seaboyer, the Court
debunked certain myths and stzreotypes improperly, and al1 too ofien, associated with a
sexual assault complainant. For example, section 276 prohibits the use of
Evidence that the complainant has engaged in semal activity, whether with
the accused or with any other person, ... to suppon an inference that, by
reason of this sexual nature of that activity, the complainant (a) is more
likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject matter

@'Department of Justice News Release, June 12, 1996.

''An Act to A m e d the CrirninaI C d e (sema/ arunrli). S.C. 1982, c. 38.

"H. Holmes, "An Analysis of Bill C-46, Production of Records in Sexual Offence
Proceedings" (1997) 2 Can. Cnm. L.R. 71 at 75.

of the charge; or (b) is less worthy of belief
In addition to these general statements of law, the legistators also codified a number of

considerations that are to be applied by a triai judge to assess the admissibility of a
complainant's sexual history. These factors are comparable to those set out in section
278.2. Section 276.(3) established the following factors:

the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make
hl1 answer and defence;
Society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault
offences;
whether there is a teasonabte prospect that the evidence will assist
in arriving at a just determination in the case;
the need to remove fiom the fact-finding process any discriminatory
belief or bias;
the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of
prejudice, syrnpathy or hostility in the jury;
the pot ential prejudice to the complainant' s persona1 dignity and
right or privacy;
the right of the complainant and of every individual to personai
security and to the fil1 protection and benefit of the law; and
any other factor that the judge, Provincial Court judge or justice
considers relevant.'-'

Thus, when one reviews the minonty's judgment fiom O 'Connor,and the legislators'
intent in the codification of sections 278.1 to 278.91, we observe a common goal that
encourages women who have been victimized by sexual assault to report those onences to
the police and have them dealt with in the criminal justice systern. Similady, in section

276.(3), we observe a specific recognition of the possibility for discriminatory beliefs or
biases and an acceptance that those issues should be excluded fiom the fact finding

Code.supra note 3. See also J. McImes and C. Boyle "Judging S e 4
J. Vol. 2 34 1, for an
Assault Law Against a Standard of Equality" (1 995) 29 U.B .C.L.

nCrirnid

excellent analysis of Bill C-49.
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process. Lastly, subxctions (0 and (g) underscore the importance of supporting the
dignity and nght to privacy as well as the p e ~ n security
d
of the complainant in cases
involving sexual offences.
Returning our attention to Bill C46, when one looks closely at the prohibited inferences
set out in section 278.3(4), a similar principle is recognized, that the existence of certain
facts do not, in logic or in law, allow for cenain inferences to be drawn. E.G. Ewaschuk
described inferences as "factuai conclusions drawn as a result of a process of logical
reasoning"." He went on to explain, in Mme detail, the method by which inferences may
be drawn:
Thus, a trier of fact is entitled to draw inferences fiom evidence tendered at
trial. The factud inferences are, generaiiy, drawn fiom 'primary findings of
fact' made by the trier of fact in respect of individuai items of evidence.
However, the inferences drawn must be safr: inferences in the sense that
they reasonably and logically follow fiom an item or items of evidence
accepted as validly proven onty after the trier of fact has weighed al1 of the
evidence as a whole. [emphasis bis]"
Relating this analysis to this disclosure issue for example, the fact that a therapeutic record

-

relates to treatment received by a complainant even if the treatment is directly connected
to the specific allegations of the proceeding - by itself does not allow inferences to be
made about issues of likely relevance. The fact that the complainant sought treatment
after being sexually assaulted by an accused person, and that a record of that treatment

Ewaschuck, Criminal P W n g s & Practice in CarmctQ,2nd ed. ( Aurora, Ont.:
Canada Law Book Inc., 1994) at 16-57.

7 3 ~ .

74ibid.at 16-57. See also Doherty, J.A.3 comments in R. v. Morrissey (1995), 97 C.C.C.
(3d) 193 at 209 (Ont. C.A.).

exists, is a neutral fact fiom which no inferences can be d r a ~ n . ' ~

However, this position was not adopted by the majority in O ' C o m r . It is suggested here
that the Court could have determined that without a strong evidentiary foundation to
establish relevance, no inference could be drawn fiom the temporal comection between
the creation of the records and the date of the alleged commission offence. It is argued
that no connection can flow Iogically and reasonably fiom this fact and as such it should
be condemed as conjecture and speculation."

The Supreme Court declined to protect the rights of the complainants and to create an

environment that does not deter women fiom invoking the criminal justice system. They
failed to recognize not only the general significance of the nature of therapeutic records,
but also the specific fiinction that a therapist or counsellor has when treating someone that

has been sexually assaulted. For exarnple, in addition to being extremely personal, the
materials are focused on explorhg the complainant's emotionai and psychological
responses to a traumatic event, particularly being sexually violated. This lies in significant
contrast to investigators' evidence and witness testimony that is relied on to ascertain

"See Chipman I.A. in R v. White (1994). 89 C.C.C.
(3d) 336 (N.S.C.A) at 35 1.
Holmes, supra note 7 1 at 89. Arguably the prohibition would not apply to a Iisted
factor coupled with some other fact, which together give rise to a legitimate inference
bearing on an issue at trial. While the simple existence of a sexual assault counseling
record is completely uninformative in and of itself, it might legitimately bear on the issues
in the trial if, for example, the complainant denied ever having used sexud assault
counselling services.
' 6 ~ .

historical facts." Perhaps an analogy will help make this point.

Unfortunately, most of us know someone whose home or apartment has been broken into.
If we do not, we can al1 certainly empathize with the victim of such a crime. They fetl

violated. The sanctity of their home has been breached and they fa1 angry, M d and
most of ail, very uneasy about staying in a place where they no longer feel safe. This is al1
aggravated by the fact that one's home is oflen considered a place to escape fiom the rest
of the world. For most, regardless of how bad things might get in the outside world, a
home is a place to retreat to that will a o r d one the opportunity to relax and fuid some
peace of mind. Once your home has been broken into you no longer have a sanctuq to
retreat to, rather you now need a place that you can go to because you feel vulnerable.
People understand this because it is a common human need to feel safe in one's home.
Through no fault of our own, anyone of us could be next. It is because of this that we ail
seem to have compassion for the needs of these types of victims. The desire to move or
guard against future invasions is recognized, as is the need for therapeutic counselling, in
some cases. In this exarnple, it is hard to imagine what court would ailow an accused
person charged with such an offence to obtain the therapeutic records of the home owner,
without a sound evidentiary basis, to determine whether the alleged victim, during their
discussions with their counsellor, possibly made any inconsistent statements about the day
their home was broken into, or their recollections as to how they found the contents of
their bedroom. Such a notion would be seen as positively outrageous. Of course counsel

"R v. O 'Connor. supra note I at 65.
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for an accused could always make an application for additional disdosure if the
appropriate circumstances were in place to suppon a daim of relevance. For example, if
counsel had obtained some information based on evidence that a complainant had in the
past "staged" or fdsified claims of king victirnized in such a fashion, then the counseu'mg
records of such a complainant may certainly be a live issue. Still the point is made that
such a daim of relevance would require an evidentiary foundation, and the courts, it is

suggested, would not be inclined to d o w counçel to embark on a "fishing expedition" to
discover potentially relevant details.
Our society has evolved to the point that we accept the place of counsellors in assisting
those that have been exposed to tembly traumatic events. For example, the state made
available to jurors who sat on the Paul Bemardo Case crisis therapists. As tners of fact to
these tragic and inhuman violent violations that they were required to observe, the criminal
justice system not only recognized the need for such a r e , but also paid for it. Most
Canadians would agree that this is a small price to pay for what society got in retum fiom
these citizens. In this light, could anyone imagine defence cwnsel arguing for the nght to
open such therapeutic records to ensure a juror's cornpetence? The notion evokes
indignation.
Outside of the criminal justice system another example is the counselling care that was
offered to those Nova Scotians, who risked their own lives to attempt to rescue any
potential suwivors of the downed Swiss Air flight, off shore fiom Peggy's Cove in the fdl
of 1998. And beyond just the civilian needs, the government dso recogntzed that the
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military personal, deployed to assist in the recovery process and having witnessed the
grisly remains of the doomed passengers, simila.needs for professional counselling. What
court would allow the opening of such records to assess the credibility of such witnesses,
if called to test@ about their observations during the course of a civil trial? Certainly such

a motion fiom the discovenng party would have an onerous burden to establish relevance.
Why then is that we have a difficult time understanding the need for a sexual assault

survivor to seek treatment for king attacked? The violation that they have suffered is far
worse than that of the homeowner. Where does the victim of a sexual assault go to feel
safe again? Tt is not their home that has been violated but their body, the very self that no

longer protects them from the world at large. It is not a property violation, rather it is a
violent interpersonal infnngernent. It is argued that the majority view in O *ConmrCase
failed to understand this reality in their interpretation of the nghts of the accused to make
full answer and defence and the nghts of the cornplainant to equality before the court and

to their privacy. The majority failed to apply a more contextual approach," as did
L'Heureux-Dubé J. in her questioning of the relevance of the records, to the issue of the
accused' s nght to full answer and defence. Reviewing her own rationale in R v. Osoh,"
she articulated the special characteristics of therapeutic records and highlighted the
potential they have to "derail" the fact finding mission of the trial process. Specifically, she

7 g ~ Boyle,
.
"A Feminist Approach to Criminal Defences" in R Devlin, ed., C W a n
Perspectives on Legal77wory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 1991),
advances the theory of contextualizing uniquely female experiences.

v.

Osolh. supra note 14.

attempted to contextualize the nature of the records, stating that:
...medical records conceming staternents made in the course of therapy are
both hearsay and inherently problematic as regards reliability. A witness's
concwns expresseci in the course of thcmpy atter the fact, even assurning
they are correctly understood and reliably noted, cannot be equated with
evidence given in the course of a trial. Both the context in which the
statements are made and the cxpectations of the parties are entirely
different. In a trial a witness is swom to testifL as to the particular events in
issue. By contrast, in therapy an entire spectrum of factors such as personal
history, thought. motions ru well as pahcular acts may inform the
dialogue between the therapist and patient. Thus, there is a serious nsk that
such statements could be taken piecemeal out of context in which they
were made to provide a foundation for entirely unwarranted inferences by
the trier of fact?

Yet, why do we as a society not feel the same level of empathy towards someone whose
body - and self - has been invaded and whose need for healing is premised on such an
intimate a level? It is my opinion that it is stereotypical misconceptions and unidonneci

positions that causes our criminal justice system to tum a blind eye to the h a m being
suffered by such groundless pnvacy invasions comected to demands for the production of

their therapeutic records. Support for this position can found in the contrasting opinions of
the Supreme C o u d s findings in R v. O *Conno#' on the issue of the threshold of likely

relevance at the first stage of the inquiry. For example, the majority of the Court sets the
threshold as "not an onerous one" and continues to link a close temporal comection

''lbid. at 499. H. Holmes, in "Access to Third Piriy Records" (1996) 44 C.R (4"') 144 at
148 examines the nature of counselling records. It is her concem that there exists an

immense potential for abuse of the material containecl therein and therefore argues for an
application of "scnipulous care to ensure actual relevance to real issues."

8'R V. O *Conmr.supra note 1. See also A Young in "When Titans Clash: the Limits of
Constitutional Adjudication" (1 9%), C.R ( 4 3 152, that examines the historiai revictimiuition by an insensitive and patriarchd crimiml justice system.

between the creation of the records and the date of the allegations as a relevant
consideration. This represents a jump in logic prernised on a stereotypical myth about
women who delay reporting an incident and should therefore be more carefiiliy
scmtinized. Rather, it is suggested here that the length of time that it takes for a person to
come foward with a complaint, without anything more, is indistinguishable fkom the
characteristic of the wursc of t r e a t m t selected to commence the huling processa
A secondary effect that may flow fiom such considerations is society's lost opportunity to

deter males tiom continuing such behaviour. If one assumes that women will be less
willing to corne before the courts to have these rnatters judicially deterrnined if they
believe their personal records will be opened and reviewed by the court (or worse the
accused) wit hout some evidentiary foundation to assess the t hreshold of relevance, then
society will have lost an oppomnity to address and denounce the behaviour as criminal.
One might also argue that those that would attack a female do so because they believe

they can over power the victim and because they can get away with it. Assuming, for a

moment, that individuals modi@ their behaviour to avoid negative consequences (such as
imprisonment or other court sanctions), certainly similarly minded individuals would
recognize the faiiure of the same court process to protect the rights of the complainant. As
a result of this lack of disincentive, they may be more willing to manipulate the position of

power imbalance that women occupy in our society's criminal justice system and continue
to conduct themselves in a manner that continues to objectie women and put their lives
82

See R. v. O 'Connor,supra note 1 at 65 for a discussion regarding the irrelevancy of
treatment type.

and safety in peril.
Actions taken by the courts that foctor in these myths and sterwtypes when determining
issues of access to third party records creates not only a grave injustice for the suMvor of
a sexual attack, but also for society as a whole. When the comrnunity loses faith in the
system' s ability to sene both the victim as well as those accused of crimes, respect for the
system is lost and people either stop looking for justice al1 together or, at a minimum, look
elsewhere for it. One clear example of this is the case of R.v. Lee," where the triai judge
considered the issue of the validity of sections 278.1 to 278.9, and declared the provisions
unconstitutional. The Court then decided that the records of the complainant should be
disclosed to the defence. As a result, the Crown, in consultation with the complainant,
stayed the criminal charges. It is suggested that this is a concrete example of how a niling
of a court on the issue of opening up a survivor's therapeutic records can impact the

process, including the community's right to access justice. As well, the impact can have a
ripple effect on other charges. As additional victims are advised of such rulings, they will
be forced to make difficult decisians about immersing themselves in a trial system that fails
to recognize a balancing of their equal rights and privacy concerns. Their individual health
concems and treatment progress will be factored into one's decision making process as to
whether or not they will come forward with their complaint. One c m only speculate, at
this stage as to the chilling effect that such rulings will have on our community's efforts to
reduce the fûrther violent victimization of women in Our society.

83Rv. Lee (1997), 35 O.R.(3d) 598 (Ont.
supra note 65.

GD.)and the Afiidavit ofCatherine KUK,
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Also, when compared to the Supreme Court's fomments in Smith v. Jonep a fiirther
inequality is revealed. In this case the main issue deliberated and commented on was
solicitor-client privilege. The facts in this case involved a male accused charged with
aggravated sexual assault on a prostitute. His lawyer refend him to a psychiatrist
believing that it would be o f assistance in the preparation of a defence or in supporthg a
sentencing position. The lawyer advised the accused that the consultation was privilegeâ.
During the consultation the accused told the psychiatrist, in great detail, his plan to
kidnap, rape and kill prostitutes. The psychiatrist infomed the lawyer that he was of the

opinion that the accused was dangerous and that he would, more tikely than not, carry out
this plan without treatment. The accused pled guilty and when the psychiatrist discovered
that his opinion wodd not be addressed in the sentencing hearing he commenced an action
for a declaration that he was entitled to disclose this information in the interests of public
safety. The British Columbia Court of Appeal ailowed the psychiatrist to disclose the

information to the Crown and the police. The Supreme Court of Canada a 5 m e d the
decision of the lower wurt and caretiiliy assesseci the three factors that shouid be taken
into account in determining whether public safety outweighs solicitor-client privilege: a
clear risk to an identifiable person or group of persons; a risk of serious bodily h m or
death; and imminence of danger."

84[1999]S.C.J. No. 15 Fik No.:26500.

"With the following directive; that the file was to be u n s d d and the publication ban was
liAed, except for those parts of the psychiatrist's report which did not fd1 within the public
safety exception.

What is relevant here, was the dissmting judgement of Major Jea6A component ofhis
rationale was based on fostering a "climate in which dangerous individuais are more Wcely
to disclose their disoders, seek treatment and pose l e s âanger to the p ~ b l i c . "It~was his
view that that to create such a climate it was necessary to confirm the communications as

privileged, but permit the psychiatrist to give his opinion and diagnosis regarding the
threat posed by the acaised. Particularly interesting was his perspective on the c h i h g
effect that opening the privileged relationship between patient and the founsdor would

have on the public. He stated:
If defence counsel cannot fieely refer clients, particulafly dangerous ones, to
medical or other experts without r u ~ i n the
g serious risk of the privilege k i n g set
aside, their response will be not to refer clients until &er the trial, if at d.This
could result in dangerous people remaining fke on bail for long penods of time ,
undiagnosed and untreated, presenting a danger to society.
The chilling effect of completely breaching the privilege would have the undesired
effect of discouraging those individuals in need of treatment for serious and
dangerous conditions fiom consulting professional help. In this case the interests of
the appellant and more importantly the interests of society would be better m e d
by obtaining treatment. This COU^ has rccognized that mental health including
those suffenng fiom potentially dangerous illnesses, is an important public good?

This issue of promoting treatment and counselling is not addressed by the majonty.
Therefore, while it would appear that the C o u d s majority position in O 'Connor,."
specifically that the societal interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences

g6~issenting
judgement included Lamer C.J.,Major and Bimie JJ.
"Smith v. Jones. =supra note 84 at 4.
"~bid. at 7. Reference at the end of this passage is made to M.@.)v. Rym, that is
discussed later in this chapter.
g9S~~pra
note 1 at 24.
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and the obtaining of treatment by victims was declared not to be a "paramount

consideration" in the detennination of the disclosure of complainants' counselling records,
the potential h m that flows tiom discouraging treatment for dangerous offenders is a
priority for the minority of the Court when it cornes to the issue of solicitor-client
privilege. Perhaps the distinction between the two is that, as highlighted in Chapter One,
the vast majority of s e 4 offenden are male and srnial usault complainats are f d c . If
this is in fact the premise behind the distinction, then the geder-bad inequality underlying
the positions is startling.

2. Constitutional Challenges and the Mills Case.

To review thus far, this chapter has examined a fact dnven issue being resolved through
the courts. In the absence of statutory principles, the courts created a rem*

a a o stage

process to determine the production of therapeutic records in a third party's possession.

The legisiative branch of government responded to the need for ftrther assistance by
passing Bill (2-46. This codification was created through a public consultation proccss,
and input fiom Canadian legal scholars, including those Justice's sitting on the Supreme

Court of Canada. Yet this is not the end of our review. The next stage in the formation of
a law in Canadian çociety is how the courts have interpreted Bill C-46. As one would
have expected, there have been constitutional challenges to sections 278.1 to 278.91.
While these constitutional challenges are interesting enough on their own, they dso
advance the examination of gender inequality within the criminal justice system. To focus
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on this issue other matters such as procedural requirements, distinctions ôetween the

credibility and the reliability of complainants in sexual assault prosecutions and rulings on
the review and production of therapeutic records are not discussed here?

Further support for the argument that gender plays a large part in the creation of a law can
be inferred fiorn the language used by the courts as they assess the wnstitutionaiity of Bi11
C 4 6 . In particular, it is noted that although one Court cites principles that prohibit the

ranking of Charter rights, the end result of the balancing process implemented favours the
accused's right to full answer and defence over the female wmplainant's right to privacy.
It is dso important to note in these cases the degree to which the trial judges attempt to
determine the constitutionality of Bill C-46 within a fiamework of contextualization. This
is particularly significant in the consideration of the section 1 Chorter limitations.
Belzil J. found Bill C-46 as unconstitutionai. In this case,the
For example in R v. MNS,~*
accused was charged with a sexual assault offence and sought disclesure of the
cornplainant 's therapeutic records, not in possession of the Crown. During the course of
the trial, the defence commenced a series of motions for the disdosure of the
complainant's therapeutic records. Belzil J. onginally applied the principles as set out by
the majority in O 'Connor,as the motions pre-dated the legislation. Having been
persuaded on their likely relevance, Beizil J. reviewed the records and ordered two fiil1

q o r interpretations on procedurai issues see: R v. C.KG..[1997] S.J.No. 856 (Sask.
Q.B.); R. v. J.F.G..[1997]N.W.T.J. No. 47 (SC.).

''R

V.

MiIIs. sl(pr4 note 2.
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and two part pages discloseci to the rccused. A second motion, requesting additional

records was heard but prior to a ruling Bill C-46 was mled in force and effect. Counsel
for the accused advocated that Bill C-46 violated the accused's section 7 and 11 (d)
Charter rights. The violation was articulated through an impairment of his ability to make
full answer in defence and an undennining of his constitutionai right to a f ~triai.
r Equaiity

rights as guaranteed by section 15 of the C h f e rwere not considered by the Coun.
Belzil J. accepted the majonty's view in the Supreme Court of Canada in O 'Conmr as the
state of the law. At page 336, he stated:
It is important to note that the majority judgment pointed out that in
criminal proceedings, the ultimate goal is the search for tnith rather than
the suppression of potentially relevant e v i d e n ~ e . ~ ~
The Alberta Court also highlighted the majority's rejection of the concept of a societd
interest in the prosecution of sexual assault o f f e n ~ e sIt. ~was
~ determined that those factors
considered as relevant by L'Heureux-Dube J. and specifically rejected by the majority, yet
included in the new legislation, were relevant issues to be assessed in detemiinhg the
constitutional validity of the legislation. In addition, Belzil J. also noted that because Bill
C 4 6 altered the balance between privacy rights and the rights of the accused to a fair trial,

in pan because the majority's ruling on the likely relevance test at the first stage,

specifically endorsing a low threshold, was c o n t r q to the higher threshold provided for in
the new legislation. The Court held that this also created an unf'air

burden o n the

Following this Belzil J. analyzed the inherent confiict between the two parties7rights by
adopting Lamer C.J.C.findings in the Dagemïs Case.Specifically Behl J. noted:
It would be inappropriate for the courts to continue to apply a cornmon
law mle that automatidly favoured the rights protected by S. I l(d) over
those protected by s.2@). A hierarchal approach to rights, which places
some over others, mua be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and
when developing the common iaw. When the protected rights of two
individuals corne into conflict, as can occur in the case of publication bans,
Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that hlly respects the
importance of both sets of rights."
Belzil J. then goes on to conclude that "privacy rights do not tmmp the right to a fair trial
and the right to fair trial does not trump privacy rights."= Finally, Behl J. brings his
judgement to an end by holding Bill C 4 6 unconstitutional because within the legislation
"privacy rights are ranked paramount to the rights of an accused to a fair trial."97
On a procedural ground, Belzil J. highlighted section 278.4(2) that specifies that neither

the cornplainant nor the record holders are compellable as witnesses at a hearing for
disclosure. This provision was held to constitute a substantial departure fkom the
reasoning of the majority in O 'Cont10r.~

95CanodanBrdcasting Corp. v. Dogenais. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 83 5; 94 C.C.C. (3d) 289; as
cited in R v. MiIIs* mpra note 2.

06R. v. Mi//s*mpra note 2 at 344.

Moreover, on the ground of departing fiom the majority's position on the appropriate
considerations the trial judge concluded:

In the net result, Bill C-46forces a trial judge, without having seen the
documents, to engage in such a balancing of interests at an early stage and
compeis the trial judge, in part, to use factors specifically rejected by a
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada even at the second stage of the
analysis.
It is clear, accordingly, that Bill C-46 does, indeed, incorporate a number of legd
propositions advanced by the minority of the Supreme Court of Canada in
O ' C o ~ o and
r specifically rejected by the rnaj~rity.'~
Tt is suggested that an overwhelrning concern of Belril, J. was the potentiai for a

miscamage of justice for an accused if wrongly convicted. Part of his concern was
connected with the nature of a sexual assault offence and the stigmatitation that follows a
conviction for sarne. He determined that the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada in
O 'Cornor properly balanced al1 interests connected to the production of third party

records and concluded that:
Bill C-46 tilts the balance and creates a legislative regime which is presumptive
against disdosure even though the Supreme Court of Canada majority in
O 'Cortrior stated that such records are oAen relevant in criminal proceedings. In
my view, the tilting which 1 have identified is cunfirmed by the legislative adoption
of a number of legal propositions specifically rejected by a majority of the court."'
As such, the Court determined that the accused's Charter rights as guaranteed in sections
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7 and 1 1(d) had been breached by Bill C46.

In a later decision, the sarne Court prepared its judgment on the issue of whether or not
the new legislation could be saved by section 1 of the Chrater-'02At the hearing of the
determination of the issue, evîdence was called by the Crown to elaborate on the specific
and unique nature of a sexual assault complainant's relationship with a therapist. Refemng
to this evidence Belzil J. summarized the vulnerabiiity and potential harm suffered by a

sexual assault survivor. He held:
It is clear that the vast majority of complainants of sexual abuse are fernale.
Therapists, for the most part, accept complainants of sexual abuse at face
value, and absent information to the contrary, accept the complainant's
version of alleged abuse as being accurate. The foais of individuals
engaged in treating victims of sexual abuse is on rehabilitation and therapy,
not on verifying the tmth of allegati~ns.'~~
The Court attempted to corne to grips with the potential chilling effea that the production
of third party therapeutic records might have on other complahants of sexual assault,

particularly related to their desire to seek wunselling and treatment, to begin or advance
the healing process. As such, the two competing interests needed to be bdanced against

the other. One had to give way to the other and, in the end, it was held that the

impairment of a fùndarnentai right, such as hl1 answer in defence, could not be saved by
section 1 of the Charredol The ultimate effect of this determination is the creation of a
hierarchy of Chmer rights, with the accused's right to full ariswer and defence ranked
--

'o'R v. Mills(1997), 207 A.R. 161 (Q.B.).
'O3ibid.at 166.
''%id at 173.

above the confîicting rights of a complainant.

Also related to the issue of contextualking the impact of the application of the legislation,
Belzil J. continued to assess the impact on complainants' willingness to access justice
through the criminal court. He recognized that the disclosure of therapeutic records "will
act as a deterrent for a few cornplainants not to seek therapy" but he was satisfied that no
more than a "small handtiil of patients have refiised therapy due to a risk of disclosure in
the course of legal proceeding~."'~~
This position was based on his examination of the
evidence presented looking at the impact of the O 'ConnorCaw over the two years
following its determination. Rather, Belzil J. stressed the potential positive cathartic affect
that a trial has for a "small numbei' of complainants that may also lead to either the
commencement of therapy or the pursuit of fûrther therapy? However, the Coun did not
incorporate into its decision the effect that a not guilty verdict, based solely on credibility,
might have on a complainant. As well, no assessment was made by the Court as to what

impact the arbitrasr determinations of likely relevant information, containeci within a
complainant's counselling records, may have on women deciding whether or not they will
access justice through the criminai courts.
Rather, the Coufi, in conclusion, stated:
As important as privacy nghts are, the fact is that the criminai justice
system must remain vigilant to the danger of wrongfiil conviction.

Parliament is not fke to impair Charter protected rights. A balance must
be stnrck between competing rights of privacy, on one hand, and the right
to a fair trial, on the other.
In my view, Bi11 C-46 is not a proportional response and does not constitute a
minimal impairment of rights, but rather constitutes a substantial impairment of the
fundamental right to a f i r trial."'
In a similar application, Chapnik J. also held that sections 278.1 to 278.9 1 were

unconstitutional.'" In R v. Lee, the acaised was charged with two counts of xmd
assault. During the course of his trial, Mr.Lee presented the Court with an argument that
the new legislation violated his sections 7 and 1l(d) Ci#nler rights. The Court agreed and
fully and unreservedly adopted the reasoning of Mr.Justice Belzil in R v. M i i i ~ . Later
'~
the Court assessed whether or not the legislation, now deemed unconstitutional, could be
saved by section 1 of the Charrer. Chapnik J. held that the new legislation could not be
saved by section 1, and the Court ordered the production of third party records according
to the procedure laid out by the Supreme Court of Canada in O 'Connor. In detennining

the issue, the Court balanced the conflicting rights of the individuals involved in the
process, and stated:
As 1 held yesterday, Parliament's attempt at balancing has resulted in a

violation of the accused's right to a fair trial. There is not public interest in

'OUR. v. Lee (1 997),35 O.R.594 (Ont. G.D.).

'(%.
v- Milis, supra note 2. See dso R v. E.H., [1998] O.J. No.4515 (Ont. G.D.), and R
v.Hmper, 119971O.J.No. 5584 (Ont. G.D.),that adopt the rasons as set out in R v.
Mills.
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impairing the rights of the accused person to have a fiiir trial."'
Furthemore, the Court relied on an article written by David Paciocco'" that enumerated
reasons why, in his view, Bill C-46 was unconstitutional. In his assessrnent of
proportionality, he concluded:
In the end, though, this legislation is not even close to rninimally impairing
the relevant constitutional rights, the tests that this Bi1 adopts are so
weighed down with extraneous factors and with redundant obstacles to
access that it simply c m o t be found to be rninimally impairing. In fact, so
prevalent are those obstacles, that this Bill will corne perilously close to
qualiSing as one of those rare enactrnents whose very purpose, and not
just its effect, contravenes the Charter."'
Thus, in these two cases we see the courts grappling with the competing interests of the
accused's right to a full answer a defence and the wmplainants right to equality and
privacy. Also, it is significant to note that the complainant's rights, while considered are
not scrutinized within the parameters of the Charter. In the end, the female complainant's

constitutional guarantees rernained unrecognized and were forfeited to those claimed by
the male accused.
On the other hand, a series of cases have upheld the constitutionality of the new

legislation. In R v. Stronrner, Patterson A.C.J. upheld the new legislation as constitutional

"OR. v. Lee (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 598 at 602 (Ont. G.D.).
"l~aciocco,D. "Bill C-46 should not suMve constitutional challenge", 3 Semal Offences
Law Reporter 185 at 192. See also M. Peters "Third Party Disclosure Under O'Connor:
Defence Concems (1996) 44 C.R.(4'") 179.
"'lbid.as cited in R v. Lee, supra note 1 10 at 602.
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except for section 278.5(2),"' in an application by Mr.Stromner for access to the
complainant's records in the possession of a third Party. A component of the accused's
application was that Bill C-46, was of no force and effect becsuse it violateci his rights as
guaranteed under section 7 of the Chorter. Once again, an argument promoting the
declaration of the legislation as unconstitutional focused on the legislation's requirement
that a trial judge was tu consider factors that the majority in the Supreme COURof Canada
rejected as appropriate considerations. These considerations related to Society's interest
in encouraging the reporting of sema1 offences, society's interest in encouraging the

obtaining of treatment by complainants of sexual offences and the effect of the
determination on the integrity of the trial pro ces^."^ When he considered these values,
they were contrasted with the accused's guaranteed rights to fùll answer in defence and

-

the foundational premise of the criminal justice system that no innocent person is
wrongly convicted of an offence.

In balancing these competing interests, the trial judge detennined that the means set out in
the new legislation, to balance the competing interests, were rationally connecteci. He

specifically held:
Society and the Mctims of sexual crimes equally have an interest in
ensuring, to the extent possible, that the victims are not fùrther humiliated
and degraded by disclosure of essentiatly private material.
The impugned legislation is Parliament's direction for balancing these
competing interests. In my view, with the exception of S. 278.5(2), the

ll3R.

v.

Stromner, ,119971A.J. No. 872 (Aita. P.C.).

"'R v. Stromner, [1997] A.J. No. 872 (Aita. P.C.).

measures contained in the Act are not orbitrary, unfir or based on
irrational considerations. In balancing the interests of both parties, each of
whom enjoys Constitutional protections, the means are rationaily
comected to the objective. Finaily, there is a proportionality between the
Charter limitations on the nght of disclosure in the accuseci and the privacy
rights of the indi~idual.~"
These words aiign themselves with the evolution of principles set out in the Law Case, lr6
that contemplated the scope and purpose of section 15 Chmer guaranteed rights to
equality.

As well, within a contextual fiamework the trial judge recognized the degrading aspects of

a sexual assault cornplainant role in the criminal justice system. He noted that in addition
to being compelled to test@ to the degrading aspects of the crime, an additionai fbrther

humiliation was being suffered as a result of the disclosure of her most intimate records to
the very person who perpetrated this terrible indignity upon

ber."'

Nonetheless, with regards to section 278.5(2), the triai judge determined that the
requirement of a judge to take into consideration factors, without having had an
opportunity to review the records, created an "insurmountable banier in the detennination
of the process." It was his view that the inclusion of these factors dunng this stage of the
disclosure detennination process, had the potential of impacting o n an accused's nght to

ll'lbid at 49 and 50.
l16Lmuv. Minister of Utman Resarrfes Development, File No.: 25374, judgernent March
25, 1999.
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make full answer and defence. "'As a result, this section was deerned u n c o n s t i t ~ t i o n a l . ~ ~ ~
As well, there are a series of cases that have upheld the constitutionality of the new

legislation in its entirety. In R v. Hurrie, a defence motion was heard to strike down Bill46."' During an application in a dangerous offender proceeding, one of the Crown

witnesses revealed, for the first time, that she had spoken about the sexual offence to a
counsellor in 1977. The Crown was not aware of this information until testified t o by the
witness. As a result of this testimonial disclosure, defence cornmenced a motion for the
disclosure of the therapeutic records and challenged the constitutionality of provisions in
sections 278.1 to 278.9 of the Criminal Code. The defence postulated that the legislation
created a presumption against disclosure and that the procedurai requirements set out in
Bill C-46 infringed the accused's right to make hll answer in defence. The defence
argument proposed that the new legislation irnpaired the ability o f defence counsel to
properly prepare a defence because witnesses would be "chilled in their discussions with
defence counsel.""'

Additionally, the defence proposed that the procedural requirements

were too onerous and that they included factors not present in the majority judgment in

O 'Conrror.
The trial judge determined that the provisions in section 278.5(2) simply provided for the

1181bidat 46.
llglbid.at 46.
''OR v. Hurrie, [1997] B.C.J.No. 2634 (B.C.S.C.).

"'lbid. at 10.
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need to establish an evidentiary basis of relevancy before a-ing

the initial production of

the documents in questions, first to a judge and then potentiaily to an acaised.
Taylor J. r a i d an interesting issue related to the accused's right to fbll answer in defence.
Specifically, a concern was raised for potential complainants who wished to assen their
rights to privacy and were aware that no such privacy right existed. The Court was
concened that such a complainant might refiise to provide even the Crown with this
information. This would then circumvent the procedural process of the legislation that
attempts to promote, at least in put, the accused's right to full answer in defencd2'
Having reviewed the positions of both parties, Taylor J. formulated the specific issue,
"whether in the recognition of the right to privacy in tenns of records as defined in section
278.1, in the context of offences involving a cornpiainant or witnesses' sexual integrity, as

Parfiament, in establishing procedures under section 278.1 to 278.9 by requiring the
establishment of evidentiary basis, created an unacceptable risk of a possibility of
miscarriage of justice occumng?""
The Court concluded that in an effort to balance the competing constitutional interests of

the defence and the complainant, the intent of the legislation required an evidentimy basis
of likely relevance, as opposed to an accused assertion of reievance as the threshold for
invoking the two stages contemplated in the legislation. It was detennined that the burden

of establishing this evidentiary basis for production at either stage was not an onerous one.

The court concluded:
In my view, the procedures set up under Bill C-46 do not prevent an
accused fiom the exercise of his right to hiIl answer in defence in a way
that could be said to infnnge upon those rights. Rather, it establishes in an
area of societal concern about the privacy rights of complainants and
witnesses in the context of sexual condua and the effea~upon such
persons of disclosure a low level evidentiary threshold of likely relevance
across which an accused mua pass to invade the privacy of wch persons in
pursuit of their constitutional rights. Recognizing that mere assertions are
not adequate, Bi11 C-46 adopts this evidentiary threshold in the context of
the criminai process and thus establishes, as 1 have remarked, a low
threshold.'"
In R. v. Cirrti, the British Columbia Supreme Court addressed the issue of a section 1

Charter consideration.'" Hutchison, J. dealt with an accused's motion regarding

restrictions on his right to make full answer in defence as a result of Bill C-46's procedurd
requirements. The COU^ dismissed the application and went on to hold that any
restrictions on the accused's right to make fùll answer in defence were justified in a fiee
and democratic society because they merely required an accused to demonstrate Wrely

relevance. This requirement balanced the accused's rights with the complainant's nght to
privacy. Hutchison, J., in coming to his conclusions, had the opportunity to review the

In addition to these trial level cases, the Court also reviewed
case law set out ab~ve.''~
Chief Justice Dickson's findings in R v. Oakes,including:
Canadian society is to be fiee and democratic. The court must be guided
by the values and principles essential to a fiee and democratic society
which 1 believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity

l2'1bid at 22.

"1v. Curti, [1997] B.C.I. No. 2367 (B.C.S.C.).
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R v. Milis, mpra note 2; R

v. Strorntier, m~prunote 1 1 3; R v. Lee, supra note 108.

of the human person, wmmitment to society justice and equality,
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group
identity, and faith in society and politicai institutions which enhance the
participation of individuals and groups in Society. The underlying values
and pnnciples of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the rights
and fieedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against
which a lirnit on a right for fieedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be
reasonable and demonstrablyju~tified.~~'
An effort was made by the trial judge to consider these guiding principles in its assessrnent

of social history and values, in addition to the broad design and workings of society when
it determined certain section 1 lirnitati~ns.'~~
Finally, the Court detemiined that with the

establishment of a likely relevance threshold Parliament pteserved fiili answer and defence
while at the same time preventing accused individuals fkom engaging in fishing
expeditions. In stnking the appropriate balance, the Court concludeâ:
The cases hold that if Parliament has clearly s h o w its intention to take a
certain course, and this course does not go beyond rninimally infnnging a
Charter right, the courts should be loathe to overn.de Pafliament, which is,
&er all, surely supreme in a free and democratic ~ o c i e t y . ' ~ ~
I n a recent decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, both the constitutionality of Biil
C-46 as well as the role of the legislative branch of the govemment, was considered. In

the case R. v. Regan , the accused applied to the Court for dedaration that sections 278.1

I2'R v. Oakes (1986), 24 C.C.C. (36) 32 1 (S C . C . )at 346; as cited in R v. Curt&supra
note 128 at 8.
12?lones v. 7he Queen (1986), 3 1 D.L.R.
(4&)569 at 594 (S.C.C.); as cited in R v. Curti,
supra note 125 at 10.

129R.
v. Curti. supra at note 125, at 20. See also R
G.D.), endorsing R. v. Curri

v. Fm>jy, [1997] O.J. No. 4828 (Ont.

I O9

to 278 -91 of the Crimiml Code, were unconstituti~nd."'~
In this case, the accuseci,
charged with a number of m related offences, argud that the new legislation created a
more onerous regime than was considerd appropriate by the Supreme Court of Canada in

O 'Connor and as a result, this legislation infnnged his sections 7 and 1l(d) rights as
guaranteed under the Charter. The application was dismissecl by MacDonald, AC-J., who
held that the legislation was not so significantly different fiom the process considered by
the Supreme Court of Canada in O 'Connor, so as to render it unconstitutional. Once
again. the Court grappled with the competing interests of the accused and complainant. In

doing so, the Coun also considered the two branches of govenments law making roles.
Sirnply put, the Court acknowledged "Parliament is supreme, provided its laws are
constitutionally valid. The Court's role is to ensure constitutional c~rnpliance.'~'
Both the Crown and interveners for the complainants argued that the process as
formulated in O 'Cottnor was not the only possible constitutionally valid approach to the
production of private records. It was their view that as long as Bill C-46 addressed and
balanced competing rights in a constitutionally acceptable way, then the legislation should
be deemed constitutionally valid, even where the processes diverge fkom those proposed
by the Supreme Court of Canada. Interestingly, they advocated that "to force Parliament
to follow O 'Connor on al1 fours, would be tantamount to the courts (as opposed to

130R.

v.

Regan, [1998] N.S.J.No. 356 (N.S.S.C.),
r e l d September 15, 1998.

'"'lbid. at 13; The court acknowledged that this relationship was originally confirrned by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Vriend W. Alberta (1998), 156 D.L.R.(4") 385 at 437.

Parliament) writing legislati~n."'~~
Prior to reviewing the pre-amble of the legislation, the Court recognized the range of
alternatives the legislators had when wntemplating a response to the vacuum in the
codified provisions of the CrimimI Code. The legislators did not adhere to requests for
total disdosure that would have completely ignored the complainant's privacy and equality
rights. Similady, they rehted the position of absolute privilege which would have, of
course, ignored the accused's rights. The Court, deterrnined that "like the majority in

O 'Connor,it attempted to strike a balance that would recognize both sets of wmpeting
rights."'"As a result, the Court presumed that Parliament attempted to reconcile both
competing rights in a constitutionally valid manner.'Y

In R. v. N.J.M., an accused was charged with semial assault and buggery offences.
Counsel for the accused brought an application seeking production of the complainant's
medical and psychiatrie records. The Court held that the application failed to provide any
evidence to ground the belief that the complainant's therapeutic records had any likely
relevancy as connected to the issues of the complainant's state of memory or to her

'14Note: there are additional cases that have considered the constitutionality and upholding
Bill C-46 as valid, that have not been reviewed in this essay. These cases include R v.
Hnyda, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2600 (B.C.S.C.); R v. Weeseekase,[1997] S.J.No. 790 (Sask.
Q.B.); R V. G.C.B., 119971 0.1. No. 5019 (Ont. G.D.);
R v. REC., [1998] O.J. No. 977
(Ont.G.D.);
R v. R. [unreportedl Mr.Justice Belleghen, Brampton, Ontario, June 2, 1998
(Ont. G.D.)
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competency and credibilityJJSM e r review t h e pre-amble of the legislation and Sections
278.3(4), 278.5(1) and (Z), Easton J. determined that he was bound by the legislative

enactments. It is important to note, however, he also indicated that this case did not
involve a constitutional challenge of the legislation and the Court did not nile on that
issue.
The Court went on to comment on the privacy of the complainant and the privacy and
sanctity of these records have and that they have now assumed a pararnountcy which they
rnay not have enjoyed prior to the recent enactments. The Court held:
Obvious care was taken by Parliament to address a myriad of grounds
which it has now stated to be, in and of themselves, insufficient to establish
likely relevancy to an issue at trial or to the competency of a witness to
testiîjr. 13'

Thus, the Canadian trial courts are far fiom unanimous on the constitutionalityof Bill C46. Perhaps more importantly for our purposes here, the courts have a l s given
~
diserent

values to the conflicting interests of the rights of the male accused and those of the female
complainants. For exarnple, in the Mills case BelWl J. held the law to be unconstitutional
and that it could not be saved by section 1 ofthe Charter primarily because of it's impact
on an accused person's right to tùll answer and defence. Contrary to this, the cases that
were reviewed here that upheld the Bill as constitutional did so after considering the

135R
v. MJM. (1 997). 155 Nfid. And P.E.I.R. 228 at 236.
'3616idat 235. See also A. Young "When Titans Clash: the Lirnits of Constitutiond
Adjudication" srrpra note 8 1 for a discussion regarding the nature of constitutional
adjudications that balance these competing interests.

Il2

contextual effects of opening and disclosing these counselling records. These effms
included society's interest in having srnial offences reported, the integrity of the triai
process and the potential for the further humiliation and degradation of the female
complainants. Although not specifically articulated it these cases, it is submitted that these
positions are the same issues and balances that a section 15 Charter andysis of equaiity
would mandate. Therefore, to be given even greater weight it is urged that these positions
of equality should be evaluated by the courts within a section 15 Charter right.

3.

L.L.A. v Beharriell

In L.L.A. v. Beharrieli,13' the compendium criminal case to O 'Connor, Beharriell was
charged with indecent assault. The allegations dated back some 13 years prior to the
charge being laid. In 1992, the cornplainant went to a public hospital care centre and a

second adult women's counselling centre to obtain counselling for the difficulties that she
was suffering as a result of the alleged sexual abuse. Prior to the trial, Beharriell brought a

motion for the production of the complainant's counselling records. The motion was
adjourned to be determined by the trial judge. The Crown served and filed notices to
quash the subpuenas served on the two counselling organizations. The trial judge
dismissed the Crown application to quash the subpoenas. The trial judge alx, held that the
records were not privileged and ordered the production of the counselling records.

13'(1995), 103 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.).
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Eventually, the cornplainant and the two counselling organizations appealed the issue to
the Supreme Coun of Canada. In the meantime the triai judge stayed the order for
production pending the outcome ofthe appul.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal because the procedures for the

production of the wunselling records a s set out in the O 'Conmr case were not followed.
In part, because neither the trial judge nor the parties had the benefit of the Court's

decision in O 'Corrnor at the time of the original motion, Beharriell was allowed to renew
his request at his trial under the two stage process enunciated in O 'Connor.*"

Larner C. J-C. and Sopinka J., with Cory and Major J.J. concurring, wrote for the majority.
Related to the procedure and the substantive issues connected with the production of the
sexual assault counselling records in the hands of third parties, they simply endorsed the
law as it was established in O'Connor.

L'Heureux-Dubé J., with LaForest and Gonthier J.J. concurring, agreed with the
majority's result but expanded her reasons as she addressed the issue of privilege. She
concluded that the private records of a senial assauh criMnal proceeàing should not, as i
class, be considered as privileged communications.

Still, she did provide reasons that may prove to be helpfùl for the courts as guidelines for

114

assessing applications for the production of these types of materials. In particular she
began her ruwns by articulating some basic evidentiary first principles. She noted that "aii
relevant information is presumptively admissible at triai" aithough "srne probative and
trustworthy evidence will be excluded to serve ovemding social inter est^.""^ This
exception creates privilege within the scheme of public policy. L'Heureux-Dubé J.
descnbed the traditional justification for legal pnvilege as utilitarian o r "instrumentai"
considerations that focus on the societal importance of certain relati~nships.'~
She
explained:
Essentially, t his rationale asserts that cornmunications made within a given
relationship should be privileged only if the benefit derived fkom protecting
the relationship outweighs the detrimentai effects of priviiege o n the search
for the truth."'
This passage would seem to support the notion that courts should be considering the

effect that the opening of such records might have on the willingness of sexual assault
victims to either seek counselling or coming foward to the police with their cornplaints of
sexual abuse.

L'Heureux-Dubé J. also highlighted a second non-utilitarian viewpoint to justify privileged
communications founded on a more abstract proposition. This perspective was anchoreci

"'lbid at 107;see also M. Neuhauser in "The Privilege of Confidentiality and Rape Crisis
Counselors" (1985) 8 Women's Rts L. Rep. 185; R. Weisberg "Defendant v Witness:
Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory
Communications Privilege" (1977-78) 30 Stan L. R. 935 at 940 to 942.

in fiindamental individual values that align themselves more with the principles protected
in the Charter. Specifically, regarding the communications within the context of the
counsellor and sexual assault complainant relationship she quotes Anna Joo:
Whereas the utilitarian rationaie views the goal of counselor- patient
privilege as promoting beneficial fùture relations, the privacy justification
perceives the main purpose of the privilege as shielding the patient fiom the
h m that the disclosure may cause. According to the privacy justification,
some human relationships are tùndamentai to human dignity and should be
fiee fiom state interference.'"
Within the x o p e of L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s anaiysis of privilege she c o n d e s that there is a
strong contention for protecting the confidentiality of the records of wmmu~cations
between a counsellor and a sexual assault complainant. These arguments for privilege
were broken d o m into five categories. First, that sexuai assault counselling relationships
are based and depend on confidentiality. This confidentiality was recognized as essential in

"creating the sense of security necessary to encourage the free flow of discussion which is
crucial to the victim's recovery."'"

Second, without confidentiality sexual assault victims wiil be deterred fiom seeking

la21bid at 108; see also A. Joo, "Broadening the Scope of Counselor - Patient Privilege to
Protect the Privacy of the Sexual Assault SuMvor" (1 9 9 9 , 32 Harv. J. on Legis. 255 at
260; "Developments in the Law - Privilege Communications" (1 985), 98 Harv. L. Rev.
1450; R. v. Gmenke (1991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at 315 (S.C.C.).
'431bidat 1 15; see also K. Williamson "Confidentiality of Sexual Assault Victim Counselor Communication: A Proposed Mode1 Statute" (1984) 26 A&. L. R 461 at 466
to 467; C. Scarmeas, "Rape Victim-Rape Crisis Counselor Communications: A New
Testimonial Privilege" (1 98 1- 1982) 86 Dick. L. Rev. 539 at 543 to 544; M. Lawrence
"Rape Victim-Crisis Counselor Communications: An Argument for an Absolute Privilege"
(1984) 17 U.S. Davis L. Rev. 1213 at 1223 to 1224.
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treatment or fiom discussing with their counsellors al1 of the information ~ 0 ~ e C t e
todthe
h m suffered. This effect would be harrrûul to both the victims and to society as a

whole.'"

Third, the possible repercussions of the chilling effect of anything that deters victims fiom
seeking counselling which may lead victims to report these crimes to the authorities will
accentuate the under-reporting of these type of offences. This is particularly significant
because according to Statistic Canada only 6% of the sexual assaults surveyed in 1993
were reported to the police.'45Concems of female complainants over the police and the
courts treatment of their allegations deters a significant portion of women fiom reporting
these criminal transgressions to the authorities. In contemplation of the contextual
application of the law L'Heureux-Dubé J. wrote:
The legal system has a direct and vital interest in promoting the reporting
of sexual assaults. It is important to recognize the impact that procedurai
and substantive rules have upon the resolve of sexuai assault victims to
obtain treatment and upon the reporting of crimes of this nature. Therefore,
the societal importance of the relationships between counseIlors and sexuai
assault complainants necessarily goes beyond the benefit to the victims: it
also vitally linked to the effectiveness of the criminal justice to deal with
sexual assault ~rirnes."~
Fourth, the records of statements made in the course of medical or therapeutic treatments

"'J. Robert "Criminal Justice Processing of Sexual Assault Cases" (1994), 14 : 7 Juristat
3; and Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, Changrhg the Lm&cqe: ErtcIi'ng the
Violence - Achieving L@a&y (1 993) at 28 to 29.

'"%.L.A. v. Beharriell, supra note 137 at 1 16.
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are hearsay and intrinsicaily unreliaMe. fhis unreliability, in part, stems fiom the fact that

the records are gathered in a medical or therapeutic context. Treatment in these situations
requires that counsdlors inquire into personai history, thoughts, emotionai and other triai
irrelevant information. The purpose of maintaining these records is to assin in counselling
not to create an accurate historical verbutimt record. Also, these records are not
necessady produced contemporaneously with the counselling sessions. Al1 of these fictors

combined accentuate the therapeutic or founseling notes ~ n r e l i a b i l i t ~ . ' ~ ~

Fifth, the comrnon law principles goveming privilege need to be compatible with Chrrrier

values including female victims' privacy and equaiity interests. This position is bolstered
by a review by the Court of other Chrter values, such as the right to freeâom of religion

and expression. In these instances we are able to observe how the Canadian courts have

consistently considered the application of such principles in relation to the constitutional
rights affected.'" The links that exist between laws and their societal consequences have
been highlighted and considered.

Still, regardless of these arguments, L'Heureux-Dubé J. rejected a class privilege for these

14'16id at 1 17; see a h M. MacCrimmon and C. Boyle, "Equdity Faimess and Relevance:
Disclosure of Therapists Records in Sexual Assault Records in Sexual Assault Trials, in
Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, Filtering and Analysing Evidence in
an Age of Diversity (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1993) 81 at 1O3 to 105.

at 1 17 to 1 18; see also M. MacCrimmon, "Developments in the Law of Evidence:
The 1991-92 Term Truth, Faimess and Equality" (1993), 4 Sup. Ct. L.Rev. (2d) 225 at
258 to 259.
'%id.

pnvate records. Given the principle aim of our criminai justice system's adversarial
process is the search for truth, she concluded:
A class privilege is a complete bar to the information contained in such
records, whether or not relevant, and the onus to ovemde it is a heavy one
indeed. The particular concems r a i d by the recognition of a class
privilege in favour of private records in criminal law relate to: (1) the tmthfinding process of our adversarial procedure; (2) the possible relevance of
some private records; (3) the accuseci's right to make fiil1 answer and
defence; (4) the categories of actors inciuded in a class privilege; and (5)
the experience of other countries.

'"

On this last point, the experience of other countries, L'Heureux-Dubé J. examines both the
American and some of the Commonwealth countries' positions. She concludes the
Amencan position regarding privileged communications is "somewhat simild to that of

Canada, although the communications "between counsellors and sexual assault

complainants, are considered privileged as a result of the enactment of statutory privilege,
both by the federal govemment and by the ~tates".'~*
In the Commonwealth, public
interest immunity or Crown privilege allows for the non-disclosure of relevant evidence
when considerations of public policy outweigh the importance of full disclosure. This is a

14glbid
at 1 19. A comparative Mew of privileged communications can be found at pages
108 to 114.

'50ïbid.at 1 Il. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Flonda, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Utah and Wyoming provide for an absolute
protection of privacy records relating to semal assault complainants in criminal trials. A
search was not conducteci to determine whether any of these statutes have been tested to
date regarding their constitutionality vis-a-vis the Six and Founeenth Amendments. Some
state courts have mled the absolute privileges as unconstitutional due to the infrngements
of the defendant's rights: see In re Robert H.,509 A.2d 475 (1986); Commonwealth v.
Smrcels, 5 1 1 A.2d 22 1 (1 986). Yet two States, Pemsylvania and Xllinois have found the
privilege to be constitutional: see Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992) and
People v. Foggy, 52 1 N.E. 2d 86 (1 988) respectively.
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cornmon law privilege. In criminal law this inununity cannot prevent the disclosure of
documents that "can enable the accusecl to resist an degation of crime or to estabüsh
innocence." '"

Thus, the Court rejected the notion of a clasr, privilege for these type of counselling
records. Instead of a clas privüege, a b h c i n g of Chrater vdws praxss was preferred
by the Court. This is the same method applied in the O 'Connor Case L'Heureux-Dubé J.
supports the ideal that the constitutional values required to be b a l d in these types of
disclosures instances are: (1) the right to full answer and defence; (2) the right to privacy;
and (3) the right to equality before the law without discrimination.'" The rationale used to
support this conclusion is referred back to the passages aiready discussed f?om the
O 'Connor Case and fkom Larner C.J.C.'s conclusions in the Dogemis CaseJJ3that refbte
a hierarchal approach to interpreting Charter rights and promotes a balancing of

competing interest process.'"

"'lbid. at 1 14. See also Duncan v. Cammell, Loird & Co. [1992] A.C. 624 (H.L.). Still no
commonwealth countries have addressed the private records of a semai assault
cornplainant . L' Heureux-Dubé J. reviewed other cases related to govemmental
documents, police informants and social worker logs, and concluded that it would be
"doubtftl that public interest imrnunity would bar disclosure of such records when the
accused's guilt or innocence is at stake." (at page 114).

rS3Dagenais
v. C a d i a n B r d c a s t i t ~ g
Corp. (1 994),94 C.C.C. (3d) 245 at 3 16 to 3 17
(S.C.C.).

lML.L.
A. v. Beharriell, supra note 4 at 126.

4.

Civil Law Cornparison

After the Supreme Court of Canada considered the procedure for disclosing a sexual
assault complainant's therapeutic records during the course of a criminal trial, they
reviewed the same issue within the context of a civil Iaw suit. In M.@.)v. Ryrmxs5a fernale
plaintiff commenced a civil action for damages allegedly caused by the defendant's sexual
conduct. Specifically, it was alleged that when she was 17 years old she received

psychiatrie treatment fiom Ryan During the course of the treatment Ryan had sexuai
relations with the plaintiff, and committed acts of gross indecency while in her presence.
The plaintiff asserted that this conduct injured her and therefore she sued for damages.

To resolve the dificulties allegedly caused by the conduct of the defendant AM.sought

psyc hiatric treatment fiom another counsellor. Concemed about her privacy, the new
counsellor assured A.M. that their private communications would remain confidentid.
This led the new counsellor to refrain from taking the usual kind and amount of
counselling notes.

Ryan requested production of A.M.'s reports and counselling reports and notes. At a

hearing before a Master for disclosure, A.M. agreed to release her repons but refùsed to
disclose the notes taken during the counselling sessions and claimed privilege over the

notes in question.

The Master held that there was no privilege and ordered the notes to be disclosed. The
British Columbia Supreme Court afirmed that decision. The British Columbia Court of
Appeal allowed A.M.'s appeal in part, but ordered the disclosure of her reporting letters
and her notes relating to the discussions between A-M. and her new counsellor. The

production of these materiais were held to be "protected rv156 by four conditions:
that inspection be confined to Dr. Ryan's solicitors and expert witnesses,
and that Dr. Ryan himself wuld not see them; that any person that saw the
documents should not disclose their contents to anyone not entitled to
inspect them; that the documents could be used only for the purposes of
the litigation; and that one copy of the notes was to be made by Dr. Ryan's
solicitors, to be passed on as necessary to Dr. Ryan's expert ~itnesses.'~'
The r n a j ~ r i t of
~ ' the
~ ~ Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. McLachlin J.
writing for the majority reviewed the four requirements for a privilege to exist for the
communications between a psychiatrist and a patient. First, the communications at issue
must have originated in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. Second, that the
element of confidentiality be essential to the fiil1 and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties to the communication. Third, the relation must be one, which
in the opinion of the community, ought to be sedulously fostered. And fourth, the interests
served by protecting the communications fiom the disclosure outweigh the interests of

"%Forest, Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JI.; L'Heureux-Duôé J.
dissenting.

pursuing the truth and disposing wrrectly of the l i t i g a t i ~ n . 'It
~ ~is important to note that
this founh requirement assumes that the opening and disclosing o f such records will in
some m m e r foster the pursuit of tmth and the correct disposd o f the Iaw suit. It is
proposed here that this represents stereotypical rationale and a bias o f the Couxt as t o the
nature of the communications between the plaintiff and her counsellor. Without an
evidentiary foundation o f relevance, the court is Ieft with an i l l o g i d presumption o f
relevance - there may b e something in the notes that will help determine an issue o f
credibility.

The COU^ went on t o hold that in this case the first three conditions for the prinlege for
the communications existed here. McLachlin J. held:
It may thus be concluded that the first three conditions for privilege for
communications between a psychiatrist and the victim o f a sexual assault
are met in the case at bar. The communications were wnfidential. Their
confidence is essential t o the psychiatrist - patient relationship. The
relationship itself and the treatment it makes possible are of transcendent
public importance.
The founh requirement is that the interests served by protecting the
communications from disclosure outweigh the interests of pursuing truth
and disposing correctly of the litigation.IM
The COU^ went on t o establish that "once the first three requirements and a compelling
primajacie case for protection is established"16' the focus shifts t o the balancing of
competing interests considered by the fourth requirement.
-

"'M(A.) v. Ryan, supra note 155 at 173 t o 175.

'601bidat 174.
'6'lbtd at 179.

McLachlin I. acknowledged the importance of the Chrrrter values protected by sections 8
(search and seizure) and 15 (equd treatment and benefit of the law) and wrote:
A nile of privilege which fails to protect confidentid doctor/patient
communications in the context of an action Prising out of semai assault
perpetuates the disadvantage felt by victims of sexual assault, often
women. The intimate nature of sexud assault heightens the privacy
concems of the victim and may increase, if automatic disclosure is the d e ,
the difficulty of obtaining redress for the wrong. The victim of a sexual
assault is thus placed in a disadvantaged position as comparwf with the
victim of a different wrong. The result rnay be that the victim of a semial
assault does not obtain the equal benefit of the law to which S. 15 of the
Charter entitles her. She is doubly victirnized, initially by the sexual assault
and later by the price that die m u t pay to claim redress - redress which in
some cases may be part of her program of therapy. These are factors which
may properly be considered in determining the interest served by an order
for protection fiom disclosure of confidentid patient-psychiatrist
communications in sexual assault cases!62

Nonetheless these interests must still be balanceci against the Society's interest in the

"pursuing the trut h and disposing wrrectly of t he litigation."'"

Furthemore, disdosure

must be produced to "get at the tmth and prevmt an unjust verdict."'"

The Court specifically rejected the al1 or nothing approach adopted by the Supreme Court

of the United States in Jaflee v. Redmo~id.'" which endorsed an absolute privilege for al1

psychotherapeutic records. Altematively, the Coun adopted the position established in

'62ibidat 175 to 176.
'63ibidat 1 7 5 .
'@'Ibidat 177.
'651 16 S . Ct. 1923 (1996).
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O 'Connof wherein the test was developed for the production of third party therapeutic

records. This test balances the cornpeting interests by reference to a number of factors
including the right of the accused to fiil1 answer and defence and the right of the
complainant to privacy.

Finally, on the issue of the production of the counselling notes the Cowt held that despitc
the "compelling" interest in p r e s e ~ n gthe confidentiality of the communications in issue
the notes should be discloseci. The Court went on to protect the rights of the patient by
accepting the conditions attached to the disclosure as set out by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal.

Still, it is the view of this writer that these conditions only limit the invasion of privacy to a
restricted number of people al1 woriung for the defendant. This presents the patient with
the same limitations as were presented to sexual a s w l t complainants in the criminai
context developed in the O 'ComorCase Therefore, if this is the reality that wornen face

in the civil justice system, the sarne results may dissuade women fiom using this court

process as well. The end result is Iimited access for women who have been sexually
assaulted to any forrn of conventional justice.

L'Heureux-Dubé J. in dissent, reviewed that sirnilar applications within a criminal context,
requires that the courts assess a proportional balance between Charter rights. On this issue
166S~~pra
note 1.

of balancing Charter vaiues she mntempiated her position uticulated in O 'Conm~
and
wrote:
...the nghts t o individual liberty and security of the person as enshrined in
s.7 of the Charier enwmpasses a nght to pnvacy. This finding was based
on a number of developrnents in the jurisprudence of this Court. In its s.7
jurisprudence, it has expressed great sympathy with the notion that liberty
and security of the person involve privacy interests. That privacy is
essentiai to human dignity, a basic value underlying the C h t e r , has also
been recognized. Our right t o sccurity of the person under 9.7 has been
found to include protection fiom psychotogical trauma which can be
occasioned by an invasion of our pnvacy. Certainly, the breach of the
privacy of a sexual assault plaintiff constitutes a severe assault on her
psychological well-being. Section 8 also reveals that the Charter is clearly
premised on a respect for the interests of individuals in thtir privacy.
Finally, the common law of torts of defamation and trespass fûrther
recognize the validity of an individual's claim to funher privacy interests.'"

L'Heureux-Dubé J. went on to distinguish between the strong public interest in the
relationships between a patient and a counsellor and the nature of the records themselves
and the effects of the disdosure would have asserting her expectation to privacy right.

This is what distinguishes the basic premise or value of the right t o privacy fiom the
doctrine of privilege.'" More specifically, that once the privacy is violated it cannot be
regained. Again comparing the wntext of a criminal application for disclosure and the civil

application for production, L'Heureux-Dubé J. held:
. ..the discovery process has the potential to allow a far more serious

incursion upon a plaintiffs' reasonable expectation of privacy than on
plaintiffs in other types of tort cases. These case are somewhat unique. As
was observecl in O'Connor, supra, at pp. 487-88, the wrong involved here,
sexual assault, may create a need for a therapeutic response if the victim is
to restore herself to a state of healthy fiinctioning. As Dr. Paritt's affidavits
167

A.M v. Ryan, supra note 155 at 199.

'681bidat 200.

attest, effective counxlling requires that the most intimate daails of a
patient's life and her i ~ e r m o sthoughts,
t
fears, and feelings be fieely
shared with the therapists. At the same t h e , it oAen requires that the
wunsellor keep records of what has transpired during the sessions with the
plaints. A plaintiff may also maintain a private diary of these experiences,
thoughts, and feelings.'"
She concludes that the discovery of such materials will act as strong disincentive to
plaintiffs to recover damages for the injuries suffered by either preventing the
commencement of the litigation or may encourage unjust settlements to avoid the
disclosure of private records and notes. Such results are inconsistent with section 15
equality rights as guaranteed by the C h f e r ."O

In her dissenting judgement she agrees with the majority that a successfùl claim of
privilege had been made out that established that records were exempt fiom disclosure.
She also agreed with the Court of Appeal' s general conclusion that it had a broad
discretion to control the process of discovery to ensure that the remaining documents and
their disclosure did not affect any of the parties unjustly. However, it was her view that the
discretion exercised in these circumstances did not result in an "appropriate balance of the
Chorier values of pnvacy, equality, and fair trial.""' Given the nature of the documents
and notes, and the potential h m that would flow fiom an invasion of pnvacy relating to

such sensitive and questionably relevant matters, she preferred a process that would allow

a judicial officer to first review the materials. Specifically, she heid:
By failing to screen the private records in such cases, the courts create a
hierarchy of Charter values, where interests in privacy and equality may be
seriously affecteci for records or parts thereof which may provide very
little if any benefit to the defence or be unnecessary to ensure the fainiess
of the proceedings. Procedures adapted to the context of discovery in civil
p r o d i n g s fiom the principles developed by this Court in O ' C o l l l are
~~
in order.'"

How then does one reconcile these two different approaches? Is there a firndarnental
distinction between the criminal trial process and the civil triai process when it relates to
this disclosure issue? It is contemplateci here that the majority in the Ryan Case hinge their
position on the common law principle behind the recognition of an exception or
"privilege" regarding the disclosure bas& on the ''ibndamental proposition that everyone
owes a general duty to give evidence relevant to the matter before the court so that the
truth may be a~cenained."'~~
An exception or privilege to this component of the fact
finding mission may exist where it can be established that a public good transcends this
goal. Once again competing interests need to be balanced. However, the Charter's
application to this balancing process is distinguishable in the two justice systems.

More specifically, the Charter's application to wmmon law principles within the d m of
private li tigation is unlike criminal cases, wherein govemment action is chaltenged.
McLachlin J. described the difference as follows:
The most that the private iitigant can do is argue that the common law is consistent

with C ' e rW.It is very important to draw this distinction between Charter
rights and C h t e r values. Care must be taken not to expand the application of the
Charter beyond that established by S. 32(1), either by creating new causes of
action, or by subjecting aU court orders to Charter scrutiny. Therefore, in the
context of civil litigation involving only private parties, the Charter will "apply" to
the common law only to the extent that the cornmon law is found to be
inconsistent with Chmter principles.'7' [emphasis hers]
L'Heureux-Dube similarly resolves the conflict. In O 'Connor the female cornplainant's
privacy interests were balanced against the acaised's section 7 Charter right to make hl1

answer and defence. Contrary to this, the defendant in a civil proceeding does not have a

direct Charter right to be guaranteed. Even though similar values are in issue the
defendant's liberty is not in jeopardy. She, quite properly, is concemed about a

miscarriage in justice that would result in an incorrect finding of fact. Again the balancing
process is implemented between the plaintiff and the defendant but here the interests are

fiamed within Charter &,

because these interests (as is the case with an accused

person within the criminal sphere) are not absolutes. She described the dichotomy as

In many cases, the exercise of discretion, through the making of an order, for
example, will not constitute direct state action and therefore cannot be subject to
the same constitutional scnrtiny as legislation or the acts of state officials. Where
this occurs, this Court has nonetheless found that the exercise of discretion must
adequately reflect the values underlying the Charter. In the criminal context, a
proportional balance of the effects on Charter rights is required... In cases ofnoncriminai law powers exercised in the context of legislation with a public purpose or
ot her state action, the court must also reflect a balance of Charter vaiues when
exercising a statutory or cornmon law discretion...'"

1751bid
at 191. In this passage she citesR v. O'Connor, supra at note 1; LL.A., supra
note 129; R v. SaIituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R 654; and R v. Park,[1995] 2 S.C.R. 836 as
examples criminal cases. For civil references she cites Degemis v. Carnadiun

(E)Conclusioa
A review of the creation of Bill C 4 6 provides an interesting perspective on how a

statutory law is created in Canadian society, and some of the wmplexities of the
competing interests, including the gender issues connected to the production of a f d e
cornplainant 's therapeutic records. Further, it provides an illustration to assess the criminal

justice system's treatment of female sexual assault wmplainants. Chronologically, it was
pointed out that while the Federal Department of Justice was contemplating a new piece
of legislation to fiII a void and respond to an issue in the common law regarding the
production and disclosure of a complainant's therapeutic records, a specific fact dnven
issue arose relating to the disclosure of certain records. As the British Columbia Coun of
Appeal attempted to balance competing interests between the accused's right to make fùll
answer in defence and the rights of the fernale complainant, the Court structured a
procedural scheme in an attempt to resolve such issues in a fair manner. The case of R v.
O 'Connorwas eventually appealed to the Supreme Coun of Canada. Here fùrther

refinements to the process were fonnulated, and perhaps more importantly, the competing
interests of the participants were b a l a n d in favour of the accused's right to make full
answer and defence. The Court wncluded the prioritized harm should be focused on the
danger of a wrongfitl conviction. Kt was argued that this effectively created a hierarchy of
Brmdcmting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R.835, per Lamer C.J. for the majority, at 875; Barm
v. Canada. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416; nillsv. C a d (Attomy GeneraI).[1998] 1 S.C.R
513 at 558.
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rights, with the rights of the male accused k i n g "balanceci" above the competing rights of
the female complainant. Then the Federal Department of Justice, as sanctioned by the
democratic process, drafied and passed specific legislation t o deal with the issue. Bill C46 was draAed wit h significant consultation and the advantage of having wntemplated

both the majonty and the minority' s perspectives on the issues in R v. O *Colutor.

In an attempt t o balance ofien diametricaily opposed interests and rights, Bill C 4 6 was

created. That o f course, did not end the debate, as the next wave of sexual offence
prosecutions brought with them a number of constitutional challenges to the legislation. It
was through an examination of the language used by the courts that revealed a continued
reliance by some on gender based stereotypical myths. Juxtaposed to these decisions, a
number of cases were examined that upheld the Bill as constitutional. Attempts were made
to compare the differences in the positions based on the respective courts' considerations
and reliances upon both the individual harm suffered by the complainants as well as the

overdl societal harm connected t o the under-reporting and the community's access to
criminal justice. Now, as a nation, w e await a second assessment of sirnilar issues by the
Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Mills. Given the evolution of section 15 equality
interests post O *Connor,particularly as contemplated in the Law Case, one might predict
the Court will enunciate additionai views on the equality rights component of the
competing interests in issue.

Support for this prediction can also be found in the case of L.L.A. v. Behorriell. In this

13 1

case the majority of the Courr did not elaborate on the pros and cons of a class of privilege
and merely endorsed their eadier p r o d u r a l position as enunciated in the O ' C o m r Case.

L'Heureux-Dubé J. concurred with the majority's reliance on the procedure set out in the

O 'ConnorCase, however she also elaborated on a number of policy considerations. These
considerations included the contextualkation of the potential h m and impact on equality
that the disclosure of a sexud assault complainant's records has on fernale viaùns' access
to justice. Still, in the end, the rninority of the Court preferred a balancing process as

compared to a class of privilege for the notes and records in question. Through the
Canadian civil law cornparison we saw the same C ~ u r t "address
~
the sune issues yet with
a different perspective. In the case of M. (A.) v. Ryan, the entue Court considered the

female plaintiff s equality rights as guaranteed by the Charter, or at a minimum equality
interests within the realm of Charter values. The application of the law and its impact on
women, particularly as litigants, was considered. The Court disagreed on a number of

issues that were examined, but in the end, agreed on the superior value of allowing a trial
judge to balance the competing and irreconcilabie interests of the parties over the creation

of a class or category or privileged documents.

Thus, through the example of the disclosure of sexual assault complainant's counselling
records we are able to observe the varying degrees with which the Canadian courts have
either neglected entirely a "contextudized approach" to assessing the balancing of the

"6~amerCC.
J.C. and Gonthier J. who sat on the O 'Connor panel did not partake in the
civil hearing.
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female complainants' interests and their C k t e r guaranteed rights, or when contextudized
factors like individuai o r societal harm were assesseci, the female parties' interests were
more often than not balanced below the rights of the male accused Party. This result was
consistently rationalized through the findamental tenet of our criminal justice system that an innocent person must not be convicted. My point here is that while this notion is
supremely important, the courts must not abandon a female cornplaùiant's right tu be
treated fairly with dignity and equality in the courts search for the tnith. These concepts

must be addressed within a contextual tiamework, particularly focused on the dif5erent
components of h m that flow fiom the opening, reviewing and disclosing of these most
private documents. These issues must be caretùlly contemplated as the trial courts embark
on their assessrnent of determining the factors set out in Bill C- 46 at both stages of the

disciosure process, assuming the legislation survives its challenge in the Mi& case. If it
does not, it is hoped the drafters of the replacement legislation appreciate the complexity
and consequences of the issues in addition to the need balance dignity, respect and trial

fairness fiom al1 perspectives. To do otherwise is effectively reducing femde

complainant's and the comrnunity's access t o real justice.

CHAPTER THREE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(-4) INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about the problem of domestic violence. Sociologists,
anthropologists, psychologists. politicians, criminologists as well as lawyers and legal
theorists have al1 added volumes to our understandings about this form of violent
behaviour and the law's reaction to it. It is not the aim of this chapter to review al1 of this
data. as that in and of itself has been the dedication o f entire journals.' The social

phenomena of wife battering is an extremely complicated matter with much debate going
on within each of the disciplines outlined above regarding its many layers of intricacy and
possible solutions. The aim of this chapter is to examine two different responses of the
criminal justice system to domestic violence, recently instituted in Ontario. The
frarnework within which these two models will be discussed is the depth in which they
have considered the broad context of domestic violence. It is argued here that while

significantly better than the criminal justice system's conventionai approach to domestic
violence. both of these models have failed to completely assess the many different and
sometimes conflicting aspects of the problem. Because of this, the solutions proposed fall
short of the mark of providing the victirns of domestic violence not only equal access to

justice but, more importantly, the protection on which their lives often depends.

'See the Journal of Interpersonal Violence (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage Periodicals Press).
This journal is concerned with the study and treatrnent of victims and perpetrators of
physical and sexual violence.
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This chapter first describes the criminal justice system's conventional approach to dealing
with the offence of assault within a domestic relationship. The shortcomings of this
approach are set out and then highlighted by some of the theories that attempt to isolate
the cause or causes of the violent behaviour. Once these theories are briefly presented the
two responses, the K Court and the Plea and Conditional Discharge Court, are outlined.
Foliowing this descriptive process, the chapter attempts to analyze these two responses
first from a practical perspective and then from a theoretical view point. In short, it is
argued that both models have oversimplified the problem (causes and consequences) and.
as a result, have provided the community with an incomplete solution. Finaily, some

judicial interpretations of the issue of the admission of hearsay evidence for the tmth of
its content \vil1 be examined to evaluate the effectiveness of the K Court initiative. This is
done, in part, to fiuther accentuate women's unequal access to criminal justice in this
regard.

(B) THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH

In Canada, prior to the 1980°s,the criminal justice system's treatment of domestic assault

charges was much like any other assault offence. The police, as investigative agents of the
state. responded to a complaint in a attempt to keep the public peace and protect citizens
from being injured. They intervened, took statements. observed and noted injuries and

when they exercised their discretion to do so made arrests.' Once these charges were
processed and a court date was set, a crown attorney was assigned the responsibility of
having to prosecute these offences. On the day of triai the crown attorney would meet
with the femaie complainant, assuming she responded to the subpoena, and attempt to
prepare her for trial. If she failed to attend the proceedings, and she was an essential
witness to the matter, the prosecution had a number of choices. The crown could request
an adjournrnent and put the matter over to a fiiture date in the hope that she would attend

at that time. The crown could request a material witness warrant under the Criminal Code
that would authorize the police to locate, arrest and hold the femaie complainant potentially in custody - until the matter could be brought back before the courts.' Or the
'C. Burris and P. Jaffe "Wife Abuse As a Crime: The Impact of Laying Charges" (1983)
35 Canadian Journal of Criminology 309. This article seeks to explore the reasons why
the police were not more willing to lay assault charges. They found that in London
Ontario in the year 1979 police laid charges in oniy 3% in al1 family violence cases. even
though the police advised the victims of the violence to seek medical attention in 20% of
the cases. The implications of this situation were exarnined. including increased feelings
of helplessness for the victim, condoning the maie batterer's behaviour and the loss of an
opportunity to interrupt the cycle of violence that also increases the future risks of abuse
for the victim. See also an updated version of this study by P. Jaffe. E Hastings, D.
Reitzel and G. Austin, "The Impact of Police Laying Charges" in N. Hilton, ed., Legal
Responses to W f e Assaulr: Currenr Trendr and Evaluarion (Newbury Park: Sage
Publications, 1993).

'Criminal Code section 705 provides that ''where a person who has been served with a
subpoena to give evidence in a proceeding does not attend or remain in attendance. the
court. judge, justice or provincial court judge before whom that person was required to
attend may, if it is established (a) that the subpoena has been served in accordance with
this Part part XXII - Procuring Attendance], and (b) that the person is likely to give
material evidence, issue or cause to be issued a warrant in Fonn 17 for the arrest of that
person." Sections 706 and 707 provide for the procedure to be followed when a witness
has been arrested under such a warrant. The failure, without lawful excuse, to appear and
give evidence when required to do so by law is punishable as contempt of court under
section 708.
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crovm could withdraw the charges as unviable without the cooperation of the material
witness, namely the complainant.

If the witness did attend, but was either unwilling to testi@ completely as to the events as
she had described to the police soon after the incident, or was reluctant to test@
truthfùlly and to the full extent as her memory would allow, then the crown then aiso had
a number of choices that could be made. The prosecutor c o d d possibly withdraw the
charges again because they were unprovable. Or the prosecutor could require the
rejuctant. and now recanting witness, to testiQ in court regardless of ber wishes. Once
called as a witness where she began to testiQ in a manner inconsistent with her original
description of events as set out in her witness statement, the crown could then make an
application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence AC? to obtain leave from the court
to cross examine his or her own witness regarding the originally prepared statement. This
would allow the crown to argue for a ruling made by the court to have the complainant
deciared as adverse.' Through this process a witness, when faced with contrddictory
recolIections, the possibility existed that she could feel sufficientiy pressured to provide
the court with evidence that would be consistent with her oath. Practically however,
unIess the prosecution had additional evidence to cal1 to support the allegations of abuse

"Canada Evidence Act R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.

For the meaning of adverse see Wuwanesa lblu~uallnsurance Co. v. Hanes [19631 1
S.C.C. 321 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cassibo (I982), 70 C.C.C. (2d) 498 (Ont. C.A.). It includes a
hostility of mind as well as opposed in interest or unfavourable in position to the party
calling the witness. Note that "adverse" has been held to mean hostile and not simply
unfavourable; see R. v. Mclnfyre (1963), 2 C.C.C. 380 (N.S.C.A.).
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as set out in the charges beyond the evidence of the complainant, there would be very

Iittle point in having the sole crown witness declared as adverse. The prosecution would
simply be lefi with a "hostile" complainant and no additional evidence to cal1 to prove the
charges beyond a reasonable d ~ u b t . ~

Therefore, such a situation left the prosecution no m e r ahead than it was before the
charges were laid. Perhaps even worse off, if the accused having observed the system fail
now believes that he is able to manipulate his partner and the criminal justice system. In
this scenario there is arguably a reinforcement of the abusive behaviour for both the

specific individuai as well as for cther like-minded individuds already involved the
implementation of physical violence within a relationship. Moreover, for the cornplainant
there is an inability for the criminal justice system to provide any immediate help,
protection or access to justice.

It is argued

here that the failure of the approach described above is grounded in an

unresponsiveness by the criminal justice system to an appreciation of the
contextualization of the cycle of violence at the very heart of the domestic assault
problem. Meaninghl and effective solutions require that the causes and consequences of
domestic violence must be taken into account by those entnisted to improve the situation.
The following section reviews some of the most prominent theories of domestic violence.

6For the procedw to be followed in a S. 9(2) application see R. v. Milgaard (1971), 2
C.C.C. (2d) 206 (Sask. C.A.), leave to appeal rehsed (1971), 4 C.C.C. (2d) 566n
(S.C.C.).

(C)THEORIES OF DOMESTIC ASSAULT

1. The Cycle of Violence

Lenore Walker is the psychologist who pioneered the work in the field of battered women
as victims trapped in a cycle of deceit.' She reiied on the cycle of violence and the theory
of learned helplessness to describe and explain the three distinct stages of the cycle of

violence that occurs in many abusive domestic relationships. The first is the building of
tension. This phase is followed by a severe battering incident that typically involves
uncontrollable rage. Finally an act of contrition follows the outburst of violence. The
violence creates fear and anxiety for the female party during the first two phases. The
effect of this is to extend her fear beyond the immediate incidents of violence so that
terror begins to seize the entire relationship. As the behaviour repeats itself in a cyclical
fashion the female party may realize that the abusive behaviour is unlikety to change, but
she is unable to terminate the relationship primarily because of her learned helplessness.
It is the woman's learned helplessness that explains why she stays in the dangerous

reIationship and maintains the unreasonable position that the abusive male wilt improve
and stop the violence.'

'L. Walker. The Bartered Wornen (New York: Harper and Row, 1979).
8

D. Downs, More Than Victirns; Battered Women, The Syndrome Socieîy and the Law,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1996). See "The Key Tenets of the BWS" at
81.

Although the specific cause linked to the cyclical nature of a physically abusive
relationship has not been recognized by the Canadian courts, they have accepted into fact
its existence. For example, in a commission of inquiry into the deaths of Rhonda and Roy
Lavoie. Mr Justice Schulman, commissioner, identified a cycle of violence as being
intricately involved in many abusive relationships? He described the first of three distinct
phases as a duration of tension building. During this phase the male party grows
increasingly angry, hstrated or out of control, fiequentty due to experiences outside of
his relationship. The male Party, unable to express or connect his feelings to these outside
factors, attempts to legitimize his feelings by blaming h e m on matters, real or perceived,
associated with his female partner. The male party releases increasing anger and
frustration by "minor abusive incidents such as pushing, shoving or calling the woman
narne~."'~
These incidents become increashgly intense over time. Concurrent to this, the
male party becomes increasingly jealous of his female partner and he exerts more control
over her life. The female partner fails to understand her male partner's anger and

frustration. As the male party's behaviour becomes increasingly less rational, the female
party begins to believe the abuse is legitimately focused at her. She then adapts by being

9

Report of the Honourable Mr. Justice P. Schulman, Commission of lnguiry into the
Deafhs of Rhonda Lavoie and Roy Lavoie, A Study of Domestic Violence and the Justice
Sysfern in Manitoba, (Winnipeg: Manitoba Government Publications, 1997).On January
2Oth, 1995 Roy Lavoie murdered his wife Rhonda Lavoie. He then committed suicide.
They had been dating since Monda was 14 years old. They resided together for 7 years
and had three children together. Monda was 22 years old when she was murdered &d
Roy was 30 years old when he took his own life. This Commission o f Inquiry sought to
discover the reasons behind this temble tragic end, not to assign blarne, but to find
lessons that hope fully would serve others.

conciliatory or avoiding her male partner to prevent any fkther abuse. However, the male
partner's tension continues to build until control is lost and a violent incident occurs. Mr.
Justice Schulrnan described the nature of these violent outbursts:
The first explosive incident which occurs may be relatively minor, such as
the man pushing the woman or calling her hurtfùl and abusive names.
Subsequent abusive incidents become more and more significant, and may
ultimately involve serious violence including punching, choking, rape, and
the use of weapons or objects. If sexual assault is involved, particularly
when objects are used during the assault, the likelihood increases that even
greater acts of violence against the women will follow."
Following this outburst phase both parties experience various forms of shock, disbelief
and denial. The male party blames his partner's behaviour as the triggering event. The

fernale minimizes the extent of her injuries or persuades herself that the behaviour was in

some way justified. At this point she feels depressed and helpless.

This stage of the cycle is followed by a "honeymoon" phase. During this segment of the
cycle the male party becomes apologetic and exhibits channing and loving behaviour. He
requests forgiveness and makes promises to change the external factors that the female
party believes contributed to the violence, such as alcohol abuse or stress related to

employment. This honeyrnoon phase reinforces the female partner's sense of hope and
power. particularly to cause her partner to get help for his assaultive behaviour. At the

sarne time the female party desires to salvage her relationship and isolates herself fiom
fiends and farnily that were a source of her male partner's jealousy. As a result, both

parties become more and more dependent on each other, and persuade themselves they
can overcome their problems together. Tt is at this stage that the women who have

contacted the police tiequently urge the prosecutors to &op or withdraw the outstanding
charges.

This pattern of behaviour repeats itself over and over again. Regarding the cyclical nature
of the violence Mr. Justice Schulrnan concluded:
it often grows shorter over tirne, and the severity of the explosive incident
generally increases with each cycle. Each cycle a woman passes through
tends to Iower her self-esteem and impair her judgement. It becomes more
difficult for her to leave the relationship, or to recognize that she is not
responsible for the violence in her relationship."

The criminal courts have also recognized the cycle of violence theory. Recently, the
Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to review the battered woman syndrome as
a component of self defence. In Malot v. The Queen" a female accused was charged with
the murder of her husband and the anempted murder of his girlfiiend. She was convicted
at trial. She appealed first to the Ontario Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court
Canada, where in both instances her appeals against conviction were dismissed. At triai
Dr. P. Jaffe was qualified and gave expert opinion evidence regarding the psychological
effects of being a battered woman. Major J., writing for the majority, outlined the uses
that could be made of such evidence by a jury. He held that it was permissible to use

"lbid. at 16.
"(1 W8), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 456 (S.C.C.).

expert testimony to hetp explain:
1. Why an abused woman might remain in an abusive relationship.
3. The nature and extent of the violence that rnay exist in a battering relationship.
3. The accused's ability to perceive danger fiom her abuser.
4. Whether the accused believed on reasonable grounds that she could not
otherwise preserve herself from death or grievous bodily h m . ' "

2. Complea Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Captivity

Psychiatrist Judith Herman theorizes the effects of sustained domestic abuse within the
realm post-traumatic stress disorder. Her focus is on the component of control and the
mental processes that the victim undergoes after having been subjected to violence in the
domestic setting. Herrnan suggests that:
Some battered women speak of entering a kind of exclusive, aimost
delusionai world, embracing the grandiose belief system of their mates and
voluntarily suppressing their own doubts as proof of loyalty and
submission...Prolonged captivity also produces profound alterations in the
victim's identity. Al1 the psychological structures of the self the image of
the body. the internaiized images of others, and the values and ideais that
lend a person a sense of coherence and purpose - have been invaded and
systematicaIly broken down. l5

-

This notion is connected to DSM - IV's description of the "acute distress disorder" that
"llbid. at 464. See also R. v. Lavallee (1990), 55 C.C.C (3d) 97; and C. Boyle. "A
Feminist Approach to Criminal Defences" in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian Peîspectives on
Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 199 1) that advances the
theory of contextualizing uniquely female experiences within criminal defences. See also
A. Tomkins et al., "Self Defence Jury Instructions in Trials of Battered Women Who Ki11
Their Partner" in N. Hilton. ed.. Legal Responses to W f e Assauft: Current Trends and
Evnlzra~ion,(Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993).

"J. Heman, Trauma and Recovery: The Ajrermarh of Violence - From Domestic Abuse ro
Political Terror ( New York: Basic Books, 1992) at 92; as cited by D. Downs supra note
7 at 85.
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describes the trawnatic consequences of experiencing incidents "that involved actual or
threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the integnty of self or others." and the
victim's responses includïng intense fear, helplessness, or horror.16

3. Battered Women as Survivors

Others, such as E. Gondolf, believe that the women in abusive relationslips are active
participants in the interaction of the relationship and in the creation of their own self
identity. He supports the notion that they are not responsible for the abuse and the
violence but, that as the violence escalates, they recognize that self blame is inappropriate
and as result they seek outside help as the relationship becomes less caring and

increasingly dangerous. This perspective concentrates on a system failure rather than a
failure of any son at the feet of the battered woman. The concept of learned helplessness
is not completeiy abandoned as it explains the resulting behaviour of the abused woman

who attempts to get help outside of the relationship, such as in shelter, the police or

perhaps the criminal justice system. but fails to get the help and support she needs. D.

Downs summarizes E. Gondolf's interpretation of learned helplessness as:

If these efforts fail, learned helplessness might set in and women might
lose a sense of the "observing self," which is an attribute of reflective
judgement and autonomy. With the appropriate shelter or related help,
however, a new definition of selfcan arise. phoenix-like: the transition

I6Diagnosticand Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorders : DSM - IV, 4th ed.,
(Washington DC.: Amencan Psychiatrie Association, 1994), section 308.3.

from helpless viclim to sunivor. [emphasis his]"

4. Masochism

Some theonsts believe that the women in abuse relationships are sometimes complicit in
their own victimization. l a Freudian theorists suggest that women are predestined to be
rnasochistic as a result of psychodynamic factors unique to women's psychological
development. in response to this position, feminist theorists argue i f women are
masochistic in this manner they are made that way by experience. They reject the idea of
a gender predetermination and provide a political and social explanation, grounded in a
woman's disempowered position in a world dominated by men.lg Still others point to a
number of reasons that abused women remain in violent relationships, such as their own

exposure to domestic violence as children, psychological factors involving self
destructive behaviour, psychological dependency and the lack of access to both the social
and the economic resowces to leave the relationship. For example, Dutton and Painter

17

D.Downs, supra note 7 at 86, summarizing E. Gondolf. Battered Wornen as Survivors:
An A [ternative ta Treating Learned Helplessness (Lexington, Mass. I Lexington Books,
198 8). See also M. Whalen, Counseling to End Violence Against Women: A Subversive
Mode!, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996) at 27.
18

See J. Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problern of
Domination (New York: Pantheon, 1985).
I9See M. Masse, ln the Narne of Love: Wornen Masochism. and the Gothie (Ithaca NY:
Corne11 University Press, 1992). She discusses how the powerless and oppressed seek
power and esteem through subversive acts which are products of their situations. See also
R. Lenton, "Power Versus Feminist Theories of Wife Abuse" (1995) 37 Canadian Journal
of Criminology 305.

contemplate a 'bumatic bonding" theory wherein they describe a cycle of counter
dependency that starts with the male party 's assaultive behaviour and significant
dependency needs. They support the notion that the male is responsible for the destructive
components of the relationship, particularly the abuse. On the other hand, to avoid the
violence, the woman starts to modifL her life around the demands of her abusive partner
and thereby isolates herself fiom extemal support. In turn, her compliance to his
controlling demands legitimizes his power. Her compliance makes her counter-dependent
upon her male partner which, in tum, contributes to her inability to terminate the
relationship. This counter-dependency also causes anxiety and distress for the woman as
she feus losing her partner that she has become psychologicaily, and perhaps

economically dependent upon."

5. Other Theories

A detailed description of al1 of the different theories that have attempted to explain the

causes of domestic abuse is beyond the scope of this work." Still, given the complicated

nature of this troublesome social phenomena, some of these theories should at least be

noted. Within the realm of determinants that have been directed at the male abuser,

'OD.Dutton and S. Painter, "Traumatic Bonding: The Development of Emotional
Attachments in Battered Women and Other Relationships of Intermittent Abuse" ( 1983)
6 Victimology 139 at 145.
"For an excellent review of the theories related to the causes of domestic violence can be
found in The National Research Council, N. Crowell and A. Burgess eds.,
Understanding Violence Againsî Women (Washington: National Academy Press, 1996).

explanations to account for the violence that occurs within a domestic relationship have
included; evolution," physiology and neurophysiology," alcohol abuse,"
sex and power
psychopathology and personality trait^,^ attitudes and gender scherna~,'~

motives," as well as social leanllng theories." Other theonsts have focused on the dyadic

"V. Quincey and M. Lalumiere, "Evolutionary Perspectives on Sexual Offending,"
(1 995) 7(4) Sexual Abuse at 301 to 3 15; as cited by The National Research Council,
supra note 2 1They suggest that sexual violence may be explained by evolutionary
theories modified by specific attitudes toward females combined with an erotic interest in
violent sexual behaviour.
%ee J. Archer, "The I d u e n c e of Testosterone on Human Aggression" (1 991), 82 British
Journal of Psychology 1; as cited by The National Research Council, supra at note 21, for
a comprehensive review of the literature on the topic.

" See G. Kantor, "Refining the Bnishstrokes in Portraits on Alcohol and Wife Assaults"
in A Zco ho1 and Interpersonal Violence: Fostering Multidisciplinary Perspectives NI AAA
Monograph 24, NIH Publication No. 93-3496 (Rockville Md.: National Institute on
Alcohol and Alcoholism, National Institutes of Health, US.Department of Health and
Hurnan Services, 1993); as cited The National Research Council, supra note 2 1. In this
study it is reported that men's drinking habits, particularly binge drinking. are related to
domestic violence across al1 ethnic groups and social classes.

"S. Hart, D. Dutton, and T. Newlove "The Prevalence of Personality Disorder Among
Wife Assaulters" (1993), Journal of Personality Disorders 7(4) 328; as cited in The
National Research Council. supra note 21. This study found a high incidence of
psychopathology and personality disorders among men that physically abuse their female
partners.
For exarnple men, in general, have been found to be more accepting of men abusing
women and the more culturally traditional those men appear to be the more accepting
they are of the abuse. C. Greenblat "Don't Hit your Wife...Unless: Preliminary Findings
on Normative Support For the Use of Physical Force by Husbands" (1985), 10
Victimology 22 1;as cited in The National Research Council, supra note 2 1.
'6

"A. Browne and D. Dutton, "Escape fiom Violence: Risks and Alternatives for Abused
Women - What do we Currently Know?" at 65 in R. Roesch, D. Dutton, and V. Sacco,
eds.. Family Violence: Perspectives on Treafment, Research, and Policy (Barnaby B .C .:
British Columbia Institute on Farnily Violence, 2 990). This article reports that power and

control fiequently underlie intimate relationship violence, although the purpose of the

contexts or features unique to the relationships wherein this type of behaviour has been
doc~rnented.'~
Some have looked to societal influences such as sexual scripts and cultural
mores to account for the a b u s i v e n e ~ sAs
. ~ ~well, institutional influences such as family,
educational settings, religions, and media have been studied to determine their respective
impacts on domestic violence." While still others have searched for multi factor models

violence may be Iinked to the male party's own feelings of powerlessness and inability to
accept rejection.
" Social

Learning theonsts suggest that human behaviour is learned by observing others,
forming ideas about the acceptability of those behaviours and then trying and continuing
those behaviours that are reinforced. See K. O'Leary "Physical Aggression Between
Spouses: A Social Leamhg Theory Perspective" in V. Van Hasselt, R. Momson, and M.
Hersen, eds., Handbook of Family Violence (New York: Plenum, 1988).
' 9 ~ o example
r
see J. Giles-Sims, Wge Battering: A System Theory Approach (NewYork:
The Guilford Press, 1983), who studied the state of an emotional bond between the
parties and the timing of the male's controlling behaviour. This study found some
evidence to suggest that women were willing to accept the first act of violence as an
anomaly and therefore forgive the behaviour. but that this response may actually reinforce
the violent act.
'OE?cpectationsabout dating and intimate relationships are thought to be taught by
culturally transmitted scripts. Scripts support violence when they promote males to feel
superior and are entitled to be sexually aggressive as compared to female scripts that
perceive females as being responsible for controlling the level of sexual involvement. See
J. White and M. Koss "Adolescent Sexual Aggression within Heterosexual Relationships:
Prevalence, Characteristics, and Causes" at 182 in H. Barbaree, W. MarshaIl and D. Laws
eds.. The Juvenile Sex Offender (New York: Guilford Press, 1993). Also, anthropologists
have studied cultural differences in both the amount and acceptability of domestic
violence within different societies. See D. Counts, J. Brown and J. Campbell, eds.,
Suncr ions and Sancruary: Cultural Perspectives on rhe Beating of Wives (Boulder Colo.:
Westview Press, 1992).

'' Family influences have been examined by D. Farrington "Childhood Aggression and
Adult Violence: Early Precursors and Later-life Outcornes" at 5 in D. Pepler and K.
Rubin, eds., The Development and Trearment of Childhood Aggression (Hillsdale N. J . :
Erlbaum, 1991). Religion effects have been studied by V. Whipple "Counseling Battered
Women Frorn Fundamentaiist Churches" (1987), 13 Journal of Marital and Family
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explanations, such as the biopsychosociai mode1 that examines the reiative contributions
of three main predictors of violence, narnely the physical, the social and certain
psyc hiatnc symptoms."

Thus. having outlined these various theories that have al1 attempted to explain the causes
behind the controlling and abusive behaviours of male person directed at theù female

partners, one is able to see the many complexities comected to the issue. This
information is an important part of the analysis section of the chapter as the effectiveness
of two recent criminal justice's response is scrutinized.

(D) THE K COURT MODEL

Ln 1995. a nurnber of Crowns in the Metropolitan Toronto area were becoming

increasingly fmstrated by the reality that far too many criminal assault charges alleging
incidents of physicd intra familial abuse were being withdrawn at the trial stage of the
criminal justice system. The bulk of these charges were being withdrawn and not
proceeded with primarily because the female compiainants were unwilling to CO-operate
with the process. Basically, these type of charges were being investigated by the police as

Therapy 25 1. A. Dworkin in Pornography: Men Possessing Wornen (New York: NAL/
Dutton, 1991) has suggested that pomography encourages the objectification of women
and condones sexual aggression by men towards women.

3'P. McKenry, T. Julian, and S. Gavazzi "Toward a Biopsychosocial Mode1 of Domestic
Violence" (1 993, 57 (May) Journal of Marriage and Family 307; as cited in the National
Research Council, supra note 2 1 .
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most other fiont line investigations - without an appreciation for the nature and dynamics
of the cycle of farnily violence. The officers would attend at the scene and attempt to
gather information fiom the witnesses in attendance about what had transpired. Perhaps
some additional background information was obtained, medical assistance provided and
the victim services sector were contacted about either immediate of funire shelter and

assistance.

At approsimately the same time that these shortcomings of the criminal justice system

were being contemplated investigative reporters from the Toronto Star including Jane

.Armstrong. Caroline Mallon and Rita Daly were collecting data fiom al1 of the domestic
assault charges laid and processed through the bail release progam. They recorded al1 of
the domestic assault charges processed by the Toronto Provincial Court for the week of

July 30" 19%. They then monitored those charges through the cnminal justice system for
the nest 18 months to determine how well the system performed. Their frndings were

shocking.

On March 9h. 1996 Jane Armstrong reported: "The Star study found a justice system

failing at every step with judges, crown attorneys, defence lawyers and police pointing the
finger of blame el~ewhere."~~
In particular, their study discovered that by March 9Ih-,

1996. only 60 percent of the 133 cases processed resulted in a conviction and that most of

the charges were completed by way of a guilty plea to a lesser and included offence. The
"J. Armstrong et al., The Toronto Star (9 March 1996) A l .

150

reporters also discovered that 37 percent of the cases "fell apart because the victim either
failed to show up in court or changed her story on the stand.""

During this tirne penod the conventional approach to the prosecution of domestic assault
was in place in the jurisdiction. As a result, a Crown proposai was implemented to

improve the response. A specidly designated spousal abuse court was established. This

-'K Court M~del,"'~
entitled because of the court room in which it was assigned, was
based on a CO-ordinatedeffort that included a multi-professionai cornmitment to
reforming their individual interactions with the female complainants of dornestic assault
charges.

On the policing fiont, the investigative agencies were educated about some of the realities
connected with patterns attached to the cyclical nature of domestic violence. They were
trained to seek corroborating evidence at the scene, including such things as 9 1 1
ernergency tapes, neighbours' statements, scene and injury photographs and. perhaps
most importantly, the video taped statement of the cornplainant (with her consent) as soon

j51t was fashioned on an Arnerican criminal justice response to domestic violence.
operating in San Diego, California. It was reported that the American expenment,
dedicated to a cooperative effort from al1 professional agencies involved in the
investigation, prosecution and deterrence of this violent behaviour, recommended a zero
tolerance policy towards domestic violence. In 1995 the program boasted a 95 percent
guilty plea rate for the 2942 charges that were laid. As for the 58 matters that went to
trial, the prosecution registered an 86 percent conviction rate. J. Armstrong et al., "Hitting
Back in San Diego" The Toronto Star (March 16 1996) C 1.

after the incident transpired as possible.

This was done so that a prosecutor could marshal an application before the trial court to
allow the Crown to enter the videotaped statement to prove the tmth of the contents of the
statement made by the complainant. This "past recollection recorded" is an exception to
the rule against the admissibility of hearsay e~idence.'~
Therefore, if a complainant cornes

to court and testifies in a rnanner that is inconsistent with her onginal version of the
events surrounding the allegations of domestic violence, that pnor statement, if proved to
have been made (hence the videotaping and search for corroborating evidence) could then
be declared by the court to have some probative value." The courts have consistently
looked to a nurnber of factors to assess the reliability of the previous statements. Some of
these factors include a detemination of whether the statement was made under oath or
solemn affirmation following a warning that to mislead investigators is a serious matter.
whether the entire statement is videotaped, and whether it was made at a time when the
subject matter was sufficiently fresh in the mind of the complainant so as to ensure
accuracy.j8 Also, while compiling the information to be attached to the bail briefs. the
police made efforts to include prior occurrences summaries connected with police

j6For the general pnnciples behind the exception see R. v. B. (KG) (1993), 79 CCC (3d)
257 (S.C.C.); R. v. U.(F.J.) (1995), 101 CCC (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
j7R. y. Beriault (1997), 6 C.R. (5h) 382 at 386 (Que.C.A.) R. v. Eisenhauer (1998) 14
C.R. (5<h)35 (N.S.C.A.).
"See R. v. B.(KG) supra note 36 and R v. Eisenhauer supra note 37. These issues are
more fùlly developed later in this chapter.

responses that did not result in criminal charges. This was done to get as complete a
picture as possible p i o r to the trial date for the charges. This not only required a
cornmitment of time and expertise fiom the police but d s o a cornmitment of financial
resources as well.

On the probation senices side of the equation, education and training was aiso
implemented to assist in the reduction of specific recidivism. A treatment program based
on education and counselling provided by accredited domestic violence professionals and
accessed through probation services was established. Yet, these facilities could only be
accessed once a detennination of guilt was made by the court.

As well, the prosecutors charged with the responsibility of fairly presenting the evidence

eathered, were also assigned to the specialized K Court to ensure that they had a clear

C

understanding and appreciation of the rules and options available to the crown when
confionted on the day of trial with a reluctant female complainant. This included an
appreciation of recent developments in the Law of evidence, particularly those related to
hearsay and similar fact d e s . This was particularly important given the fundamental
changes to the principled approach taken by the Supreme Court in cases such as R. v.

Khan. R. v. KGBJ9 that allowed a prosecutor to advance the case involving a recanting
witness beyond a declaration of adversity by the court and tender the evidence as

j9R. v. Khan (1990), 59 CCC (3d) 92 (S.C.C.); R. v. B. (KG.) (1993), 79 CCC (3d) 257
(S.C.C.). These cases are described in M e r detail later in this chapter.
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provided by the complainant soon afier the incident as the truth of what in fact actually
transpired.

The other response to the initiative included the establishment of a special court to
process the charges. As the accused persons' bail hearings were completed, the cases
were vetted by an assistant crown attorney to ensure that al1 domestic incident charges
laid were earmarked for the K Couri to be tried. These charges included not only
to a
aliegations of domestic violence but also other criminal charges directly c o ~ e c t e d
domestic setting, such as stalking, death threats, and break and enter charges. To be
directed to the K Court the nature of the relationship between the parties had to include
either a curent or p s t marriage, cormnon law relationship or a union that resulted in and
shared a child. Both heterosexud and homosexual relationships were included.

Aithough the Ontario government is currently in the process of gathering statistical data
to determine the effectiveness of the new K Court, one can certainly argue that the

changes irnpiemented have attempted to respond to the realities of the denial, fear and
heIplessness experienced by a woman trapped in the cycle of violence. As well, there are
some early indications that this response is having some impact on the guilty plea rate for

domestic offenders as the numbers have increased fiom 40 percent to 50 percent. This
This is
increase was marked within the first 6 rnonths of the court's ~peration.~'

'M. Herman, Assistant Crown Attorney, Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario and
member of the domestic violence work team, telephone interview Wednesday April28
1999. See also J. Armstrong et al.," Guilty Pleas Up" n e Toronto Slar ( 1 1 December

significant for at l e s t two reasons: one, a guilty plea prevents a victim fiom going
through the ordeal of having to testi@ against her partner; and two, it saves the system
resources that could be reinvested elsewhere. It has also been reported that within the
same period of time, the conviction rate after trial for the K Court increased from 10 to 14
percent."

(E)THE PLEA AND CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE COURT MODEL

A different response to the same fnistrations comected with the prosecution of domestic

violence cases emerged elsewhere in Ontario. The main concept behind this approach was
to treat the male party's violent and abusive behaviour through a counselling and

treatrnent program. The focus in this mode1 is shifted away fiom the changes in the legal
system that might be implernented to help ensure convictions and stressed an

environment of CO-operationbetween both the partners of a domestic relationship and the
criminai justice system. Rather than being faced with the unco-operative recanting female
witness at the time of the trial, assurning that she even showed up. an option would be

provided to the first time accused male person involved in a matter alleging "minor"
incidents of violence. In exchange for his admission of guilt and the completion of a court
recognized treatment prograrn, the male party would receive a conditional discharge fiom
the court. To be accompanied with this counselling and education program for the male

1997) A l .
4I

Jane Armstrong, supra note 40.
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Party, support and assistance would be offered to the female partner and their children.
The aim of this mode1 is the reduction of the behaviour that leads to domestic violence
and thereby promote increased safety for the victims of domestic violence.

The first step in the program is to have a crown review the charges and the allegations

supporting those charges. In determining eligibility, a number of factors are considered
including:
1.
3
-.

3
3.
5.

The charge must be the accused's first for domestic violence.
That no significant harm has been suffered by the cornplainant by the
accused's actions.
The accused's willingness to admit their assaultive behaviour towards the
complainant.
The complainant's willingness to participate in the project.
The accused consents to allowing partner contact."

If eligible under these conditions, the matter is then directed to Victim Services staffwho

contact the female complainant to explain to her the goals and parameters of the program
and then attempt to obtain her input into the process. If the accused is agreeable?he is
advised of this option and he is processed through the special domestic assault plea court
established to deal with the charges. Once the accused accepts these provisions he pleads
guilty to the charges before a provincial court judge and his sentencing hearing is
adjoumed for 20 weeks. He then enten a counselling program" that consists of an initial
'
1

-Notice to the profession, Re: Domestic Assault Project, Ontario Court, Provincial
Division, Brampton Ontario.

'"lbid. The three service providers for the Brampton Provincial Court are the Catholic
Family Services of Peel Dufferin, Man to Man Program; The Salvation Arrny Domestic
Violence Prevention Program and the Family Services of Peel. To be enrolled in the
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assessment meeting, followed by 16 weekly group counselling sessions. In addition to
these sessions focussed on the male batterer's behaviow, the agencies involved also
contact the victim to determine her unique needs for safety and protection. Referrals may
also be made for the female partner during this contact. If the accused successfùlly
cornpletes the intervention and counselling prograrn then the crown's position on
sentencing is a conditional discharge and probation with ternis, including additional
treatment if it is deemed a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ~

(F) Analysis of These Two Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Vioience

Gcnerally speaking, both of these models support the position that the criminal justice
system has responded more positively to the crisis in our society related to domestic
violence than it h a to the issues connected to the disclosure of female sexual assault
complainant's counselling records. The most significant factor behind this distinction is
the system's attempt to not only understand the contextual background behind the abuse,

including causes and consequences, but it has also moved forward at improving some of
the inequities related to the conventional response to interpersonal violence. However, the

two responses set out above, when examined carefully depict an oversimplified approach

to the advancement of equal access to justice for the female victims of domestic violence.

counselling sessions the accused is expected to make a monetary contribution of up to
$350 to help defiay the costs of the program.

"41bid.See also section 736 of the Criminal Code relating to the provisions of a discharge.

1. Practical Issues

One potential problem that may a i s e fiom the Plea Court mode1 is where the male party
initially agrees to the conditions of the plea, but afier attending for the initial assessrnent
and perhaps a number of the treatment or counselling sessions decides that he will not
complete the program. When this occurs does the plea get stntck because of a claimed
fundamental disagreement as to the nature of the proceeding? The law grants to a trial
judge the discretion to allow a change of plea fiom guilty to not guilty at any time before
the conviction is entered and the sentence is passed."

However, this discretion should

only be exercised when the accused has established that the plea was invalid because it
was entered in error or under an improper inducement or threat.46 Due to the fact that the

guilty plea is entered in open court it is presurned to have been made voluntarily and
thcrefore the onus is on the accused to establish that his plea is ~ r o n g . 'This
~ onus
becornes even more difficult to overcome if the accused has had the assistance of Iegal
counsel during the course of the guilty plea? It has also been held that a change of plea
wiil not be granted if it is established by the court that the accused understood the

"R. v. Bamsey, [1960] S.C.R. 294, 125 C.C.C. 329; R. v. Kavanagh ( 1 9 5 3 , 114 C.C.C.
378 (Ont. C.A.).

46R.V. Rajaeefard (1996), 104 C.C.C (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.).
'7R.

V.

Morris (1994), 87 W.A.C.296 (B.C.C.A.).

48R.V. Clermont (1996). 150 N.S.R.264 (N.S.C.A.).

consequences of his ~lea.'~
As a result, a guilty plea should not be struck even in a
situation where the plea was motivated by an accused person's desire to receive a reduced
sentence, such as a conditional discharge that is otherwise nav va il able.^^

Thus. the jurisprudence supports the position that if an accused was represented by
couisel and understood the consequences of his plea, then the trial court judge shouid not
allow the plea to be struck. I f the plea is not struck then the treatment option that the
accused removed himself fiom, no longer exists and the court is left to the conventionai
sentencing tools, such as deterrence through punishment, whether it be monetary fines,
incarceration or community service work. The violent behaviour goes untreated.

Yet even in the face of this legai jurisprudence, a trial judge does allow the plea to be
stmck down - and without a K Court prosecution mode1 to fa11 back on - then the
cornplainant and the comrnunity are h e l l e d back into an unsatisfactory conventional
approach to the prosecution of the charges. There is no CO-ordinatedeffort to ensure the
unique issues of dornestic assault offences, such as the recanting witness caught in the
cycle of violence, are dealt with in their proper contextual nature. There are no responses
to assist a female victim of abuse that wrongly believes that violence will corne to an end

without intervention. Therefore, assuming that this is the best that the criminal justice
system has to offer, it is suggested here that the plea court mode1 cannot exist without the

49R.v. Atlay (1992), 70 C.C.C. (3d) 553 (B.C.C.A.).
V. Btrrden (1996). 90 O.A.C. 169 (Ont.C.A.).

availability or option of a muiti component K Court model."

2. Theoretical Issues

(i) Contextual Shorteomings

Regarding the K Court model, it is suggested here that an option for counselling,
treatment and or education, coupled with a lenient sentence position such as a conditional
discharge. in r e m for an early indicated guilty plea - within the sarne parameters of the
plea court model - would aiso assist some female complainants access to justice. The

complainants that such an option would assist are those that truly desire to continue the
relationship, have only been exposed to a minimal amount of physicai abuse and whose
safety is not in i s ~ u e . ~ '

iMore importantly, it stressed that "some"complainants may benefit fiom such an option.
Many would not. This is the most significant component of this chapter's criticism of the

responses set out above, specifically that both of these responses have oversirnplified the

"See the discussion related to the unified hybrid domestic assault court option discussed
in the Reforms Chapter of the thesis.
"See H. Johnson, "Seriousness, Type and Frequency of Violence" in Wife Assault and the
Criminal Justice Systern, M. Valverde, L. MacLeod and K. Johnson eds., (Toronto:
University of Toronto, 1995). This article reviews the 1993 Statistics Canada national
survey on male violence against women. At page 136 she notes that this survey provides
empirical evidence of an escalation in the severity of assaults over time.

160
causes and the consequences in their attempt to understand the complexities of domestic
assault within its broader contextual societai framework. This position can be supported
through a number of contentions.

First. neither the women whose safety is at risk given their exposure to more serious

injury, nor those complainants who do not wish to reconcile the relationship would seem
to benefit from such an approach." Studies have shown that women are at the most
S ~ ~ O U
risk
S

of significant harm irnmediately after attempting to terminate an abusive

relationship. Still, other potential partners and children of an abusive mate may reap some
benefits from a shifi, or hopefilly a cessation of violent behaviour, and therefore it is
suggested here that any treatment is perhaps better than none at d l , and that some

attempts should be made to treat the underlying causes of the abusive behaviow. This
treatment cm. of course. take place without some of the other risks associated with this
plea approach. The nature of the risks Vary with the nature of the violent behaviour as
well as to the number of individuals that are in harms way, but include hrther assaultive

behaviow taking place in the home while the matters are still before the court.

Secondly, any improvements must take into consideration the needs and wishes of the
cornplainant directly involved. This concept is complicated because the two
considerations of "needs" and "wishes" are ofien mutually exclusive of each other. For

''ibid. at 136. Separated spouses tended to inflict more serious violence compared to
abusive men in current relationships.
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exarnple. the theones reviewed above, including the cycle of violence that would predict
that some women who request to have their abusive male partner's charges withdrawn do
so because they are trapped in a state of learned helplessness, or at a minimum some forrn

of unhealthy mental state of being if they are unable to safely extricate themselves and
their children fiom a dangerously violent situation. These women may not appreciate
their tme long-term needs are inconsistent with their imrnediately perceived wishes. Tfiis
is complicated by the fact that al1 women have a section 15 Charter nght to be treated

equally and fairly by the law. Therefore, serious efforts must be made to get the input
from the specific cornplainant involved. However, it is argued that given the extremely

high threat of harm, and the almost countless different theories related to the causes of
domestic assault, that one telephone cal1 fiom a minimally trained victim services worker
is far from suficient. There needs to be a detailed appreciation of the history behind the

incident, including previous assaults, the number of children involved, prior treatrnent or
counselling, any potential culturai variables, in addition to the gathering of a
complainant's position on wishing to have M e r contact with her abusive partner. To
gather such types of information would require not only a specially trained and skilled
case worker, but also time so that a trusting relationship of some level could be created.

Thirdly, and directly related to the input of the cornplainant, it must be stressed that an
"one size fits all" approach is wholly inappropriate in the circumstances of domestic
assault. Some women may have actually only been abused on one single occasion and as
a result wish for a conventional criminal justice response to an unprovoked assault on

their person. If this is the case, some assurances must be made that unwittingly an
unequal lower tier of justice is not king created by these criminai justice responses. For

example, S. Merry studied the legal consciousness of working class Amencans and their
experiences with both court and mediation processes in eastem Massachusetts in the early
1980'~.~'
She found that the group that used the courts, both criminal and civil. was

Iargely but not entirely women. Through her studies she discovered an interesting paradox
comected to ail users but especiaiiy women:
It empowers plaintiffs with relation to neighbors and relatives, but at the

same time it subjects them to the control of the court. People who take
their personal problems to court become more dependent on the state to
manage their private lives...After submitting their problems to the courts
for help. plaintiffs must then struggle to keep control of their problems as
the courts reformulate and reinterpret these problems' meaning and
con~e~uences.~~
She found that the courts are accessed as a fonn of conflict resolution when ail other

means have failed. The court of last resort, if you d l . Those seeking justice through the
courts are othenvise powerless to resolve the conflict. Then when they attempt to exercise

rheir rights before the law they discover that their voices are muted by the courts. Her
studies found that while the plaintiffs were encouraged into the court they were denied a
legal forum to assert their rights. On the issue of a separate tier of justice S. Merry wrote:
Thus, as these working-class court users seek to assert their sense of
entitlement to legal relief for these problems, they find that it is denied by
the courts. The court does not reject their requests out of hand but subjects

"S. Merry. Getting J ~ i c and
e Getfing Even (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1 990).
"lbid. at 2 . See also comments at 178 regarding women's particular response to the
courts invitation for "personai" problem resolutions.

them to periods of monitoring, to probationary supervision, to social

services. The problems are denied as legal cases but receive continuing
supervision and management as moral or therapeutic problems. The
plaintiffs do not find their rights protected, but they do receive lectures,
advice about how to organize their lives, encouragement to corne back for
mediation, and promises that something will be done to the plaintiff if the
problem recurs: the cornplaint will be issued, the problem will go back to
court, perhaps the defendant will be fmed or irnpris~ned.'~
She described this as a form of "cultural domination" as the courts exert their legal
authority to frame the problems in other discourses, which thereby denies access to a
justice system created to provide protection. Such diversions offer nonlegal, nonrights
based solutions instead.

Some of these nodegai solutions are examined more closely in Chapter Four that deals
with ~otentialrrfonns. Still, it is important here to note that if the criminal justice system
is to provide access to justice for the victims of domestic assault, then the provision of

that service will require a clear determination of what the complainant's wishes are. It

would be a further miscarriage of justice if a woman taking the position of a survivor, as
described above, desiring that her rights and safety be protected by the courts through the
prosecution of the criminal charges discovers, afier the fact. that her partner's charges
have been rechannelled into a conditional discharge Stream of consciousness. How one
goes about discovering the wishes of the complainant may start with a phone call, but
may very well require a much more contextual appreciation of the circumstances that
bnngs those parties before the courts.
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Moreover, this situation, as troublesome as it appears, is not as contentious as the possible
scenario where a crown is required to protect the safety of the cornplainant as a member
of the public, regardless of her clearly articulated wishes. This is described here as the

ascertaining of the complainant's needs. How does one distinguish between the individual
comp!ainant trapped in a dangerous spiral of escalating violence fiom the woman who
was hit once, immediately desired protection fiom her abusive partner, has since rnoved

on and is no longer in any danger and no longer wishes to be involved in the prosecution
of the matter? This is a complicated distinction that may need to be made fiom time to
time that has no easy answers. It is postulated here that due to the very real potential for

tragic consequences to transpire, it is better to err on the side of caution. As the statistics
outlined in the first chapter indicate this is such a significant problem that once a
thorough effort has been made by a skilled professionai to ascertain the wishes and needs
of both the cornplainant and the community, as well as the context of the allegations,
someone must be allowed to exercise their discretion to ensure that the violence cornes to
an end.

(ii) The Consequences of Domestic Violence

An essential part of trying to decrease the arnount of domestic violence in our community

is understanding domestic violence within a contextual fiamework. As already pointed

out these types of criminal offences are dramatically under reported. Therefore, it is
postulated that a contextual understanding of the problem includes an appreciation not
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only of the potential causes of the violent behaviour, but also the consequences of the
abuse for both the direct victim as well as the community in which the victim lives. This
information is required to properly assess the deterrence value of the modelled solutions
described above. Without this broad appreciation any proposed solution is destined to fail
if not in the short term, certainly in the long term.

The most obvious consequence to the direct victim is the physical injury. Depending on
the severity of injury, physicai pain and suffering may follow physical abuse. One study
conducted a review of an urban American city's emergency room medical injuries
records. They found that 50 percent of al1 of the injuries to women seen in the emergency
room and 21 percent of the injuries that required emergency surgery were attributed
incidents of domestic ~iolence.~'

Also, most would anticipate the victim of physical abuse would additionally suffer
psychological h m fiom the violent behaviour. Conditions such as depression, suicida1
tendencies, low self esteem, shame, anxiety, alcohol and drug dependency problems, and
post traumatic stress disorder have al1 been associated to the victims of both sexual

assaults and domestic ~iolence.~'
Still, while the notion of battered woman's syndrome is

"E. Stark, A. Flitcrafl, D. Zuckerman, A. Grey, J. Robinson, and W. Frazier, Wijie Abuse
in the Medical Setring: An Introductionfor Heaiih Personnel ( 1 98 l), Domestic Violence
Monograph Series, No. 7 (Rockville, Md.: National Clearinghouse on Domestic
Violence, 1981) as cited by the Nationai Research Council, supra note 2 1 .
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For an excellent review of the research and studies that have docurnented the
psychological consequences of domestic violence see Understanding Violence Againsr

an accepted notion within legal proceedings it is not a recognized psychiatrie syndrome.

Rather, the term is linked to the consequences of having been abused. The use of the term

has been the subject of much debate, primarily because it makes the consequences of
domestic violence a pathology and disregards the many differences that exist between
women's responses to being physically abused.19

One level removed fiom the direct impact is for the children being raised in violent
households. Many studies have been conducted on these subjects which have documented
a broad range of effects. including being at a greater risk of physical injury than those

children not subjected to the b e h a v i o ~ , ~the
' exhibiting of high levels of aggressive.
antisocial. fearful and inhibited behavioursp' and the role modelling that young boys are
involved in as they observe their fathers abuse their mothers.

Wornen. supra note 2 1 at 79 to 84.

'9See M. Dutton, "Undentanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition of the Battered Wife Syndrome (1 993), 2 1 Hofstra Law Review 1 191. This
article provides a conceptual fiamework for examining the diversity of women's
responses to violence within the context of the Amencan criminal justice system
"

M. Straus and R. Gelles, "How Violent Are Arnerican Families? Estimates fiom the
National Family Violenve Resurvey and Other Studies" in M. Straus and R. Gelles eds.,
Physical Violence in Arnerican Families: Risk Factors and Adaptations to Violence in
8,145 Families (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990) as cited by the
National Research Council, supra note 2 1 .
60

6'P. Jaffe. D. Wolf, S. Wilson, and L. Zak, "Similatities in Behaviour and Social
MaIadjustrnent Arnong Child Victims and Child Witnesses to Family Violence" (1986).
56 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 142, as cited by the National Research Council,
srrpru note 2 1.
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Further impact is absorbed by community. Society on the whole must also deal with
ramifications of domestic violence. For example, the fear of crime and of being
victimized by crime eRects people on the macro level, and because women fear crime
more than their male counter parts, they are disproportionately afEected? Also, there are
financial costs of violence. H. Meyer has estimated that medical costs and lost work
productivity attributable to incidents of domestic violence in the United States is in the

. ~ ~ estimation has been supported by the
range of $5 to $10 billion per a n n ~ r nThis
Arnerican Bureau of National Affairs, whose findings are that the annual costs of
domestic violence to employers for health care and lost productivity are between $3 and
$5 billion per year.'

There are also the costs of medical care (immediate and long term),

the maintenance of homeless shelters and of course the costs to the cnminal justice

system, including the investigation, processing, prosecution and perhaps even

incarceration costs.

Lastly, there are atso less direct costs, such as changes in the quality of life for the

battered partner and children that may be involved. One can only contemplate the costs
associated with a battered womenTsreality of isolation, fear and lost opportunities to

"M. Gorden and S. Riger The Fernale Fear (New York: The Free Press, 1989); 1. Gomme
"Fear of Crime Among Canadians: A Multivariate Analysis" (1986), 14 Journal of
Criminal Justice 249, as cited by the National Research Council, supra note 21 at 87.
(j3H.Meyer, "The Billion - Dollar Epidemic" (1992), American Medical News. January 6,
as cited by the National Research Council, supra note 21 at 87.
HThe Bureau of National Affairs (1 WO), as cited by the National Research Council supra
note 2 1 at 87.

ennch their own lives, forgone because of the controliing effects of violent physical
abuse. An indication of these indirect costs can be found in a study conducted in New

York that found that 56 percent of employed women who had been physicaily abused had
lost their employment as a direct result of the abuse and 75 percent had been harassed by
their male partner while in the work place.6s

(iii) Treatment as a Solution

Having considered this broad range of consequences attributable to domestic violence.
one can begin to analyse the solution component - education. treatment and counselling of the recent Ontario responses to domestic violence. The first thing that comes to mind is

that, in their efforts to improve and overcome the shortcomings of the conventional
treatment of incidents of female partner assaults, criminal justice policy makers have
rnissed the issue of complesity and diversity in causes and consequences. Obviously not
al1 women who have been physically assaulted by their male partners fa11 into identical
backgrounds and histones of abuse. The causes Vary and the costs to her. her family and
society on the whole are al1 potentially very different. Also, if a goal of the criminal
justice system is to prevent this specific male party from re-offending his treatment
program will need to be modified for his panicular needs.

"L. Friedman and S. Couper, The Costs of Domestic Violence: A Preliminary
Investigation of the Financial C m of Domestic Violence ( New York: Victim Services,
1987).
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As one contemplates the value of the models one must consider whether either have had
an impact at reducing domestic violence in the jurisdictions where they have been set up.

The government of Ontario is currentiy in the process of collecting data to assess the
impact of the programs, although unfortunately these results are not yet available. In
addition to the input fiom both the victims and the offenders the state must be interested
in the effect that such initiatives have on individual recidivism as well as the lowering of

the prevalence of the behaviour throughout society. Moreover, there should be some

consideration of how the models treat the broad social disabilities comected with
domestic assaults. Since the results of the data gathered to date is unavailable one must
consider some of the literature in the field that has assessed similar responses to domestic
violence established in other jurisdictions. In doing this one may be able to predict the
programs' effectiveness.

In a iiterature review conducted by Hamberger and Hastings, they concluded that court

ordered treatment for wife batterers was an important positive step towards reducing
domestic violence. On the concept generally they wrote:
When wife assault is called a crime, several forces corne to bear. First the criminal
justice system responds, as society's representative, to hold the wife assaulter
unequivocally responsible for the violence. By mandating treatment for the
offender, the criminal justice system and the treatment comrnunity are
simultaneously giving him an oppominity to change and telling him that he is
responsible for stopping his violence. Hence, there is good reason to coordinate
criminal justice, social services, and treatment components to respond to partner
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L. Harnberger and J. Hastings, "Court Mandated Treatment of Men Who Assault Their

Partner; Issues, Controversies, and Outcornes" in N. Hilton, ed., Legal Responses to Wife

They went on to examine the two pnmary types of court mandated treatment sessions for
wife batterers. The first type is described as a pre-triai diversion or deferred prosecution
plan wherein the male party has his arrest record cleared o r the charge reduced in some

fashion once he has successfuIly completed a court mandated treatment program. The
second type is court ordered participation as part of a sentence imposed foI1owing a
convictionm6'The Arnerican studies that examined both of these formats were reviewed.
To assess their impact twro main areas of research have been conducted. The first involves

the effectiveness of treatrnent sessions on the reduction of recidivism. The second is in
the dissection of attrition rates and how well the criminal courts hold the abusers
accountable when they drop out of the program they were ordered to attend in the first
instance.

Another study completed by Hamberger and Hastings four years earlier discovered that
the manner in which a male party was directed to the battering counseIling had an effect
on their program completion rate. They found that about two-thirds of the court mandated
completed the sessions, as compared to two-fifths of the men whose treatment was not

Assadt, Czcrrent Trends and Evahation (Ntwbury Park: Sage Publications, Inc., 1993) at
188.

67~bid.
at 190. A third type of court mandated treatment is also described that involves a
municipal court order for minor ordinance violations that d o not amount to a
misdemeanour offence.

coun ordered? Others have studied the effect that the abuser's persona1 variables have
had on the attrition rates connected to the treatment sessions. For example, it has been
reported that younger, less educated and lower income level factors have al1 been linked
to higher program drop out rates."

On the issue of recidivism, M. Steinman compared the number of domestic assault cases
that occurred pnor to the creation of coordinated community response with the cases that
occurred post. This study found that without the coordinated effort the arrests actually
increased the repeat violence. Yet the study also found that police arrests coupled with
other criminal justice initiatives, including "an energetic prosecution of offenders and
other interventions delivered by a coalition of public and private agencies," deterred
additional violence.70 Similarly, M. Syers and J. Edleson collected domestic assault data
in Minneapolis over a 13 month period. Included in their research was direct input from
the victims themselves. At the 12 month period they discovered the least amount of

repeat violence for the men who were arrested and ordered to attend for treatment. At the
other extreme. they found that the highest repeat violence occurred among men who were

6 11

L. Hamberger and J. Hastings, "Counseling Male Spouse Abusers: Characteristics of
Treatrnent Completers and Dropouts" (1989) 4 Violence and Victims 323, as cited by the
National Research Council, supra note 2 1 at 122.

(j9R.Gruznski and T. Carillo, "Who Completes Batterer Treatment Groups? An Empirical
Investigation" (1988), 3 Journal of Farnily Violence 141.
"M. Steinman. "Lowering Recidivism Among Men Who Batter Women" (1990), 17
Journal of Police Science and Administration 124 at 124, as cited by the National
Research Council, supra note 2 1.

not arrested.

However, such studies are fiequently cnticized. In their literature review, Hamberger and
Hasting point out serious methodological flaws in most of the studies inducted in the
field. At the completion of their work they conclude:
After reviewing much o f the research literature, what do we 'know' about the
short- [sic] and long terrn effects of treatment on wife assault? The answer,
unfortunately, is 'Not much.' ... We cannot confidently Say whether 'Treatment
works.' We should be well beyond that question, asking instead, 'What treatrnent
works best on which types of client, and under what conditions?"'
Therefore. while the initiatives to treat and educate the abusive male partner are a
progressive step in the right direction towards putting an end to domestic violence, it is

far fiom certain as to whether what is currently being done is enough. It is suggested here
that given the large nurnber of variables that are linked to the causes and consequences of
domestic assault more information is needed so that treatment can be geared to category
types. Solutions to this complicated problem will require a significant contextual

appreciation of the factors at the root of each case. Yet, this is not to suggest that each
individual instance of domestic assault will require an independent exhaustive inquiry;
rather, it is suggested that certain categories of offenders need to be recognized so that
optimal treatment prograrns can be made be available to best take advantage of the
opportunity to implement a lasting cure.
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Supra note 66 at 220. A discussion as to treatment types is set out in chapter four, that
specifically deals with reforms.
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3. Recent Canadian Judicial Interpretaîions Related to the Prosecutions of Domestic

Assault Cases

The next step of this section is to examine the courts' response to this new initiative in
prosecuting domestic assault cases. A recent search for cases that have dealt with the
issue of a recanting domestic assault complainant's original statement admission into
evidence for the truth of their contents has tumed up very few cases. One case directly on
point is reviewed below. This case provides us with a predictable issue that needs to be
carefully examined. In this case the complainant provides the police and a number of
third parties with an explanation about how she received her injuries. By the time the trial
is commenced she recants this original version of events and provides the court with a

second and inconsistent recollection of the incident. It is argued that it is an injustice for a
court to merely assess that since there are now two inconsistent stories before the trier of

fact. there is a reasonable doubt and an acquitta1 must be entered. To avoid this result. it is
outlined in this section that the context of domestic violence must be considered by the
courts. There must be fair determination of the facts from the evidence, including the two
different version of events as provided by the complainant. It is argued that part of this
consideration should be the assessrnent of al1 circumstances of reliability, including the
complainant's original statements to the third parties. To fûlly appreciate the principles
discussed, a brief review of the leading cases on hearsay has been included. Also, given
the limited number of cases that deal with the issue, an effort has been made to discuss
some of the Iegal principles that are evolving in the generai area o f hearsay evidence and
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its admission into court under the exceptions of necessity and reliability. Also, one theme
that is highlighted in this section is the distinctive rules that apply to an accused person as

compared to the prosecution when it cornes to the admission of hearsay evidence.
Specifically, we see that the courts have focused on the possibiiity of a miscarriage of
justice that would flow fiom an innocent person being wrongly convicted rather than on
the rniscarriages of justice that may flow fiom a distraction by the courts fkorn their search
for the truth. This residual discretion connects back into the theme of conflicted interests,
fairness and equaiity as developed in the Second Chapter, specifically the disclosure of a
sexual assault complainant's therapeutic records.

(i) The Trilogy Plus One

In 1990 the Supreme Court of Canada took a bold step in the direction of hearsay reform.
In R. v. Hian" the accused, a physician, was charged with sexually assaulting a three and

half year old child. Once the examination of the child was completed he was retumed to
his mother. At this time she noted a wet spot on his clothing that was analyzed and found
to be a mixture of semen and saliva. Approximately 15 minutes afier leaving the medical
office the mother asked the child what he and the physician had spoken about. The child

responded "He asked me if 1 wanted candy. 1 said yes ... He said 'open your mouth,' and

"(1991), 59 C.C.C.(3d) 92 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. L.T. W. (1995), 13 1 Sask. Reports 47
(Sask. C.A.) at 49.
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you know what? He put his birdie in my mouth, shook it and peed in my mouth."" The
boy was four and a half at the time of trial. At trial, an issue arose regarding the child's
ability to give unswom testimony. The trial judge allowed the hearsay statement of the
child that was made to his mother as described above under a strained "spontaneous
statements"" exception. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Khan appeal
regardless of the declared error by creating a principled exception to the exclusionary nile
related to hearsay. McLachlin J., writing for the Court held:
The hearsay rule has been traditionally regarded as an absolute d e , subject to
various categories of exceptions, such as admissions, dying declarations,
declarations against interest and spontaneous declarations. While this approach
has provided a degree of certainty to the law on hearsay, it has fiequently proved
unduly inflexible in dealing with new situations and new needs in the law. This
has resulted in courts in recent years on occasion adopting a more flexible
approach, rooted in the prïnciple and the policy underlying the hearsay mle rather
than the strictures of traditional exceptions.''
The Court went on to anchor the new approach in two generai requirements: necessity
and reliability. For interpretive purposes, necessity was broadly descnbed as "reasonably
n e ~ e s s a r y ' 'Examples
~~
of circumstances that would meet this requirement threshold
included the inadrnissibility of a child's evidence or perhaps the trauma that would be
caused to a child if required to testifi in court. Regarding reliability, McLachlin J.
provided a number of considerations that could be relevant, but clearly designated the

trial judge as the person to best frame the factors."

In R. v. Smith" the Supreme Court of Canada had an opportunity to re-examine the
principled approach to the hearsay issue. In this case the accused was charged with
second degree murder. The Crown wished to tender the statements of the deceased to
support it's theory that the accused had initially tried to persuade the deceased to smuggle

drugs into Canada from the United States. When she rehsed he lefi her in a hotel in the
United States. The deceased then made series of phone calls to her mother; one indicating
that she had been abandoned by the accused and that she required a ride home. a second

indicating that he had still not returned, a third indicating that the accused had returned to
the hotel and that she would no longer require a ride, and a fourth call indicating that she
was on her way home. The main issue on appeal was the admissibility of the statements
made by the deceased to her mother over the phone. The Court held the first two calis
should be admitted but excluded the third due to it's lack of reliability. The fourth call
was not in issue. Lamer C.J.C., on behalf the Court, supported the refonns established in

Khan, stating that:

However, Khan should not be understood as turning on its particular facts, but,
instead must be seen as a particular expression of the fundamental principles that
underline the hearsay rule and the exceptions to it. What is important, in my view,
is the departure signalled in Khan fiom a view of hearsay characterized by a
general prohibition on the reception of such evidence, subject to a limited number
of defined categoncal exceptions, and a movement towards an approach governed
by the principles which undedie the rule and its exceptions alike. The movement
--

771bid.at 105.
'"1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.).

towards a flexible approach was motivated by the realization that, as a general
rule, reliable evidence ought not to be excluded simply because it cannot be tested
by cross-exa~nination.~~

In R. v. B. (K. G.)

this principled approach was expanded to admit into evidence a p i o r

inconsistent out of court videotaped statement for the tmth of its content. In this case a
yowig offender was charged and tned in the youth court for second degree murder. The

incident arose when the accused and three other young men became involved in a
physical altercation in which the deceased was stabbed and killed. Two weeks afier the
killing the three other young men were interviewed separately by the police. During these
interviews each had present with them a parent and legal counsel. With their consent the
interviews were videotaped. In statements each of them indicated that the accused had
admitted to them that he believed that he had stabbed the deceased. During the trial each

of the three cornpanions refûsed to adopt their earlier videotaped statements. Under

section 9 of the Canada Evidence Act, each was cross-exarnined and admitted that they
made the statements but also gave evidence that they had lied to the police. The trial
judge held that the earlier videotaped statements could only be used to assess their overall

credibiiity. The accused was acquitted. The Supreme Court of Canada overturned the
lower court ruling on this issue and ordered a new trial.

Lamer C.J.C., again writing for the majority, rejected the technical rule of exclusion and
-

- -

791bid.at 270.
"(1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.).

found that where there was a sufficient guarantee of reliability attached to a statement,
then the pnor inconsistent statement should be admissible for its tmth. On the issue of
reliability he held:
The reliability of prior inconsistent statements is clearly a key concern for Law
refonners and courts which have reforrned the orthodox d e , and, as 1 have
outlined, this concem is centred on the hearsay dangers: the absence of an oath,
presence, and contemporaneous cross-examination. The reliability concern is
sharpened in the case of prior inconsistent statements because the trier of fact is
asked to chose between two statements fiom the same witness, as opposed to
other f o m s of hearsay in which only one account of the declarant is tendered. In
other words, the focus of the inquiry in the case of prior inconsistent statements is
on the comparative reliability of the pnor statement and the testimony at trial, and
so additional indicia and guarantees of reliability to those outlined in Khan and
Smith must be secured in order to bring the pnor statement to a comparable
standard of reliability before such statements are admitted as substantive
evidence.*'
This notion of a threshold reliability was addressed in R. v. C/.(F.J.).8' This case involved
a recanting child witness. The accused was charged with five counts of incest and the

sesual touching his daughter. The young complainant was interviewed by the police and
provided them with a statement detailing the sexual attacks. The sexual acts were
described in some detail and with a recollection regarding fkequency. Following this the
accused was interviewed by the police. During this interview the accused provided the
police with an admission regarding the manner and ffequency of the offences. The
accused's statement was mled admissible at trial. When called to testifi the complainant
recanted the allegations, indicating that she had lied to the police. The trial judge directed

''Ibid. at 287. See also R. v. Finfa(1994), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 41 7 (S.C.C.) at 526 for a
discussion regarding reliability as established by a combination of several factors.
"(1996), 101 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
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the jury that they could examine the complainant's prior statements and compare it to the
accused's confession as the similarity in details could be considered in their deliberations.
The accused was found guilty. A number of issues, including the burden of proof and the

proper use that could be made of the pnor inconsistent out of court statements were
examined by the Supreme Court.

Reçarding the procedural issue of burden of proof, Lamer CJ.C. held that:

the trial judge need only be convinced on a balance of probabilities that the
statement is Iikely to be reliable, as this is the normal burden of proof resting upon
a party seeking to admit evidence."

Related to the statements use issue, once again the Court relied on a flexible and
principled approach to "ensure that the new developments in the evidential treatment of
hearsay would reflect those te net^"^ as was articulated in the cases Khan and Smith. Here

the Court held that this was a proper case that the orthodox rule, that a prior inconsistent
statsment cannot be admitted for its truth, should not be applied. Larner C.J.C. w-riting for
the majority. considered the similarity between the statements of the cornplainant and her
father to support the requisite reiiability. He noted that:

In order to eliminate. or at least substantially reduce, the likelihood of a similarity

'%id at 1 19. See also D. Paciocco and L. Stuesser, The Luw of Evidence (Concord, Ont. :
Invin Law. 1996) at 13; "the general rule is that the party seeking to have a rule of
evidence applied must establish its factual prerequisites on a balance of probabilities.
This means that while a rule of exclusion or a special rule of admissibility provides a list
of preconditions, the judge must determine that each is met before the rule can operate."

between two statements arising through coincidence, the similar factual assertion
must be so striking that it is highly unlikely two people would have independently
fabricated it. ... In some cases, the necessary degree of similarity will result fiom
the unique nature of particular factual assertions in both statements. In other
situations, while there may not be any points of similarity that are sufficiently
striking to render coincidence unlikely when viewed standing alone, it may be that
the cumulative combination of sirnilar points renders the overall similarity
between the two statements sufficiently distinctive to reject coincidence as a likely
explanati~n.'~
Having compieted this brief review of the Supreme Court's reformed position on the
principles of hearsay, we can now turn our attention to its actual and potential impact on
the prosecution of domestic assault cases.

(ii) Domestic Assault Cases

In R. v. iklohamecf6the Crown applied to have the complainant's pnor inconsistent
staternent adrnitted into evidence for the tmth of its contents. In this case the complainant

and the accused were mamed in 1989. On September 14, 1996 the accused assaulted the

complainant following an argument. Afterwards the accused lefi the apartment to
purchase some cigarettes. While he was gone fiom the apartment the complainant locked
the apartrnent door. When her husband returned he becarne upset and kicked the door

open and entered the apartment. He found the complainant in the kitchen preparing a

''1bid. at 1 17. Similarities between the statements is considered in addition to the factors
set out in R. v. B.(K.G.), including the availability of the witness to be cross-exarnined at
trial, the use of an oath given at the time the out of court statement was made, and
whether or not the statement was videotaped.
86[1 9971 O.J No. 1287 (Ont. Prov. Div.).
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meal for their children. At this time there were two pots on the stove, one a boiling pot of
macaroni and the other a boiling pot of tomato sauce. The accused, angry at being locked
out of the apartrnent, picked up the boiling pot of macaroni and poured it on the
complainant's head. She ran fiom the kitchen and the accused followed her with the
boiling pot of tomato sauce. The accused then intentionally poured the mohen liquid over
the complainant's head. This caused senous second degree bums to her back and chest.

She eventually ran out of the apartment where she was assisted by neighbours. An
emergency " 91 I call" was made and she was transported and admitted into a local bum
unit for treatment.

Within the two hours following the attack the complainant spoke to the neighbours who
assisted her, the 91 1 operator, the ambulance attendants? a police oficer present in the
emergency ward at the hospital and to the plastic surgeon who took the information fiom

her about her injuries. The compfainant told each of these parties a similar account of the
assaults as set out above. Three days later, Detective Gerry attended at the bum unit to
take a statement fiom the complainant. The interview was audio taped. At that time she

also advised the detective that the injuries that she had sufTered had been caused by her
husband in the manner set out above. Further, she advised the detective that she had been
physically assaulted by her husband in 1993 when he punched and choked her with an
unknown type of cord.

The next contact that transpired between the detective and the complainant was on
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November 13, 1996. At that time the detective became aware that the complainant was
now recanting her earlier version of events. From that point in time fonvard she indicated
her wish not to have anything else to do with either the police or the prosecutor's office.
She even refùsed to answer the door to receive her subpoena to attend court. Months later
at the trial she was cailed by the Crown to test@ on the matter. At that time she
indicated, under oath, that & had assadted him earlier in the day and that she poured the
boiling macaroni pot on him. She also testified that the boiling pot of tomato sauce was
spilled on her accidentally.

In a conventionai manner the prosecutor made a section 9(2) Canada Evidence Act

application to determine the issue of adversity so that the witness could be cross
examined. During her cross examination the complainant failed to adopt any of her

previous statements as tme, maintaining that she had falsely accused her husband of the
violence. In an unconventional manner the Crown then applied to have the comptainant's
previous statement admitted for the tmth as to what had happened on September 14,
1996. The Court granted the appIication and allowed the prior statements to be admitted

into evidence for the truth of their contents.

MacDomeli Prov. J., reviewed the pnnciples set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the decisions discussed a b ~ v eGiven
. ~ ~ the recantation of the complainant the component

87R.V. B.(K.G.) (1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 257; R. V. LI.(F.J) (1995), 101 C.C.C. (3d) 97; R.
v. Khan [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 59 C.C.C. 92, and R. v. Smith [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, 75
C.C.C. (3d) 257.

183
of necessity was conceded? As a result, the judge's reasoning focussed on the reliability
requirements of the issue, He noted the three main concems at the root of the traditional
distrust of pnor inconsistent statements included:
1) the absence of an oath or solemn affirmation; 2) the inability to assess the
demeanour of the declarant at the time the staternent was made; 3) the lack of
opportunity for the party against whom the statement is offered to cross-examine
the declarant at the time the statement was

The court went on to consider a nurnber of safeguards that could be flexibly considered
when assessing the reliability of the statements in issue, including the videotaping of the

rate ment.^^ Still, probably the most interesting feature of these types of cases is what the
courts do when the statements are not videotaped following an oath or affirmation
accompanied by a warning about the consequences of intentionally misleading the police.
In the Moharned case, MacDonnell Prov. J . relied on other circumstantial guarantees of

reliability that consider the fiailties of reliability in hearsay evidence. For example, the
availability of the witness for cross examination by the opposing party was held to be a

"Sec also R. v. Conway and Husband (l998), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 397 (0nt.C.A.) at 406; R.
v. U.(EJ.) (1995), 101 C.C.C (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) at 119. The criteria for necessity is met
whenever a witness recants. For a broader review of necessity see R. Pomerance,
"Confionting the Hearsay Dangers: The Principles of Necessity and Reliability "
[unreported] a paper presented at the National Crirninal Law Program, Dalhousie
University. Halifax Nova Scotia July 1997. But see R. v. Charles (1997), 152 Sask.
Reports 65 (Sask. C.A.) at 75.

89R.V . Moharned, supra note 86 at 3.
90

Still, it should be clarified that an oath, a caution as to the significance of providing
false information and the videotaping of the statement are not preconditions to the
admissibility of a prior statement. R. v. Cr.(F.J.). supra note 82.

substantial means to ensuring reliability.g'

Furthemore, the Court determined the option of relying on other alternative guarantees of
trustworthiness. MacDonnell Prov. J. considered the principles articulated in the case of

U ( F J ) and held:
1 regard U.(F. J.) as a case that turned very much on its own facts, but in any event
it is note worthy that in that case the Supreme Court found a circumstantial

guarantee of reliability not in the fact that the accused's statement tended to
confirm the prior statement of the cornplainant but rather in the fact that the
accounts were strikingly ~imilar.~'
The Provincial Court stressed the difference between threshold reliability and ultirnate

reliability. It was pointed out that the judicial inquiry regarding the element of reliability
needs to be focussed on the circumstances in which the statement was made.93It was

reasoned that if the circumstances in which the statement are made eliminate the
possibility that the person making the statement was either untniffil or mistaken then
evidence c m be assessed as reliable. Although it is not specifically articulated i n the
decision, it is then assurned that other factors, beyond the those circumstances of the
making of the statement, are relied upon to determine ultimate reliability. So for example,
in the case of Mohamed the photographs and medical expert descriptions of the burn
injuries could only be considered in the determination of ultimate reliability and not in the

v. B.(K.G.)supra note 87 at 116.

9 1 ~ .

"R. V. Mohamed, supra note 86 at S.
"Sec also R. v. Hawkins and Morin (1996)' 1 11 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) at 129 and R. v.
Smith,supra note 87 at 270.
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assessrnent process that concludes whether or not the hearsay statements, specifically
about how the injuries occurred, are in and of themselves reliable. It is argued here that
this is perhaps a false distinction yet one that the courts adhere to. Having spent eight
years in the criminal justice system's trial courts (the trenches so to speak) it is suggested

that to rely exclusively on the sanctity of an oath and to neglect other circumstantial
pieces of evidence, such as the testimony of other unbiased third parties, to detennine the
reliability of a p i o r out of court statement is naively ridiculous."

MacDonnel Prov. J. applied the facts of this case to the three contentious reliability issues
as established in R. v. B. (KG.).
First with regards to the absence of an oath at the time
the statements were made to the detective in the hospital, the Court considered the serious
nature of the manner in which the interview took place in the bum unit. The fact that the

detective spoke with the cornplainant about the accused's bail conditions and the
possibility for the increasing of security at the hospitai. the fact that the detective "had
with him a large attache case containing tape recording equipment" and the fact that "he
pimed a microphone to her clothing and to himself ail satisfied the issue of the absence
of the ~ a t h . " ~ ~

See L. Stuesser, "Admitting Prior Inconsistent Statements where 'Adverse'- Section 24,
Evidence Act (Ont.)" (1962), 40 Can. Bar. Rev. 96; and D. Dugdale, "Against Oath
Taking" [1985] N.Z.L.J. 404, both as cited by Lamer C.J.C. in R. v. B. (K. G.). These
articles suggest that in a modem society the power of an oath should be discounted as a
means of guaranteeing witness reliability.
QJ

v. hlohamed. supra note 86 at 6.

9 5 ~ .

Second, on the issue of the statement not k i n g videotaped, the trial judge relied
significantiy on the circumstances surround the audio taping of the statement. This
combined with the Court's opportunity to observe the witness take the stand during the
voir dire conducted at the trial compensated for the inability of the trial judge to be

present during the time that the statement was made in the bwn unit.

Third. the tàct that the complainant remained available for cross examination for the
remainder of the trial, if the previous statement was adrnitted for the truth of its contents.
overcame the lack of contemporaneous cross examination when the statement was made
cit

the burn unit.96

The Court concluded that the Crown had established the requisite threshold reliability of
the complainant9sstatement made to the detective in the bum unit. As such, the statement
was admitted for the truth of its contents, namely that her husband had intentionally

poured boiling hot Iiquids ont0 her body.

Given the realities of the special dynamics between an accused and a complainant in
cases involving domestic assault cases, it is suggested that most would agree with the
result of allowing the Court to consider the statement that the victim made to the
detective while in the b u m unit for the tmth of its contents - that the accused intentionally
96R. V. B. (KG.) supra note 87, where it was held that the opportunity to cross examine the
party making the statement at trial could be an important substitute for the inability of the
defence to cross examine the witness at the time that statement was made.
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poured the boiling hot liquids on his wife. Still, what about the other evidence gathered
by the police from the neighbour, the 91 1 tape, the ambulance attendants, the police at the
emergency ward, and the plastic surgeon? They al1 spoke with the complainant and al1
were advised that the accused had intentionally burned her with the boiling liquids afier
having had an argument. 1s this type of information not also relevant in creating the
context in which the statement was made? Does it not add reliability to the complainant's
statement made to the police while in the hospital? It is suggested that the answer to both
of these questions is obviously yes. However, given the developing hearsay jurisprudence.
the Court could not look to these factors to suppon the threshold reliability of the
truthfulness or accuracy of the audio taped hearsay statement. Unfortunately, the Court's
eventual determination was not reported, so we are unable to determine whether this
information could be, or was, relied upon in the final determination of ultimate reliability.
Al1 that we do know is that it was idormation that was excluded fiom the statement's
initial threshold reliabiiity determinati~n.~'

Another troubling feature about this case are the questions that arises in the hypotheticai:
what if the complainant had never made the statement to the police while in the hospital?
" ~ tis noted that the distinction between "threshold" reliability and "ultimate" reliability
may require further clarification. It has been assurned for the purposes of this work that
threshold reliabiiity relates to the question of satiseing a minimum standard of
trustworthiness such that the evidence can be considered by a trier of fact. Once the
evidence is admitted for such a purpose the trier of fact must then assess the same
evidence for a final determination o f cogency. D. Paciocco and L. Stuesser in The Law of
Evidence (Concord, Ont.: Irwjn Law, 1996) examines a similar distinction between
primary materiality and secondary materiality. These issues are discussed more f d l y over
the next few pages of this chapter.
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What if she had died in a time frame beyond the scope of a dying declaration exception9'
or was consistently unco-operative with the police? Could the statements that she made to

the neighbours and other third parties be admitted into evidence for the truth of their
content? From the Court's determination of the issue we are given some guidance about
the use that can be made of the complainant's initial audio taped statement that she gave
to the police in the hospital. The case also examines the use that can be made of the
complainantosstatements to the third parties that she had contact with shortly after the
incident, particularly as they relate to the issue of reliability regarding the complainant's
statement to the police. It is argued that while MacDonnell Prov. J.'s decision in
ltloharned was perhaps correct in law (as is reviewed below) his reasoning would not
assist a court presented with this hypothetical situation. Therefore, it is postulated that the
statements made by the cornplainant to the other third parties, assuming they c m
overcome the preliminary issue of ttireshold reliability, established on a balance of
probabilities, they should also be ruled as admissible in the fact finding mission of a trial.

This position is supported by both the reasons articulated by the Supreme Court of
Canada related to the flexibility and the need for a principled approach to assessing the
admission of hearsay evidence for the tnith of its contents, as well as some of the basic
rules of evidence. Because the Court's rulings have already been examined, the next

98D.
Watt. Watt S Manuel of Criminal Evidence (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1999) at
273; "a statement made by a deceased declarant under a settled hopeless expectation of
death concerning the circumstances of the impending death, including its cause and the
identity of its perpetrator, is admissible to prove the truth of the facts contained in the
statement." See also R. v. Woods (18W), 2 C.C.C. 159 (B.C.C.A.).
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component of this chapter, reviews some basic first principles of the rules of evidence.

The basic rule of evidence is that ail relevant and materiai evidence is admissible.
Generally speaking an item of evidence is relevant if it makes a matter in issue more
likely than not. D. Paciocco and L. Struesser note that evidence has been recognized as
relevant if it "has some tendency as a matter of logic and human experience to make the
proposition for which it is advanced more likely than that proposition would appear to be

in the absence of the that e ~ i d e n c e . "The
~ ~ determination of whether or not an item of
evidence is material is somewhat more complicated, because there are two related
groupings of materiality. To assess materiality one must start with the development of an
issue. Primary materiality is detennined by the pleadings, indictment or information of a
case. the substantive law and by procedural rules. Secondary materiality is determined by
a court charged with the responsibility of resolving questions about the admissibility of
evidence and witnesses' testimony. This involves an assessrnent of whether, and to what
level. the information that has been presented to the court is accurate or honest. This

process is described as the determination of credibility and weight. On the issue D.
Paciocco and L. Steusser write:
In order to decide the value of the evidence offered in a case, the fact finder may
profit, therefore, fiom information that is not directly about the facts in issue but
rather about the witness or the evidence that is being presented. For example,
proof that a witness received a bribe from a party is important in assessing the
testimony of that witness. Evidence offered to demonstrate the value of other

9YD.Paciocco and L. Steusser The Law of Evidcnce (Concord, Ont.: Invin Law, 1996) at
19. Compare this explanation with Lamer C.J.C.'s position regarding threshold and
ultimate reliability in R. v. C/.(F.J.), supra note 82 at 119.

evidence can be material, even though it is not about one of the primary issues
It is secondarily material, since it assists only indirectîy in
r e q u i ~ resolution.
g
resolving the pnmarily matenai issues that the court m u t decide.Iw

Therefore, the Supreme Court has established a policy of a flexible and principled
approach for trial courts to deal with the admission of hearsay evidence. Basic evidence
rules suggest that the statements made by the complainant in the Moharned Case are
relevant because they make the accused's guilt, or at least the manner in which the
injuries occurred, more likely than not. The evidence of what the complainant told her
neighbour and the other third parties about the incident are obviously matenal, but
excluded by the traditional rule against admission of hearsay evidence for the tmth of its
content. However a flexible and principled exception exists to include this evidence in the
fact finding mission as long as the evidence can meet the requirements of necessity and
reliability. The necessity is obvious assuming the complainant refuses to test@. The
reliability of the statements must then be examined by a court. It is suggested that in
addition to circumstances under which the statement was taken, these other items of
evidence should also be considered as secondarily material that could be used by the court
to assess the value of the complainant's statement.

Having estabIished this position we can now review some of the jurisprudence in the area
IO

determine whether or not this position might be supported. As indicated earlier the

rationale articulated in Moharned is consistent with the conventional jurisprudence. For
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example, in R v. Comvay a n d Husband, 'O' the Ontario Court of Appeal assessed the issue,
although outside of the realm of domestic assault. In this case the two accused were
charged with second degree murder. They admitted to manslaughter but not to the charge
as laid. The Crown's entire case for second degree murder was based on a statement that
a witness, Marc Jardine, made to the police during the course of their investigation. At the

time of the triai the witness was unable to recall the statement nor could he recall even
making the statement to the police during the investigation. The Court \vas not satisfied

that the previous statement was reliable for a number of reasons including, the lack of an
oath given to the witness at the time the statement was made, the statement was not

videotaped and the cross examination of the witness at court was ineffectual because he
claimed that he could not even recall making the statement. More interesting for our

purposes. was the Court's mling on the Crown's argument that the Court should have the
abiIity to look to other factors outside of the circumstances under which the statement
was made, such as other evidence gathered by the police, that confirmed the accuracy

and reliability of the witness's statement.

Regarding the issue of reliability, Labrosse J.A. writing for the Court relied on Chief
Justice Lamer's words set out in R. v. Smith. 'O' He noted that:
The cnterion of 'reliability' - or, in Wigmore's terminology, the circwnstantial
giiarantee of tnistworthiness - is a function of the circumstances under which the
statement in question was made. If a statement sought to be adduced by way of

'"(1 W8), 121 C.C.C (3d) 397 (0nt.C.A.).
'"(1 992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.) at 270.

hearsay evidence is made under circumstances which substantially negate the
possibility that the declarant was untruthhil or mistaken, the hearsay evidence may
be said to be 'reliable', Le., a circurnstantial guarantee of tmstworthiness is
established.'03

The Court rejected the position of the Crown that other corroborating evidence, apart
from the circurnstances in which the statement were made, should be assessed to
detemine the admissibility of the hearsay statement.lMPart of the Court's rationale for
this determination was that none of the alleged confirmatory evidence referred to by the
Crown was tendered before the trial judge during the voir dire. As a result, the trial judge
could only consider the evidence presented in the voir dire to make a threshold

determination of reliability of the statement in question. Related to this issue Labrosse
J.A. contemplated the rights of an accused and noted that the "voir dire c m have an

impact on the way the trial unfolds, notably, on the strategy adopted by the defen~e."'~'

Similar exclusive reliance on the circumstances surrounding the making of a statement

'O3

R. v. Conivay and Husband, supra 10 1 at 4 14.

'<YIbid.at 416. To support this position the Crown relied on the rninority decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright, 1 1O S.Ct. 3 139 (1 990). This case
involved the statements of a child witness unavailable to testi@ in a trial involving
allegations of sexual abuse. In this case the majority held that the circurnstances relevant
to the admissibility of the statements only include those that surround the making of the
statement. Labrosse J.A. noted that the majonty's view was consistent with the principles
articulated in R-v. B.(K.G.), supra note 87. But see R. v. Big Eagle (1997), 163 Sask.
Reports 3 (Sask. C.A.) at 17, wherein Tallis J.A. relies on the evidence of independent
witnesses as a substitute for videotaped demeanour evidence. The Court also considered
the similarity of content between two statements to help assess the issue of reliability.

were pronounced in R. v. Tai and Long.

In this case the accused were charged with one

count of first degree murder and two counts of attempted murder connected with a
shooting at a restaurant. The Crown wished to tender the identification evidence of an eye
witness who shortly afier the incident picked out Long as one of the gunmen. When
caI1ed at trial the witness maintained that neither accused were the shooters. At trial, the
evidence of the police, specifically the uitness's statements related to the evidence of
identification was admitted for the tmth of its content and both accused were convicted.
The Ontario Court of Appeal excluded the evidence and entered acquittais for both

accused. On the issue of reliability and the out of court statements, Doherty J.A. writing
for the Court adopted the reasoning of Larner C.J.C. and Iacobucci J. as set out in R- v.
Hawkins. 'O7 wherein it was held that:

The criterion of reliability is concemed with tiireshold reliability, not ultimate
reliability. The function of the trial judge is limited in to determining whether the
particular hearsay staternent exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability so as to f i o r d
the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for the evaluating the truth of the statement.
More specifically, the judge m u t identrfi the specrjic dangers raised &ythe
srarement, and rhen determine whether the facts surrounding the utterance of the
staternent oflers suficient circumstantial guarantees oftrusîworthiness to
compensate for those dangers. [Emphasis added by Doherty J. A.] 'O8
Applying this principle to the facts in issue the Court held that there were only two
circumstances that could compensate for the inherent dangers connected to the hearsay
evidence. These included the fact that the statement was made soon after the event

'06(1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.).
'07(i996), I l 1 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) at 157.
'O-ra

note 106 at 5 10.

described and that the witness had no personal interest in making the identification.
However, these circumstances failed to persuade the Court that the statement should be
admitted for the truth of its content, particularly due to the fact that it was not videotaped
and because the defence could not cross-examine the witness alleged to have made the
statement.

In R. v. i ~ c i ~ a s t ethe
r ' issue
~ ~ was revisited. In this case the accused was charged with

murdering his girlfiend. The accused's position was that he was innocent m d that a third
p a t y was responsible for the death. The defence wished to cal1 a witness, identified in the

judgement only as Reilly, to testify about a conversation that this witness had with the
deceased about her concerns that she had about the third party in question. The trial judge
excluded the hearsay evidence because it was found to be unreliable. The Court of Appeal
upheld the determination and commented on the issue of the consideration of evidence

tendered outside of the admissibility voir dire. Brook J.A., writing for the majority, held
that:

He considered, and said so, that Reilly was not a reliable witness. I think it is clear
that this threshold issue of reliability is to be decided on the evidence heard on the
voir dire, without reference to any of the evidence heard on the trial outside of the
voir dire."'
This case is unique fkom the other cases reviewed to this point because it represents a
defence application to admit hearsay evidence for the truth of its contents. It seems to

'@)(1998)?122 C.C.C. (3d) 371 (Ont. C.A.).

' 1°lbid. at 374. See also R. v. Erven, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 926; 44 C.C.C. (3d) 257.
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apply the same principles to this defence application that have been applied to the Crown
utilizations already discussed. However, two other recent decisions in the field of
exceptions to the hearsay rules would seem to suggest that an additional consideration,
specifically a "residual discretion," may affect defence concerns about this type of
evidence. This distinct rule may impact on triai fairness and the equality principles
outlined above.

R. v. Kalisa"' discussed the weighing of the probative value against its potentiai
prejudicial effect for the accused in relation to the trial judge's determination of the
reliability of hearsay evidence. In this case the accused was charged with a number of
sexual offences involving a minor female comptainant. At triai she refused to testify. The
Crown attempted to have the sister of the complainant, who received a statement from the
complainant about the incident and also acted as an interpreter for her sister as she
discussed the incident with the police, a doctor and a psychologist. During the voir dire
held to determine the aâmissibility of the hearsay statements, the sister witness declared
that she had since had M e r discussions with her sister the complainant and that her
sister now indicated that the accused had done nothing wrong. Furthemore, this witness
indicated that she would not test@ about the details of the post incident discussions that
she had with her sister. The trial judge held that the evidence of the sister witness that she
originally provided to the investigators was not sufficiently reliable and excluded the
evidence. The accused was acquitted and the Crown appealed. The Quebec Court of
"'(1999)~
130 C.C.C. (3d) 121 (Que. C.A.).

Apped dismissed the appeal. In its support for the trial jucige's determination they held:
The Court is of the view that in the determination of the reliability of the hearsay
evidence, it was effectively part of the trial judge's role, apart fiom assessing
credibility per se, to determine whether the prejudice which may be caused to the
accused substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence, which was
incomplete and weak, to the point of risking making the trial unfair for the
accused, contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. "

'

Another case that would appear to support a residual discretion for trial judges is R. v.
Folland. "'In this case the accused was charged with sexual assault. The defence position
was mistaken identity. The allegations suggested that after an evening of drinking the

complainant went to bed alone. She awoke to find a man having sexual intercourse with
her. obviously without her consent. She identified the accused as the person responsible.

in part. because of perception that her attacker was partially bald. The accused's position
mas that

afier the sexual assault had occurred a third Party, Mr. Harris,admitted to having

sesually assaulted the complainant. The police also tested semen found in the
compIainant's underwear and in a pair of men's underwear found in the bed where the
complainant was sieeping. The DNA test performed excluded the accused as a source of
the semen. Regardless of this the accused was convicted after trial. After the trial. bodily
samples were obtained fiom the third party and tested. DNA tests performed on these
samples detennined that the third Party was the source of the semen located in the

' I2lbid at 126. No indication was made in the reported decision as to which judge wrote
the decision. The panel included Brossard, Rousseau-Houle and Delisle JJ.A. No
reference was made to the specific section of the Charter under which the potential
unfairness could be created. See also D. Paciocco and L. Steusser, supra note 99 at 23 for
a review of the exclusionary discretion rule.

'13(1999), 132 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (Ont. C.A.).

underwear in question. The central issue of this case was the fiesh evidence gathered and
the results from the DNA tests. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a

new trial. On the issue of admitting the hearsay evidence from the accused about what
Mr. Harris had said to him about being responsible for the attack, the Court suggested
that a residual discretion with the trial judge existed to relax the rules of evidence to
prevent a rniscarriage of justice. Rosenberg J.A. reviewed the evidence of Mr. Harris
given at trial. He noted:

If Mr. Harris were to tell the sarne story to the jury as he did under crossexamination prior to the appeal, and if he were to be believed, it would be open to
the jury to find that he did not attack the complainant and that he was asleep
before the complainant made her cornplaint about the appellant. His testimony
about having consensuai relations with the complainant the day before the attack
would explain the presence of his semen on the white underwear. On the whole,
Harris's evidence, if believed, would assist the Crown rather than the defence.""
The converse to this is that the trier of fact would reject portions of Mr. Harris's
testimony given under oath at trial and accept what he was alleged to have told others out
of court about the incident on a previous occasion.

Rosenberg J.A. declined to make a specific ruling about the admissibility of the hearsay
evidence of Mr. Harris but provided the trial judge with some guidance on the matter. He
reviewed the comments of Martin J.A. in R. v. Williams,specifically that:
It seems to me that a court has a residud discretion to relax in favour of the

accused a strict rule of evidence where it is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of
justice and where the danger against which an exclusionary rule aims to safeguard

does not e ~ i s t . ' ' ~
Rosenberg J.A. went on to comment on some of the general principles related to the rules
that exclude hearsay evidence. On the issue of defence evidence he wrote:

In my view, while the trial judge must be satisfied that the prior out-of-court
utterances have some reliability, the strict standards set, in the context of an
apptication by the Crown to make substantive use of ptior inconsistent statements
incnminating the accused, in R. v. B. (KG.) do not apply: cf R .v. Eisenhauer
[emphasis mine, cite ~rnitted]."~
I t is argued that these two passages, taken together, seems to create authority for the

proposition that a residual discretion exists with the trial judges to allow the necessity for
full answer and defence to t m p the requirement for reliability. It is emphasized that this
is the same trial and Charter right of the accused that was balanced above the rights of a
sexual assault cornplainant to privacy and equality, as was examined in Chapter Two.

This result would appear consistent with the decision in R. v. Chaldey."'In this case the
accused was charged with one count of first degree murder, ten years afier the death of
Mr. Bartko. This charge was laid after two of the accused's farnily members came
fonvard and advised the police that their brother, the accused, had confessed to the

"'lbid. at 3 1. R. v. WiIZiams is cited at (1 985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 356 (Ont. C.A.). The
passage set out in the text was approved by Cory J. in R. v. Finta (1994), 88 C.C.C. (36)
4 17 (S.C.C.) at 527.

' I6/bid.at 3 1. The passage also makes reference to cf: R. v. Eisenhauer (1 998), 123
C.C.C. (3d) 37 (N.S.C.A.) at 64, application for leave to the Supreme Court of Canada
dismissed, August 20, 1998 [126 C.C.C. (3d) vil.

"'(1992),

72 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (B.C.C.A.).

killing. The deceased, Mr. Bartko was known to the accused as a boy friend of his exwife. Ms. Cater. For our purposes, the key issue is the alleged statement of the deceased
made to Ms. Cater, days before his death, about an unidentified black male who had

threatened hirn with a knife. The trial judge excluded the evidence as inadmissible
hearsay. At trial the accused was convicted and he appealed. The British Columbia Court

of -4ppeal disagreed with the trial judge's ruling and ordered a new trial. Wood J.A. held
that the statement was admissible as "original circumstantial evidence from which an

inference could be drawn that he had a contemporaneously fearful state of mind."'" More
importantly however. the Court went on to consider whether or not the same statement
could be admitted for the tmth of its content, particularly that the deceased had been

threatened by a third person with a knife, thus leaving with the jury some circumstantiai
evidence that this unidentified person was responsible for the killing. Relying on the
principled approach established in the Khan Case, Wood J.A. examined the issues of
necessity and reliability. The necessity was obvious given the declarant was deceased. On
the issue of reliability Wood J.A. stated:
The principal concern which underlies the rule against the admission of hearsay
evidence is the tnistworthiness of the out of court statements. .., the focus of that
concern has always been the declarant. and nof the person through whose mouth
the declarations are tendered. The reliability of the witness who offers the hearsay
testimony, and who is under oath and available for cross-examination, has much
to do with the weight to be ascertained to the evidence, but in my view it ought
not to be a condition of its admissibility. The weight to be ascribed to the evidence
given under oath in a trial is a question of fact for the jury. It is not a question of
law. The tnistworthiness tests upon which the admissibility of hearsay evidence
depends, on the other hand, ought to be legal tests which do not purport to invade

the fimction of the jury [emphasis hi^]."^

From this jurisprudential review, a clear reluctance by some cowts to consider
corroborating evidence, apart fiom the circumstances in which the statements were made,
has been established. As already set out, this rule fails to fimher the fact finding mission
of a domestic assault.

Given the unsatisfactory treatment by the law of this issue, our attention is now turned to

an argument for reform. The Arnerican academic R. Parks has contemplated the issues of
hsarsay reform. In an article that explores the reasons for excluding hearsay he

surnrnarized the five major arguments to oppose hearsay reform in criminal cases. These
included:
First, the conventionai academic rational for excluding hearsay - iack of crossexamination of the declarant - appears frequently in the discourse of Iawyers. and
must be counted as a major reason for the exclusion. Second. concern has
frequently been voiced about the danger of misreport and fabrication by the incourt witness. Third. lawyers have often alluded to the danger of surprise at triai.
Fourth. lawyers have been concerned that hearsay reform would leave admission
or exclusion to the uncontrolled discretion of the trial judge. Findly. concern has
been expressed that the relaxation of hearsay d e s will facilitate abuse of
governmentai power in cnminal cases. '"

Exarnined individuaily, none of these reasons detract from the value of expanding

'"R. Park, "A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform" (1 987-88), 86:l Michigan
Law Review 5 1. This article explores the differences that exist between civil and criminal
law. It is these differences that support his conc1usions that a different set of rules
regarding hearsay exclusion shodd be implemented.
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tlireshold reliability to include the consideration of circumstances outside of process of
statement recording. As already discussed, the cornplainant and the source of the hearsay
evidence is available at trial for cross-examination. So too would the recipient witnesses,
such as a neighbour, an ambulance attendant, a hospital worker or a police officer, that
actually received the statement from the cornplainant soon after the incident. These

witnesses could al1 be cross-examined to test the reliability of their recollections or even
their motives to fabricate. Also, this would satisSf the right that an accused person has to
face his accuser in court."' The danger of being surprised at trial is d l but elirninated by

the rules of disclosure.'" However, if a situation did arise where certain evidence

becomes known to an accused party or a prosecutor at trial for the first time. certainly the
remedy of an adjoumrnent is a far more equitable and reasonable solution than an

automatic esclusion based on an occurrence possibility. As for the uncontrolled trial
judge discretion argument, it is suggested that the consideration of more evidence not less
evidence would assist trial judges in making less a r b i t r q and more consistent decisions

rsgarding threshold reliability. Lastly. the concem about the facilitation of state abuse is
decreased when the evidence is being tendered by unbiased civilians as descnbed above.
Therefore it is argued that more considerations as compared to artificial boundaries to

"'1bid. at 88, Parks examines hearsay and the confrontation clause. guaranteed under the
sixth amendment of the U.S Constitution, that States -'In ail criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confionted with the witness against him."R. v.
Eisenhazrer (1 998), 123 C.C.C. (3d) 37 (N.S.C.A.) provides a thorough review of rational
for the opportunity of an accused to be afForded the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness.

"'R. v. Srinchcombe (I991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
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exclusion would provide a greater opportunity for the tmth to surface, particularly in
situations such as abusive relationships where, for a number o f reasons, the tmth is often
suppressed not only by the accused but also by the victim, who remains in continuous
danger.

Moreover, these cases taken together, depict the courts adherence to strict application of
the niles as they relate to the issue of threshold reliability on Crown applications, often
ignoring circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that exist outside of the statement
taking process. Nonetheless, the courts are wiIling to relax these general principles on
behalf of the accused to avoid a miscarriage of justice. But what about the rniscarriages of
justice that would flow fiom the exclusion of hearsay evidence fiom a recanting witness

on the grounds of threshold unreliability and where circumstantial evidence bearing on
the issue of ultimate reliability is ignored? It is argued here that the exclusion of this
evidence also arnounts to a miscarriage ofjustice and, as such. this position should be
reconsidered by the courts. It must be stressed that a principled analysis should not be
technically applied. As R. Delisle reminds us:
B. (K. G.) was a case of an out of court statement being subjected to a principled
analysis determining whether there were sufficient grounds of necessity and
circumstances promoting reliability that the jury could be trusted to properly
evaluate the worth of the statement. '"

Certainly the principled approach established in Khan and that has since evolved in

"'R. Delisle, "B. (KG.) and Its Progeny" (1998), 14 C.R. (5') 75.
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Smith, B. (K. G.) and C/.(FX) is flexible enough to take into consideration the contextual

realities of the recanting witness trapped in a cycle of domestic violence to ensure that the
search for the truth is not forsaken. It is contended that circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness adds reliability to the fact finding mission of a trial without negatively
impacting trial fairness for an accused person. It does not shifi the focus of concern from
the declarant, rather this type of evidence importantly helps create a context for an

assessrnent of trustworthiness. It is an item of evidence within the realm of secondary
materiality that should be used to value both the trial testirnony of the recanting witness.
as weli as the reliability of the hearsay statement. For example, if one accepts that a

cornplainant is trapped in a cycle of domestic violence as a result of leamed helplessness,
the context of why she remains in the violent and dangerous relationship, unreasonably
believing the abuse will soon corne to an end must be considered. Specifically, if in the
'-honeymoon" phase of the cycle of violence a fernale partner may be particularly
vulnerable to refusing extemal assistance to end the violence. I t should be recalled that
while in this phase the victim believes that the contrite male batterer wiIl make the
n e c e s s q changes in his life so that the violence will stop. Similarly, if one supports the

theory of a complex post-traumatic stress disorder one must also accept the position that a

victim suffering fiom such a delusional state is not in the best position to appreciate al1 of
the consequences of reîùsing to testiQ in a truthfûl manner in a cnminal proceeding
cornmenced against her abuser. Finally, the obvious must also be taken into account. the
fear of retribution for her CO-operationwith the state prosecution. It is argued that al1 of

these contextual realities must be factored into the concepts of flexibility and a principled
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approach to the courts' consideration of a recanting domestic assault witness's out of
court statements, in addition to al1 types of the relevant and materid evidence that either
supports or detracts fiom the issue of reliability.

( G )Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide a contextual explanation of the social phenornenon
of domestic assault. There is very little consensus in the field as to the exact cause of this

form of violence. In fact, it would appear that there are perhaps many different causes,
some of which may be combined to fllrther complicate the problem. Similarly, the many
consequences of domestic assault for the direct victims, their children and society as a
whole are still to be unravelled. Nonetheless, most experts agree on at least one effect and
that is the cyciical nature of the abuse. Without intervention women trapped in abusive

domestic relationships are in serious peril. The conventional response of the criminal

justice system has failed to respond to the problem, particularly with regards to the issue
of the recanting witness. Also, as was pointed out in Chapter One, this type of cnminal
offence is severely under-reported. It is suggested that the conventional criminai justice

approach to dealing with incidents of domestic violence has only exasperated this
contention.

This chapter presented two recent responses to the unique problems associated with the
crime of domestic violence. The responses to domestic violence discussed above are
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positive steps in the correct direction of increasing women's equal access to justice. but
they too have their shortcomings. These limitations are grounded in an oversimplified
appreciation of the intricate nature of the dilemma. With regards to the court mandated
treatment more needs to be done to assess the type of treatment warranted in each
situation presented to the court. More investigation is required to detemine and isolate
the causes unique to each male batterer so that appropriate counselling sessions and

treatments can be provided. Also, efforts need to be reformulated to accurately assess the
complainant's needs and wishes. When possible a spirit of CO-operationshould be
fostered. Input from complainants m u t be respected and carefidly assessed, even if it is
not adhered to.

With regards to the K Court approach to the prosecution of domestic assault charges,
advances must be made in the courts acceptance of the context in which situations of
recantation occurs. A more expansive understanding of the principled approach to the
mies assessing hearsay reliability needs to be accepted. This is not to postulate that the
current considerations of threshold reliability need to be abandoned. but rather the
considerations of external circumstances that either detract or bolster the reliability of the
out of court statements aiso need to be added to that threshold equation. Jurispmdential
authority for this pnnciple was articulated in R. v. W.(EL)and is in keeping with the
principled and flexible approach enunciated in al1 of the Supreme Court's recent
considerations of the issue. As well, the traditional reservations, as described by R. Parks
and that have been perfunctody c o ~ e c t e d
with the reluctance to broaden the principles
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should be re-evaiuated to support the need for m e r refonns in the area. in this way the
court's search for the t . t h is improved, without affecting trial faimess for the accused.
This is particularly true when a declarant is available for cross-examination. Both of these
reform issues are expanded upon in Chapter Four.

Lastly, the theme of unequal treatment characterizes the residuai discretion outlined in R.
v. Kalisa and R. v. Folland. These cases depict a concern for the doctrine of an accused's

right to fiil1 answer and defence unbalanced against the essentiaI requirement of

reliability . This theme is presented as an extension to the disparity presented in Chapter
Two, specifically the courts resolution of the conflicted interests of the male accused and
the fernale sexual assault complainant.

CaAPTER FOUR: REFORMS
(A) Introduction

Chapters Two and Three show that the criminal justice systern has failed to provide fernale
victim's of violent crime equal treatment within our coum. The quai treatrnent warranted
t O remedy t his situation, under section 15 of the C ' e r , is a criminal justice system tbat

accommodates their differences and prevents the violation of their essential human dignity
and fieedom.' As well, situations have b a n identifieci that prevent or dissuade fernales
from accessing the criminal justice system entirely. If femde complainants decide to
initiate contact with the criminal justice system they oAen end up feeling powerless and
largely ignored in the process. The consistent stumbling block to meaninfil and impartial
access for women has corne as result of the criminal justice system's failure to
contextualize the issues that confiont some female victims when they have been involved
in violent crimes such as senid assaults or physical abuse within a domestic relationship.

This recognized problem accounts for, at lest in a partial sense, why women under report

these types of crimes and why when they do become involved as prosecution witnesses,
they are fiequently reluctant to participate in the judicial process.

As discussed in Chapter Two, complainants of sexual assault who have sought out

'See Andrews v. Lmv Society of British Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R.(4th) 1 (S.C.C.) at
10 and 13; and Law v. Minister oflitman Resourees Development File No.: 2% 74,
judgement March 25, 1999 (S.C.C.) at 13, for thorough discussions of the meaning of
legal equality.
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counselling and/or therapy to assist them in their healing process are often confionted,
during the trial process, with the dilemma of having their confidential counselling remrds
disclosed to the court and perhaps even counsel for the accused. We have seen that when
the C h e r rights of these two individuais come into confikt with each other, the male
accused's rights to fùll answer and defence have been balanced above, or given a priority
over, the femaie complainant's rights to privacy and equality2This chapter suggests a
reform that may assist women in the criminal litigation process. The key to this refonn is
the recognition of the signifiant h m that flows to a sexual assault complainant fkom
either the delaying of treatment or the intemption of the counselling process. The reform
examined is judicial notice of the h m that flows fiom the disdosure of these extremely
sensitive materials and how this legal pnnciple should be used in conjunction with BiU C463 for the determination of the issue of relevance of these records.

With regards to rectiijing the criminal justice system's response to the prosecution and

deterrence of men who physicaiiy abuse their femaie partners, this chapter suggests
reforms that will account for the complexity of the many variables connected with this

dangerous and widespread social practice. On the treatment side of the issue, it is
postulated that the caretùl and individual contextualization of domestic assault matters is
the key to success. Once the needs of both the complainant and the accused are properly

'Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 8, and 15, Part 1 of the Constitution
Cana& Act 1982 (U.K.),1982, c. 1 1.

Act, 1982, being schedule B to the

3CriminalCode, R.S.,c. C-46 [hereinafter Bill C-463.
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and professionally assesseci, appropriate responses can be formulated. In this chapter,
strengths of the restorative justice xheme are examined and molded to fit the
transfomative needs of couples that wish to resurrect a heaithy domatic relationship fiom
one t hat is dangerously dysfùnctional.

(B)The Disclosure o f Sexual Assauft Compfainant's Counselling Records

1. Judicial Notice

In this section the principle ofjudicial notice is described. Following this an argument is

presented that judicial notice could, and should, be used in a court's assessrnent of an
accused's application for the disclosure of a complainant's counselling records. To
articulate this position a review of the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts

is undertaken. An important component of this distinction, specifically the role ofjudges
as law makers is highlighted. Two options to incorporate this principle to the issue of

disclosure has been presented in this materiai. The first is one based on legai precedents
and the second is founded in principle. To fbrther this position a brief presentation of a
case that deals with the issue of the judicial interpretive process connected to a section 1
Charter determination has been provided. As well, a number of cases that address the

issue of how the courts have dealt with the issues of racial prejudice, judicial notice and
the jury selection process have been briefed. Lastly, to support the principled rationaie, the
relevant sections of Bill C-46 have been exsmined to help conclude the usenilnesi of this
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reasoning to the dilemma of the disclosure of sexual assault complainant's counselling
record.

The law in Canada regarding judicial notice is that a fact which is generaily known and
accepted such that it cannot be reasonably questioned need not be formally proven in
court. It is a type of fact which is notoriously "known to intelligent persons generally4Ife
fact is not known and accepted it may still qualie as a fact that judicial notice can be taken
of, if it can be verified in a source whose accuracy cannot be questioned.'

The issue then becomes how, if at dl, can this legd principfe be applied to the hann that
flows corn the opening and the disclosing of the contents of a sexud assault complainant's

counselling records? At first glance, the jurisprudence in the area is not overly helpfùl. For
example, the courts have traditionally rejected the notion of taking judiciai notice of

previously accepted scientific knowledge and the evidence of experts given in other
judicial pr~ceedings.~
Similarly, the courts have been retuctant to admit scientific

5 ~ Sopinka,
.
N. Lederman and A. Bryant, 7kLmu of Evidence in CPnrrrb (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1992) at 976. For example judicial notice cm be taken of the existence of a
provincial legal aid system; see R. v. Cobhani (1993), 92 C.C.C. (3d) 333 (S.C.C.). See
also R. v. Ports (1982), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 2 19 (Ont. C.A.).

6RV. K (S.) (199 l), 6 C.R. (4th) 373 (Ont. C.A.); a trail judge could not take judicial
notice of a "cultural disinclination" of a Native Canadian sexual assault cornplainant to
relive past unpleasant experiences. R v. Dickson (1973), 5 N.S.R (2d) 240 (N.S.C.A.); a
trial judge could not take judicial notice of the period and process of absorption of dcohol
in the human body.

positions, reports or literature on a particular matter that hm not been tendered into
evidence by one of the panies before that coun.' This is partiailady tme of ''social f d '
directly relevant to the dispute before the c o u d Thus, relying only on the traditional
position that the courts have taken regarding the acceptance of facts based on judicial
notice and not on evidence tendered by one or more of the parties to the litigation, the
likelihood of judges k i n g allowed to take judicial notice of a fact such as the
psychological harm that flows fiom the opening and disclosing of therapeutic records is
not particularly favourabie.

However, when we examine the principle itself and how it has been expanded in other
areas, such as the jury selection process, some exciting possibilities emerge. To begin our
examination we should consider the American treatment ofjudicial notice. The law in the
United States has clearly distinguished between two different types of fact; adjudicative
facts and legislative factse9Adjudicative faas rre those facts that relate to issues that are
unique to the case being heard by a court. These types of faas relate to the specific parties

'R V. Pante11 (1995), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 83 (Ont. C.A.); R v. Desatdniers (1994), 93 C.C.C.
(3d) 371 (Que. C.A.) at 377; reference by a judge, on his own initiative and without there
being any suggestion on behalf of the parties, to a scientific work or report which sets out
opinions of experts, constitutes an error in law, leave to appeal to S.C.C. retiised (1994),
95 C.C.C. (3d) vi.
'Cronk v. Canadion General Insurance Co. (1995), 128 D.L.R. (4th) 147 (Ont. CA); the
assumption of a motions court judge, that clerical employees were able to obtain
employment more easily than management, was beyond the scope ofjudicial notice.

'Sec K. Davis, Judicial Notice" (1% 5) 55 Columbia Law Review 945. See also 29 Am.
"

Jur. 2d, Evidence at paragraphs 27 to 30 for a for a review of the types of facts related to
judicial notice.
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and their actions that make up the subject matter of the litigation. On the other han4

legidative facts relate to determinations on questions of law or policy. Legislative faas
assist a court in interpreting the content of legal niles and their application to the issues
before the court.

This distinction has been similarly recognized by Canadian academics. For instance,D.
Paciocco and L. Stuesser note that adjudicative facts refers to the facts that must be
determined in a specific case. On the other hand, they describe legislative facts as:
those that have relevance to legal reasoning and the law making policy. They are
not directed at resolving a specific factual issue in the case before the court.
Rather, they are resorted to when the courts are asked to make law, which is a
matter that transcends the pmicular dispute and is of general social irnportan~e.'~
An example of this process is when a court is called upon to determine the constitutionai

validity of a law under section 1 of the Charter or when it is asked to interpret legislation.
To effectively complete this task, the courts rely upon a wide range of social science
research and study." It has been put foward here that the courts, as they interpret Bill C46, should take judicial notice of the legislative facts linked to the ramifications of the

opening and disclosing a sexual assault complainant's private counselling records. We
shall return to this mornentarily, but first another distinction in the types of facts should be

'"D. Paciocco and L. Stuesser, The Law of Evidence (Concord Ont.: INiin Law, 1996) at
246. See also S. Schiff, Evidence in the Litigution Prucess. 3rd. ed., (Toronto: Carswell,
1988) vol. 2 at 661 to 713.
"fiid. at 246. See also C. L'Heureux-Dube, "Re-examining the Doctrine of Judiciai
Notice in the Family Law Context" (1994) 26 Ottawa Law Review 55 1 at 554.

reviewed.

Two other American academics have taken the distinctions one step fùrther. L. Walker
and J. Monahan, describe three related categories of facts; social authority, social fiame

work and social facts.I2 Social authority, describes situations wherein social science is used
to establish or interpret the law in some fashion. They compare its use by courts as le@
precedent because bath social science and legal precedents have ramifications for other
members of society beyond the immediate litigants to a legal conflict. h this way social
authority parallels the principles of legislative facts. When social science research is used
to resolve a conflict specific to individual litigants, it is categorized as a social fact. This is
obviously similar to adjudicative facts. The third category of facts, social fiamework, is a
combination of the first two, and is used to describe the facts that flow fiom social science
research that creates a background of social context to assist a coun in the determination
of a specific dispute particular to individual litigant~.'~
This category of social framework
could aiso apply to the issue of the hann and its impact on a specific sexual assault

"I. Monahan and L. Walker, "Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating and Establishg
Social Science in Law" (1986) 134 U. Pa. Law Review 477. This work advances the
thesis that "social science research, when used to create a legal nile, is more analogous to
'Iaw' than to 'fact' and hence should be treated much as the courts treat legal precedent."
at 478.
"These descriptions are a summary of C. L'Heureux-Dubé's review of L. Walker and 1.
Monahan's work, supra note 12 at 555 to 556. See also L. Walker and J. Monahan,
"Empirical Questions without Empirical Answers" (1 99 1) Wisconsin Law Review 569.
This article examines the problems that couris encounter when empirical questions do not
have empincal answers and offers suggestions on how courts should proceed in the
absence of data.

cornplainant who has counselling records and wishes to keep the contents of those records
private.

Related to this, C. L' Heureux-Dubé points to the fiindamentai role that the judges must
play in the evolution of legal principles to help clarifj. the distinction. She notes that if
stwe decisis was applied without consideration for the evolution of context changes

within society the law would quickly fail in its goal to maintain order through public
respect." This is why the Canadian couris have traditionally b a n recognlled as playing a
policy making role in the administration of justice rat her than merely designated a passive
role in the detennination of what the law is based exclusively on precedents. Also, since
the courts do perform such a role, the decisions made by judges must be subject to
appellate scrutiny. Related to these issues, she wrote:
The way in which the role of the court is perceived can, in tum, very much affect
the way in which the doctrine of judicial notice is conceptuaiized. The more couns
acknowledge their active contribution to law making, the greater becornes both
their duty and their need to lay bare the policy assumptions upon which their
decisions are based.
On the other hand, if courts deny their law making role, then they deny Our judicial
system the ability to monitor that role. Unfortunately, however, a by-product of
imposing strict rules on the taking of judicial notice is that such rules discourage
courts fiom admitting that they use it. As a consequence, underlying questions of
policy are obfLscated by a masic of "legai principles."Principles formulated on such
a basis, in tum, may lead to illogical applications in subsequent cases. Judicial
notice must not be a convenient means by which courts can escape examination of

"One example that was developed in this regard was the principled approach of hearsay
exceptions in R v. K h r [1990] 2 S.C.R. 53 and R v. i3.fK.G.) (1993), 79 C.C.C. (36)
257 (S.C.C.). This policy evolution was discussed in Chapter Three.

their underlying policy assumptions.lJ

As indicated earlier, there are also precedents fiom the Supreme Court of Canada to

support a court's reliance on reliable information through the doctrine ofjudicial notice to
assist in its section 1 Charter rights violation scrutiny. For example, in R v. lMvm&
Books. La Forest J., held:
1 do not accept that in deaiing with broad social and econornic facts such as those

involved here the Court is necessarily bound to rely solely on those presented by
counsel. The admonition in O a k and other cases to present evidence in Charter
cases does not remove fiom the courts the power, where it deems it expedient, to
take judicial notice of broad social and econornic facts and to take the necessary
steps to infonn itself about them.16
Beyond Charter cases, the Courts have also examined the issue of judicial notice and the
existence of racial prejudice in society as it is related to the legal process ofjuror selection.
In R v. ParkslTthe Ontario Court of Appeal determined that a court could take judicial

notice of the fact that racism does exist in Our society. This type of fact determination
would fall within either the categorization of legislative fact or of a social authority fact,

"C.L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 1 1 at 558. See also S. SchiK Evidence in the Litigution
Process, 3rd ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) vol. 2 at 682 for a discussion of the role of
the judiciary in making law.
I6R. V. Ectwards B& di Art Ltd ,[1986] 2 S.C.R.7 13 at 804. This case dealt with the
Charter right fieedom of religion and whether provincial legislation that required Sunday
closings would withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Court held that the legislation was
enacted for the secular purpose of providing a uniform holiday for retail workers. It
examined the legislation in Iight of its contextual purpose.

17(1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 87 C.C.C.
(3d) vi. See also R v. Willis (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 350 (Ont. C.A.).

described above. This case involved a black male that was chuged with second degree
murder. It was alleged that he was also a drug dealer and that the white deceased was a
cocaine user. The killing m r r e d during a fight between the two parties that enapted
during a dnig transaction. Of significance here was the tnal judge's determination as to the
appropriateness of the accused king allowed to question potential jurors about any
preconceived racial biases that would impact on their ability to be impartial jurors. The
Court of Appeal held that the accused should have been allowed to question potential
jurors if the facts of this case, specifically that the accused was black and the deceased was
white, would affect their impartiality. It is important to note that no evidence was calleci
by either party at trial to support the position that racial prejudice did exist in the
community fiom which the potential jurors were selected or that any of the jurors that did

decide the case were impartial due to racial prejudice. In coming to their conclusion the
Court relied on a number of social science studies and references dealing with racial

prejudice in Canada. Doherty J.A., writing for the majority noted that:
The existence and the extent of racial bias are not issues which cari be establïsheà
in the manner normally associated with the proof of adjudicative facts. Unlike
claims of partiality based on pre-trial publicity, the source of the alleged racial
prejudice cannot be identified. There are no specific media reports to examine, and
no circulation figures to consider. There is, however, an ever growing body of
studies and reports docurnenting the extent and intensity of racist beliefs in
contemporary Canadian society."
The Court also went on to articulate a costhenefit analysis of the decision to allow

empaneled jurors to be questioned on issues of racial prejudice that could effect their

%id. at 366. No fewer than nine Canadian reporis or studies are cited in the decision, in
addition to a number of American works.
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impartiality. The only cost noted was a "small increase in the length of the trial."19 On the
benefit side three advantages were noted. First, that a potential juror, who would
discriminate against an accused because of racial prejudice, could be eliminated fiom the
juiy. Second, al1 potential jurors are sensitized fiom the beginning of the process that
racial biases must not be a factor in their fact finding mission. And third, that allowing
such a question enhances the appearance of triai furness in the mind of the a c c ~ s e d . ~

The fact of racial prejudice was aiso examined in the Supreme Court of Canada in R v.
Williams. *'This case involved allegations that resulted in an aboriginal person king

charged with robbery. At the second trial the judge disallowed a challenge for cause
question, based on possible racial prejudice against aboriginal persons, to be put to the
potential jurors. The Supreme Court held that a question testing for such a bias should
have been allowed because there existed a redistic potential of partiality. The matter was
retumed for a new trial. McLachlin J. writing for the Court, addressed the matter of
judicial notice. Relying on the Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant text, she held:
The existence of racial prejudice in the conununity may be a notorious fact within
the first branch of the rule....Widespread racial prejudice, as a characteristic of the
community, may therefore sometimes be the subject of judicial notice. Moreover,
once a finding of fact of widespread racial prejudice in the conununity is made on
evidence, as here, judges in subsequent cases may be able to take judicial notice of

Iglbid at 379. Note that the Court did not rely on a costhenefit analysis in coming to its
conclusion, stating that "faimess cannot ultimately be measured on a balance sheet." at
379.

"(1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.).

the fact. "The fact that a certain fact or matter has been noted by a judge of the
sarne court in a previous matter has p r d e n t i a l value and it is, therefore, usefiil
for counsel and the court to examine the case law when attempting to detennine
whet her any particular fact can be noted." It is dso possible that events and
documents of indisputable accuracy may permit judicial notice to be taken of
widespread racism in the cornmunit. under the second branch of the nale.*
This issue was recently revisited R v. Koh? In this case the accused Chinese men, Msiting
Canada fiom Singapore, were charged with conspiracy to import heroin for the purposes
of traficking and other related charges. The trid judge retùsed to allow the accused to

question potential jurors by asking: "Would the fact that the accused are persons of
Chinese origin and visitors fkom Singapore affect your ability to judge the evidence f&ly
and without prejudice?' M e r being convicted at trial the men appealed and the Ontario
Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding that a question related to their membership in

a visible racial minority should have been allowed. The issue ofjudicial notice regarding
racial attitudes was specifically addressed. Finlayson J.A., held that:
Although the trial judge was entitled to take judicial notice of the fact that there is
a substantial population of persons of Asian origin in the comrnunity, it is my
opinion that he was not entitled to take judicial notice of the "fact" that Chinese
people are judged individually and are not classed as a race.*'
The rationale for this position was that the unentitled fact did not fall within either of the
two categories set out initially in this section, a notonous fact or one that can

demonstrated as accurate fiorn an indisputable source. Regardless, racism against visible

=lbid at 502. See also I. Sopinka, S. Lederman and A. Biyant, The Dnu of Evidence in
Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) at 977.

" (1999), 42 O.R.(3d) 668 (Ont. C.A.).
241bidat 674.
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minorities has been held to be a ~

O ~ O ~ Of aUaSu

Additiondly, Finlayson J.A. provided

obiter dicta to the effect:

My suggestion that the courts in this jurisdiction may now take judiciai notice that
reasonable persons must be taken to be aware of the history of discrimination
against visible minorities finds practical support in the reality that an accused wiil
oflen face insurmountable difficulties in marshalling evidence to meet the threshold
test with respect to individual minonties of c ~ l o u r . ~

Thus, in this review of the current state of the law as it relates to the judicial notice of
racism for visible minorities, a trend is revealed indicating the willingness of Canadian
courts to rely on social science research, as well the social realities that exist, to make
common sense policy based interpretations of legal pnnciples to increase trial faimess - at
least for accused persons. This has been achieved through the legal principle ofjudicial
notice.

Applying this reasoning to promote a jurisprudential argument for the purpose of the

expansion of judicial notice principles to include the harm that flows fiom the disclosure of
a sexual assault complainant's counselling records and thereby increase trial fairness for

female witnesses, one must consider the courts' discussions regarding the types of facts
the can be included in the principle of judicial notice? For exarnple, it was held "judiciai

''Ibid at 678. See also R v. WiIIims (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) at 502.
261bidat 680. The Court also held that to require each visible minority to adduce evidence
in support of an application to be dlowed to question a potential juror about racial
prejudices would be inconsistent with section 1 l(d) of the Charter that ensure everyone's
right to a fair and impartial tribunal.
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notice is permissibie where previous courts have proven a m a i n facVn Therefore, ifit

has been established that in the case of racial prejudice, once one court has made a finding
of fact as to its existence and the potential for injustice that could flow fiom this, and that
subsequent courts may also be able to take judicial notice of this fact, then the argument
can be made that once one court has made a finding of fact that a significant harm does
flow tiom breaching the privacy of a cornplainant undertaking therapy or wunselling, then
other courts may find as a fact that these types of intrusion could have a similar impact on
al1 women complainants. This judicial notice would allow the triai courts, charged with the
responsibility of detennining the disclosure of these sensitive records, to assess the issues
in a more equal and consistent fashion. It would help provide a context to distinguish these

types of material fiom other fonns of disclosure. Moreover, it would give significance to

the wording of legislation that sets out the conditions and factors that must be weighed in
the courts determination of the issue and the balancing of the competing interests of the
male accused and the female complainant.

From a principled perspective, it c m be maintained the legislation created to address the
production of complainant's counselling records must be interpreted by the courts. To do
so, it is argued, the courts charged with the responsibility to assess these applications
should be allowed to consider, or take judicial notice, of certain "legislative facts." In
particular, it is suggested that when one examines Bill C-46 in its entirety (as was done in
Chapter Two) its purpose becornes quite clear. It is an exhaustive guide for the courts that

*'Md. at 679; R. v. Williams, supra note 25 at 502.
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are requested t o balance the wmpeting interests and legal rights o f the accused and the
complainant.

Therefore, when the courts are asked to interpret Bill C- 46, it is suggested that they
could, and should, take judicial notice o f the harm that flows fiom the invasion o f a semal
assault complainant's private cuunselling records. It should be r d l e d that it has becn

argued previously that this h m has two components; the first is iinked to the individuai
complainant whose course of treatment is intempted and her willingness t o access justice
in the criminal courts affecteci, and the second is connected to the chilling effect that the
possibility of disclosure has on other women who have been victimized by sexual violence
to corne forward with their complaints. It is argued that this form ofjudiciai notice would

fall within the parameters of a "legislative fact" and as such the courts could rely o n social
science research and impact studies in their determination of this disclosure issue. Through
this analysis, both the insufficient grounds set out in section 278.3 (4) and the factors t o be
considered set out in section 278.5 (2) would then be interpreted in a context that
recognizes the type of injuries that are caused by a sexual violation as well as the intimate
nature of these counselling records.

More specifically, section 278.3(4) prohibits a court fiom making inferences of relevance
on certain facts alone. These facts, presented in fbll in Chapter Two, include the mere fact
that a counselling record exists, that it relates t o the incident that is the subject matter of
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the criminal triai, or that the record may relate to the credibility of the complainant." As
well, section 278.5(2) sets out permissible factors that must be considered by a judge
reviewing such a disclosure application. The factors that arguably require some level of
attentiveness to legislative facts include whether the production of the record is based on a
discriminatory belief or bias (indistinguishable fiom racial prejudice that has been judicially
noticed); society' s interest in encwraging the reporting of sexuai offences; society's
interest in encouraging the treatment of sexud assault complainants; and the impact of the
determination of the issue on the integrity of the trial process? in shon, as the accu&
attempts to tender sufficient evidence of reievance to persuade a court that he has
established that the counselling record is likely relevant to an issue at trial and that the
production of the said record is necessary in the interests o f j u s t i ~ ethe
, ~ coun mun
consider both the individual impact on the complainant and societal impact of the request
in making its findings.

This wouid allow for a more contextuai appreciation of the impact that such disclosure

orders have, not only on the female witness's opportunity to advance through the healing
process, but also enhance the equal treatment of al1 complainants. Additionally, this
judicial recognition and the resulting protection of a nght to privacy may also hopefblly

increase women's wiIlingness to avail themselves of justice through the criminal trial
"Criminal Code, R.S.C.1985, c. C46, [hereinafter Criminal Code] section 278.3(4).
29CriminalCode, section 278.5 (2) (d),

(0,
(g) and (h).

30CriminalCode, section 278.5 (1) (b) and (c).
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process. Obviously, women complainants' treatment in the criminal justice system requires
the preliminary step of a decision by those complainants to access justice in the criminal
courts.

(C)Domestic Assault

Due to the complexities of the domestic assault problem in our society, any meaningfùl
reform must include a CO-ordinatedand collaborative effort of al1 interested stakeholders

in the criminal justice system. These stakeholders include investigators, heaith care

providers, prosecutors, defence counsel, judges, treatment professionals, and probation
and parole service providers. As well, outside of the criminal justice system, the input fiom

other individuals who are committed to preventing domestic violence, such as those
individuals running the wornen shelters, academics and researchers, must also be
considered. A multi system and well orchestrated approach is required to put an end to

this oppressive form of violence. The reforms examined here should be contemplated not
as alternatives to each other but rather as a variety of options that need to work union

with each other if reai change is to occur and lives are to be saved.

1. Unified Court

As was pointed out in the lut chapter, a significant problem that arises frequently in the

prosecution of domestic assault charges is the complainant's unwiliingness to cooperate
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with the process. The criminal justice system's response of leniency coupled with
education and counselling for the remorsefiil and contrite accused is an important and
progressive step forward t o assisting the femaie partner caught in a cycle of violence who
wishes to remedy the dilemma and maintain a safe relationship.

There are two basic types of court mandated treatment programs for mafes who physically
abuse their female partners. The first is the type that has been implemented in Brampton,
Ontario. This model has been described by some as "pretrial diversion."" In this style of
response, an accused can avoid a criminal conviction or perhaps have his charge and
sentence reduced on the successhl completion of a treatment program. The second
initiative type is requiring a male party attend a court sanctioned treatment program as
part of a sentence imposed aller conviction. This model has been implemented in the

Toronto K COU^ response. Failing to complete either program presents a difficulty for
both models although, as discussed earlier, more so for the prettial diversion response

because of the ramifications of sarne on the eventual prosecution of the charges. Few
studies have been completed to discover whether o r not the form of mandating treatment
has any impact on the completion of the prograrns and the resulting effects on recidivism.

D.Saunders and J. Parker did find that about two-thirds of the men who undertook
"National Research Council, N.Crowell and A. Burgess 4s.. Uderstanding Violence
Agairwt Women (Washington D.C.:
National Academy Press, 1996) at 122. This terrn is
perhaps inappropnate because the passing of rntence still takes place within the aiMd
courts and as such the accused is not diverted out of the criminal justice system, as is the
case for other crimes such as shoplifting. Restorative justice principles urge that, in some
cases, true prettiai diversion prograrns should be given an opportunity t o s u c d where
traditional criminal justice responses have failed.
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treatment because of coun orders completed the program, compared to two-fifths of the
men who started treatment that was not COUR ordered?' These findings suggest that more
research is needed to determine the cause and effect relationship between how one is
channeled into a program and its impact on completion rates.

Regardless of the relationship, it is important to note that a significant number of men do
fail to complete treatment programs and it is suggested that a response must be planneci
for the accused who is unwilling to complete a treatrnent prograrn. To rely on the
conventional approach of prosecution for this type of offence is unwise, primariiy due to
the issues connected with a recanting witness. Therefore, in addition to pretrial diversion
rnodel, what is also needed is a diligent prosecution model, such as the K Court initiative.
In this way the criminal justice system can, in the appropriate circumstances (for example

where minimal levels of violence are alleged) ailow an accused to admit responsibility and
then be treated for the violent behaviour in an environment of CO-operation.However,
when an accused is given the opportunity to modie his behaviour and fails to complete his
counselling, an option of diligent prosecution must also exist. As well, a collaborative
effort is required by investigators, prosecutors and probation and parole service providers
to ensure violent offenders are brought to justice and deterreci fiom recidivism.

'*D. Saunders and J. Parker, "Legal Sanctions and Treatment Follow-through Among Men
Who Batter: A Multivariate Analysis" (1989) September, Sociai Work Research and
Abstracts, 2 1.

2. Restorative Justice / Transformative Justice

i. Language

In this section the concepts C

O M ~ C with
~ ~

the broader philosophy of restorative justice

are exarnined. Once this is completed these ideas are analyzed to determine whether or not

they have a role in reforming the dificulties associated with the prosenition of domestic
assault cases, described in chapter three. However, ôefore this can be cornmenced it

should be re-emphasized that, as it was set out in chapter one, the language used to

describe an issue brings with it certain notions and connotations for both the reader
assimilating the information as well for the author describing the features of the particular
issue. The common understanding of the word "restore" implies a return t o an earlier held

position or status. It should not be the goal of any criminai justice response to restore, or

return a female victim back into, a relationship and environment where violence of any

kind is used by one partner to control another. In short, the restoration of a violent
relationship is obviously a non-starter. The word "transfomative" is far more acceptable
as it connotes, at least to this author, a positively changed or irnproved relationship

uninhibited by violence. It suggests a non-violent rmnciliation. Yet, it is also a specific
term that D. Moore and J. McDonald have applied a specific meaning to."
33Thisterm has been adopted by a movement CO-foundedby David Moore and John
McDonald in 1995. Transformative Justice Australia has as its primary emphasis,
collective engagement, emotional transformation and social support, rather than on shame,
reintegrat ive or ot herwise. See online: Transformat ive Justice Australia
<http://www.tja.corn.au/menu.htm>
(date accessed: 15 June 1999).

Phitosophically, they have described "transformative justice" as a:
practical philosophy that sees crime as a violation of people and the relationships
between them. It V ~ W Sthe conflict resulting fiom crime as an opportunity to
achieve transformative healing for al1 those affécted. Transformative justice sees
problems beginning not only with the crime but also with the causes of crimes. It
employs processes that treat the incident as a transformative relational and
educational opponunity for victims, offenders, and ali other members of the
affected community. Transformative processes must therefore employ mechanisrns
for building and repairing human relation~hips.~
Transformative justice advocates believe that the mechanisms used to impose social
regdation should be based on an understanding of human motivation on both the
"intrapersonal and interpersonal" level. Therefore, it's primary focus for reform is
understanding the emotional basis of a confiict and its transformation into something
inherently better. Thus, although the term itself may have a more appeasing tone to it, it
also has connected to it a specific process and airn different fiom restorative justice
paradigms and should not be conflsed. Still, the criticisms of restorative justice pnnciples,
as they apply to repairing violent domestic relationships, may apply equally to these

principles, that urge a community based response to domestic violence. Regardless, the
purpose here is to outline the appropriateness of the nomenclature so that when references
are made to restorative justice concepts it should be inferrecl that the aim of the reforms

discussed here are reconciliatory or transformative in nature rather than restorative.

%lbid. at TJA Philosophy (date accessed: 15 June 1999).

ii. The Restorativt Justice Philosophy

An effective way to appreciate the philosophy of restorative justice is to juxtapose its

principle next to the conventional criminal justice response to crime, o r what Kent Roach
described as a "punitive model."" He explained the distinctions around the role that the
victims of crime piayed in each paradigm:
A punitive model of victims' rights promoted the power of the traditional agents of
crime control legislatures, police and prosecutors - while not necessarily
empowering crime victims and potential victims."

-

A non-punitive model o f victims' rights based on crime prevention and restorative
justice presented a far more radical challenge to the criminal justice system than
due process or punitive forms of victims' rights."

This distinction is a focus for the Nova Scotia Restorative Justice ~rograrn.* It described
the conventional approach as an "adversariai system" that defines crime as a violation of

rules that btings about harm to the state. In this system the victim does not play a p n m q

role in resolution and the offender, if convicted, is blamed, stigrnatized and punished.
Contrary to this, a restorative justice model presents victims as central to the criminal

justice system's process of both defining harm and how it might be repaired. In a forum

"K. Roach, Lhe Proces and Victims' Rights: 7he N~ovLuw and Politics of

Crimiml

Jm~ice(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). This work is primarily concerned
with how the system's stakeholders, including legislators, judges, interest groups, and the
media have defined certain criminal justice issues and its ideologies.

'%lova Scotia Department of Justice, A Progron for Nova Sçotia: Resîoratzve Justice
(Halifax: Department of Justice, 1998).

that encourages repentance and forgiveness, restorative justice relies on community
involvernent to hold the offender accountable and to provide that offender with the
opportunity to make amends. Critically, the victim is given the chance to play an active
role in determining a resolution to the offen~e.'~
In this fùndamentai shiA both the primary
goals (the reduction of recidivism and increased victim satisfaction) as well as the
secondary goals (strengthened cornrnunity suppon and increased public confidence in the
criminal justice system) are emphasi~ed.~

However, it is significant to note that Nova Scotia's Restorative Justice Program has
recognized the ongoing debate taking place in Canada regarding the appropriateness for
domestic violence and sexual assault offences being included within the reaim of this
justice system. The primary focus for this concern is the "possible power imbalance
between the victim and the offender in a restorative forum."" As a result, these types of

offences will oniy be considered as appropnate for post-conviction, pre-sentence and postsentence restorative justice "entry point" considerations.

'Wova Scotia Depart ment of Justice, A Programfor Nova Scotia: Restorative Justice
(Halifax: Department of Justice, 1998) at 2. For an extensive review of these principles see
J. Llewellyn and R. Howse, "Restorative Justice - A Conceptual Frarnework" (Prepared
for the Law Commission of Canada) online: < http://.lcc.gc.ca/en/papers/how~c.htd~
(date accessed: 15 June 1999).

Some of these restorative justice issues were recently examineci by the Supreme Court of
Canada in R v. Glcldue." This case involved an aboriginal femde accuseci, who pled
guilty to one count of rnanslaughter after she stabbed her cornmon law spouse twice, once
in the chest and once in the m.She was sentenceci to three years of imprisonment. Both
the British CoIumbia Court of Appeal and the Suprerne Court of Canada dismisseci her
appeal related to the fitness of her sentence. Ofsignificance here is t h e Courts discussion
of sentencing principles, particularly those related to restorative justice. Cory and

Iacobucci JJ. writing for the Court, considered the parameters of S. 718.2(e) of the
Criminal Code" and its application to the facts before the Court. Section 718.2 sets out
the princi ples of sentencing, including:
(e) al1 available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the
circumstances should be considered for al1 offenders, with particular attention to
the circumstances of aboriginal offenders?'
The Court recognized the concept and pnnciples of restorative justice as a form of
community-based sanctionhg and that these notions would develop over time in the

jurispmdence. The Court, in recognition of the concept wrote:
In general terms, restorative justice may be described as an approach t o remedying
crime in which it is understood that al1 things are interrelated and that crime
disnipts the harmony which existed prior to its occurrence, or at l e s t which it is
felt should exist. The appropriateness of a particular sanction is largely determined
by the needs of the victim, the comrnunity, as well as the offender."

*'[1999] S.C.J.
No. 19.
' 3 ~ . ~ . ~1985.
. ,

c. C-46, Part XXIII [repl. 1995, c. 22, s.61, s.718 (2).

%id

*'R v. Gludie. st~pranote 42 at paragraph 7 1.

Thus it cm be said that the restorative justice is a philosophical tiamework or a new
method of looking at criminal behaviour and conflia. It extends the concept of crime from
a personal viewpoint to that of a collective societal perspective. It places much of the

responsibility of confîict resolution back within the comrnunity."

iii. Application to Domestic Assaults

It is important to note that, for the most part, the pnnciples discussed to this point have

not been exclusively directed at domestic violence. They have been examined fiom a nonspecific criminal conduct perspective. The issue now debated is whether or not they have
an applicability to domestic assault offences. To answer this question we must retum to
the concept of context. It is contended that there may be a place for these kinds of
initiatives in a limited type of domestic violence, but there are some significant hurdles that
must be overcome once it can be ascertained that they are an effective means of reducing
domestic violence occurrences.

Applying these broad restorativejustice principles to the social dilemma of domestic
assadt one must contemplate how well this victim based approach contextualizes the
position and needs of an abused female partner, as well as the possible causes and
consequences of her part ner's awessive conduct. If she wishes to have her legal rights
46NovaScotia Department of Justice, supra note 38 at 2 and 1 1.

protected and personal safety ensured through the prosecution of an offence then those

-

wishes must be at a minimum be assessed ifnot adhered to. If a cornplainant desires that
her abuser should face conventional criminal sanctions, such as detemence through
conviction, incarceration or some less severe fom of punishrnent, then her best interests
must not be presumed and her situation delegated to a perceived second class tier of

criminal j~sticc.~'

Assuming that this component of the victims needs are correctly assessed, some academics
believe that because the philosophy of restorative justice is focused on "restoration and
prevention" and provides for "healing, empowerment, forgiveness, and an identity that is
richer for not being circumscribed by victimization" it is well suited to reducing incidents
of domestic violence.4* The oppomnity to place the domestic assault victim at the centre

of the process is key, as K. Roach explains:
Unlike in the punitive victims' rights, crime-control, or due process models, the
victim's decision not to invoke the criminal process deserves respect unless it can
be show that it only reflects coercion or the inadequacies of the present
system....An important step here is to define victims as the best judges of their own
interests and not to see their actions as a product of learned helplessness."

Two other academics share this perspective. J. Braithwaite and K. Daly have developed a

47

See S. Merry, Gerting Justice and Getting Even (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1990). The issue of the potential for cultural domination of women's legal rights is
discussed in Chapter Three.

"K. Roach, supra note 3 5 at 37.
'%. Roach, supra note 35 at 33.
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comrnunity-based response to domestic violence- They propose a "comrnunity confèrence7'>
in which the sanctioning principle of shaming is stnictured ïnto a process that requires the
victim and her supporters to be included. The aim o f reintegration of the offender is
accomplished through the participation of his farnily and fiiends. This conference is then
placed at the bottom mng of a hierarchy of a series of increasingly severe and punitive
initiatives (ultimately including incarceration) to combat domestic violence."

To analyse these positions we must return to ow central theme of context. Here context is
focused on what considerations are made for the specifk causes and consequences of the

violent behaviour. For example, how responsive is a psychological or an alcohol related
aggression to the deterrent of shame? Where is the particular victim to be located on the
escalating s a l e of severity with regards to the violence and what type of nsk to ftrther
h m is she currently facing if forced to be a central figure in a deterring process? What if
the victim is trapped in a cycle of violence that has affected her judgement such that she

believes their own couple-based solution is a tenable cure? One author and researcher who
is skeptical about the potential of restorative justice as a panacea for domestic violence is
J. Stubbs.

'7.
Braithwaite and K. Daly, "Masculinities, Violence and Communitarian Controi"

in T.
Newburn and E.Stanko eds., Just Boys Doing Busines: Men, Mascuinis, and Crime
(London: Routledge, 1994) as cited by J. Stubbs,"'Communitarian' Coderencing and
Violence Against Women: A Cautionary Note" in M. Valverde et ai.,eds., Wije AsrcltlIr
and the Crimirmi Justice System: Issues and Policies (Toronto: Centre of Criminology,
1995).

She inte~ewed88 f e d e victims of domestic violence about the outcomes of their
efforts to obtain a protection order fiom before the Australian courts. From these
intewiews she found that it was very difficult to classifi or rneasure the success of their
efforts. She summarized that for some women, once the order was in place the violence
stopped. For others their requests for extemal intervention helped them to negotiate
components of the termination of the relationship, such as child access and support. Still
others found that their decision to involve the state had mixed benefits and costs. At the
other extreme, some wmplainants' efforts to involve the state only worsened their abusive
situations. Overall she found that the majority of women interviewed felt that their efforts
had assisted them in some fashion. On the issue of diversity among the women she
inte~ewedshe noted:
In the context of what has oflen been a lengthy relationship within which the
violent exercise of power and control is an established pattern of behaviour, it is
hardly surprising if the resort to law does not produce a simple and unarnbiguous
response. We need to listen closely to women's experiences before imposing
outcome measures which deny that expenence, and we need to recognise [sic] the
limitations of simple quantitative measures, what ever their appeal in terms of
simplifjing the outcome measures used in the analysis."

Therefore, when contemplating community-based responses it must be recalled that
assaultive behaviour within a domestic relationship is commonly a very highly charged
emotional matter with a complicated background. For instance, researchers suspect
culture may play a significant role in promoting violent behaviour within a domestic
"J. Stubbs, '"Cornmunitarian' Conferencing and Violence Against Women: A Cautioniiry
Note" in M. Valverde et al., eds., Wve Assmit and the CriminuiJustice System: Isnres
and Policies (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1995) at 265.

relati~nship.~'
The restorative justice mode1 w u m e s that the behaviour is universaiiy
detested. This may not be an accurate assumption. If culture is playing a role, the
effectiveness of using an accused's farnily and fiiends t a provide support and to act as a
deterrence one wonders what d l be reinforced beyond the actual supervised group
counselling sessions. Or even if it can be assumed that the support group selected
acknowfedges the use of violence as abhorrent behaviour, what guarantees exist that this
support network will be able to positively impact the relationship and its parties on an
extended basis? This may be particularly difficult $part of the behaviour pattern of an
abusive male is to isolate the relationship fiom outside influences.

J. Stubbs also pondered the effectiveness of a cornrnunity-bas4 shaming strategy on the
ability to modi@ behaviour when it is anchored in a context of power and control

implemented by men and which is sustained by a number of different variables. She
explains "vioience against females partners is widely practiced, is sustained by broader
cultural practices, and needs to be understood in broad social and political tem."" The

depth with which the proposed responses of a cornmunity- based restorative justice
solution, regarding the problems systemic oppression towards women, is still not very weii
understood.

5 2 ~ eD.
e Counts, J. Brown and J. Campbell, eds., Soncrion dSanctuury: Culrural
Per~pectiveson the Beizti~rgof Wives (Boulder Colo. : Wesîview Press, 1992) as cited by
the National Research Council, N. Crowell and A Burgess, eds., Understanding Violence
Againsr Women (Washington: National Academy Press, 1996) at 67.
"J. Stubbs, stcpru note 5 1 at 278.
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Consider for a moment that a woman is trapped within a cycle of domestic violence. How
realistic is it that a woman, isolated fiom her fiiends and f d y and subjected to repeated
incidents of violent abuse, could gather support fiom either person's family? Some
research indicates that women look to the criminal justice systern for heip because they
were unable to find support and assistance from those in their private lives." Women d m
worry t hat they wiii not be beiieved because these family members will not know her
partner to be violent." J. Stubbs found that in her study group women sought court
orders, in part, because they felt more able to discuss the matter with someone who was
neutral and removed from the imrnediate relationship."

LastIy, improved access to criminal justice, as opposed to either "transformativeyy
or

"restorative" justice, must take into account the strong possibility that, regardless of the
specific cause, the abused woman may be caught in a cycle of violence. Those charged
with the responsibility of formulating a response to the violence must determine that, due

to the controlling influences of her unremorsefiil abusive partner, she is not merely a pawn

being manipulated so that state controlled sanctioning is avoided. J. Stubbs sumrnarizes
some of the feminist criticisms of community-based mediations in this way:

%lbid. at 280. See also H.Astor, 7 i k Weighi of Silence: Talkïng About Violence in
Family Mediution, in M . Thomton, ed., Fragile Frontiers: Ferninisi Debares Armnd
Public and Private (Oxford : Odord University Press, 1995) as ated by J. Stubbs, supra
note 5 1.

Feminist critiques of mediation have drawn attention to the dangers of assuming
that a woman who has been the target of violence is able to assert her own needs,
and promote her own interests in the presence of the person who has perpetrated
that violence. It is the violent partner who is well practiced in meeting their own
interests through violence, control and manipulation. It is also the case that
requiring a woman t o come together with her violent partner o r ex-partner risks
providing the occasion for more violence and abuse, especially where the parties
are separated.

Therefore, because of the complicated background and many unanswered questions that
exist about the numerous causes and consequences of domestic violence, it is suggested
that much more research is requireâ to properly assess the role that restorative justice
principles might play in reducing this costly and potentially tragic behaviour. It is stressed
that two important issues that must be carefilly determined before such solutions can be
tested, are the safety of the victims and their children, if any, and the

that a power

imbalance premised on physical domination could have on the resolution of the conflicts
linked to the violence.

3. Co-ordinatc Cornmittee Approach to Cnrting and Intcrpnting Studics

Through the examination of the theories of domestic assault, significant gaps in our
understanding of the causes, consequences and therefore the most efficient treatments of
"lbid. at 28 1. See also M. Mahoney, "Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation" (1990-1991) 90 Mich. Law Rev. 1. in this article Mahoney talces the
position that assaultive behaviour, within a domestic relationship, is about domination and
the male partner's efforts t o control his spouse through violence. To advance this position
she examines the stmggle for control that takes place when a woman separates or
attempts to separate fiom her abusive partner.

the problem have k e n revealed. At a minimum, it is suggested that the "one s k e fits ail"
approach to refonn is an insufficient response to bring about meaninghil access to justice
and protection for women involved in abusive domestic relationships. This issue was

contemplated by D. Saunders when he wrote:
These cases illustrate the great diversity m o n g husbands who assault: diversity in
violence severity, alcohol use, social class, childhwd expenences, and other
factors. Some men are aggressive o d y at home, whereas o t h a s are aggressive in
many settings and have a long criminal record. The violence may range fiom a few
slaps and shoves to life threatening beatings and use of weapons. The backgrounds
and hence the psychological traits of these men are also diverse. Although the
patnarchal n o m s and stnicture of our society lay a strong foundation for mm's
violence against intimate partners, the expressions of their aggressive domination
takes many complex f ~ n n s . ~ '
It i s suggested here that there must be a concerted effort, by trained professionals, to
assess the specific needs of the cornplainant in addition to the treatment needs of the
accused. Also, special care would be required for those determinhg the appropnateness of
this form of counselling for couples expressing a desire to continue in a relationship,
particularty if children are involved. This is so for at least three reasons. First, there is a
recognized reality that this fonn of violence usually escalates in its severity.s9 Second, it
has been s h o w that children of abusive homes are at greater risk of physical h m than

'*D.Saunders, "Husbands Who Assault: Multiple Profiles Requiring Multiple Responses"
in N. Hilron, ed., Leguf R e p n s e s to Wue AsrcnZt: Current Trends and EvaIuation (
Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993) at 10.

'W. Johnson, "Seriousness, Type and Frequency of Violence Against Wives" in M.
Valverde et al. eds., Wve A S S Q Ucn>d
~ tlie CrintinafJustice System: Iscues und Poficies
(Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1995) at 136.
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other ~hildren.~
And third, evidence has k e n gathered that suggests this form of violent
behavior may be learneû through cxposure to !t'i

Once the immediate d e t y needs of the cornplainant and her children are assessed, a
suitable prograrn for the accused can be considered. This is not to suggest that every male
offender should have access to individually stnictured counseîiing. However, a review of
the literature into the theories of causes and consequence strongly urges that difEerent
factors need to emphasized during the course of counselling. For example, if a pattern of
violence seems to be related to the abuse of alcohol then a wmponent of the treatment
for the offender should include a focus on the recognition of the connection and the nature
of long term commitments to the treatment of al~oholisrn.~
If on the other hand, a

60M. Straus and R. Gelles, "How Violent Are Amencan Families? Estimates from the
National Family Violence Resurvey and Other Studies" in M. Straus and R. Gelies, eds.,
Physicui Violertce in American Families: Risk Factors and A&ptatiom to Violence in
8.145 Families (New Brunswick, N.J.
: Transaction Publishers, 1990) at 95 to 112, as
cited by the National Research Council, supra note 3 1 .
O'Leary, "Physicd Aggression Between Spouses: A Social Learning Theory
Perspective" in V. Van Hasselt et al.. eds., Haradbook of Famiiy Violence (New York:
Plenum, 1988), describes social leaming theory as a cognitive theory placed in a social
context.

62Maledrinking patterns, particularly binge drinking, have beai associated to domestic
violence across al1 ethnic groups and social classes. See G. Kantor, "Redefining the
Brushstrokes in Portraits on Alcohol and Wife Assaults" in Alcobl cmdlnterperso~~l
Violence: Fostering Multidisciplitamy Perspectives NIAAA Monograph 24, NM
Publication No. 93-3496 (Rockville Md.: National Institute on Alwhol Abuse and
Alcoholism, National Institutes of Health, U. S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 1993) as cited by The National Research Council, in N. Crowell and A Burgess,
(Washington D.C.
: National Academy
eds., Understanding Vïolence Against W o m e ~
Press, 1996) at 55.

cultural myth about violence and gender roles is at the epicmtre of the violence, then
those constructs must be identified and responded to through education."

As well, if children are involved it is suggested that founselling may also repuirecl for

those indirectly subjected to domestic violence. This is not to suggest that any degree of

x leveled at these young victims of circumstancc, rather this is a pragmatic
fault should L
reform suggestion directed at the undoing o f any misguided learned behaviour. These
young persons should be educated about why such behaviour is harmfùl and wrong and
perhaps how communication skills can be developed between partners t o avoid the control
and oppression of one life partner by another through the use of violence. Moremer, givm
the dramatic estirnates as to the degree of under reporting in the incidents of violence, as
were set out in Chapter One, we can assume that the number of cases currently before the
criminal justice system represents only the very tip of the iceberg. I f w e as a society are
truly cornmitted to the reduction or perhaps even the elirnination of physical domestic

abuse, then the education of young people as to these issues should not be exclusively
reserved for the children of violent offenders brought to the attention of the state. Schools
should be required to include as part of their curriculums, education about these matters.
Boys and girls should be taught about the signs o f violence, the harms that flow 6 o m such
debilitating behaviour and the socially acceptable ways in which aggressive feeling must be
dealt with. If children are institutionally instructed on issues of street proofing, h d t h care

QD.Adams, "Treatment Models Of Men Who Batter: A Proferninist Analysis" in K. Yllo
and M. Bograd, eds., Ferninisi Perspectives on Wve Abuse (Newbury Park, Cal. : Sage
Publications, 1988), as cited by the National Research Council, supra note 3 1.
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and the responsibilities of srnial intimacy, as if their lives may depended on it, why not
educate about domestic violence where we know for certain someone's üfe is dependent
on it?a

Having considered these treatment issues, the notion of counselling complainants mua be
addressed. Certainly the most controversiai counselling issue is the concept of "souples
therapy" for individuals involved in an abusive relationship. Some experts believe that by
initiating such a process, a woman's d e t y may be jeopardki." Others suggest that a
couples dynamic perspective may create, at least by inference, joint responsibility for the
violent behaviour and therefore present the offender with an opportunity to deny
responsibility for his a a s of violence." There are very few studies on the effectiveness of
such treatment approaches, although one was conducted by K. O'Leary. It w m p d
single-sex group therapies with couples counselling and found significant decreases in the
number of violent incidents following both types of treatment, one year after the
individuals had completed the treatments. Still, it is imponant to note that the individuals

"The National Research Council, stcpra note 3 1 at 101. See statistics on intra familial
homicide rates discussed in Chapter One.
65R.E.Dobash and R. Dobash, Wornen. Violence und Social Change (New York:
Routledge, 1Wî), as cited by the National Research Council, supra note 3 1 at 133. At
page 244 of the text they note that "a fiindamental principle is to make men responsible for
their violence. Consequently, couple or farnily counselling is rejected as ineffective, even
dangerous."

&M. Bograd, "Family Systems Approaches to Wife Battering: A Feminist Critique" (1984)
54 Arnerican Journal of Orthopsychiatry 5 58, as cited by the National Research Council,
supra note 3 1 at 133.
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in both counselling groups were directed there fiom non-severe violent situations and that

al1 of the participants in both paradigms wished to remain together." Given the potanid
for fûriher abuse, it is suggested here that before any f o m of couples counsdling is
introdud into the criminal justice system far more long tenn a comparative studies are
required. In support of this position it has been reported that rnost experts in the field
agree that couple fwnselling is inappropriate for coun mandated counselling sessions and
cases that involve more violent offendersa

4.

A National Research Centre

This work has attempted to reveal the dramatic complexities associated with the
phenornena of domestic violence. Numerous studies have been cornpleted by American

67

K . O'Leary et al., "An Empirical Comparison of Physical Aggression Couples Treatment

vs. Gender-specific Treatment, [unreported] paper presented at the 4th International
Family Violence Research Conference, Durham, New Hampshire, July 21 24, 1995,
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook; as cited by the
National Research Council, srrÿra note 3 1 at 134.

-

68EE.
Gondolf, "Batterer Intervention: What We Need to Know" [unreported] paper
prepared for the Violence Against Women Strategic Planning Meeting, National Institute
of Justice, Washington D.C., March 3 1, 1995. Mid-Atlantic Addiction Training Institute,
Indiana University of Pennsylvania; as cited by The National Resuvch Council, mpru note
3 1 at 134. See also E. Gondolf and E. Fisher, Battered Women as Suntivors
(Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1988) at 73: "severe police action is likely to be the
most effective with the sporadic and chronic batterers who have linle previous contact
wit h the police."See dso M. Whalen, Cmnseling tu End Violence Againrr Wornen:A
Subversive Mode1 (Thousand Oaks Cal.: Sage Publications, 1996) at 64, where she
rejects wuples counselling because physically abused women csn never be fra fiom their
partner's intimidation. As a result fernale Mctims cannot participate h l y , equaily and
without fear of reprisal.
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and Canadian researchers to identitjl andlor elirninate both causes and consequences of
this behaviour. Similady, as new solutions and treatment initiatives are proposecl, their
effectiveness at reducing the violence is k i n g tested. What is required to CO-ordinateand
disseminate this new information is a national research centre. To avoid the necessity of
recreating the wheel at each new tum, researchers should be made aware of past and
current work being done in the field. This could be done through a central a j p c y
delegated to keep abreast of the studies and to co-ordinate new research. Such a centre
could also monitor the types of work being done so that more longitudinal studies can be
completed. In short, the center could promote the collaboration between researchers and
practitioners so that study results could be integrated into new criminal justice initiatives."
This is an imporuint piece of the puzzle that is currently missing in our societyys

cornmitment to increase Our understanding of the problem.

Another difficulty in the field is a lack of terrninologicd wnsistency. H. Johnson and V.
Sacco, in their anaiysis of Statistics Canada's national survey on violence against women,
note that:
Definitions of violence against women in the research literature Vary widely. Some
include psychological and emotional abuse, financid abuse, and sexual coercion, as
well as physical and senial assault as legally defined."
@National Research Council, N. Crowell and k Burgess, eds., (Inderstlanding fioieme
Againsf Women (Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, 1996) at 153. They suggest
the development of three or four Arnerican regionai centers to improve research capacity
and strengthening researchers and service providers collaôoration.

'%. Johnson and V. Sacco, "Researching Violence Against Women: Statistics Canada's
National Survey" (1 995) 37 Canadian Journal of Criminology 28 1 at 289.
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In addition to the types of behaviour researched, others have studied incidents of
assaultive behaviour between intimates dong side other f o m s of abuse that may dso
occur in familial settings, such as child and elder abuse. A national research center could
be of some assistance to those gathering data in the field in the recognition of these
variables and perhaps support the use of a cornmon measure of violence. For example, M.
Straus developed a s a l e of nine escdating physical violence items called the Cotiflict
Tactic Scale.'l The use of such a standardized mode1 could allow for more concise
comparisons between findings and measuring the impact of different criminal justice
response.

Similarly, there must be some general guides regarding the measurement of success for
different initiatives. Currently, how success is measured varies widely. 1s recidivism the
key, or should the yardstick measure overall incidents reported to the police? Are
conviction rates an indication of success? If culture does play a role should these statistics
be monitored so that resources and efforts can be channeled where they may be needed
most? Or perhaps a primary goal should be the completion of a treatment program. If so,
then efforts to modiQ programs to specific needs must be measured in some consistent
fashion. Again, it is suggested here that the use of a national research centre could assist in
setting national standards for the measurement and assessrnent of the impact that digerent

"M. Straus, "Measunng Family Violence. The C o d i a Tactic Scale" (1979) 41 Journal of
Marriage and the Family 75, as cited by the National Research Council, supra note 3 1.
See also W. DeKeseredy and B. MacLean, "Researching Women Abuse in Canada: A
Realist Critique of The Conflia Scale" (1990) 25 Canadian Review of Social Policy 19.

initiatives have on a comparative basis.

To advance the position that there is a significant need for a national research cmtre, three

different societal responses to domestic violence are considered. In Manitoba, the
Winnipeg Family Violence Court (FVC) began its operations on September 17, 1 9 9 0 . ~
The goal of the program was to provide a better environment in which to process " f d y
violence" cases? The desired effêcts were to include a more expeditious proassing of
cases through the use of speciaily trained court judges and prosecutors. Their training
incorporated their experiences to help increase their contextual understanding of funily
violence cases. After the first year, results were analyzed and it was found that, "the
performance of the FVC in the first year was outstanding in its achievement of expeditious
processing, high conviction rates and consistent and appropriate sentencing.""

In the province of Saskatchewan, the Victims of Domestic Yiolence Act7' was proclaimed

'=E.Ursel, Win~~ipeg
Fmily VïoIence Court Evahation. Reswch, Statistics and
Evaluation Directorate, WD l995-2e (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1995) at ix.
731bidThe farnily violence cases evaluated included spousd assaults, child abuse and elder
abuse cases.

716~d
at ix. This report focuscd on the second year of the FVC's operation. First, it
examined to what extent the FVC could maintain its momentum in light of the inaease in
the number of cases that it dealt with. Second, it studied the relationship between the W C
and the other nonspecialized criminal courts in the province in an attempt to cornparatively
measure its success and efficiency.

'' S.S. 1994, v-6 .O2 [hereinafter YDVA].
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on February 1, 1995. In an effort to improve on the unresponsiveness of the criminai
justice system to the needs of abused women, additional options were legislatively created.
These options included "assisting women promptly &er an offence is reporteci; providing
immediate assistance on property matters; removing an abuser fiom the f d y home; and
seeking alternatives for victims who do not report abuse to m y agaicy."" The legislation
created three basic types of remedies t b t were designed t o enfiance the provisions of the
Criminal Code and related provincial statutes, to help the victims of domestic violence.
These remedies involved emergency intervention orders, victim assistance orders and
warrants of entry." An undertaking was initiated to assess the implementation phase of
this new response, regarding its impact on assisting the victims of domestic violence and
the degree to which the objectives of the Act have been met. Data was coilected through
file reviews, the analysis o f administrative data and personal i n t e ~ e w of
s both victirns
and a number of key individuals involved in the criminal justice system, including justices

of the peace, judges, lawyers, police and victim services personnel. ïhrough this process it
was detennined that more education and training was required for the persons responsible

for the implementation of the legislation." Also, it w u revealed that a consistent method
of identifjing the orders used across police services and courts was needed, in addition to

the production of monthly police statistical reports.

"Prairie Research Associates Inc., Review of the Saskatchewan Victims of Domestic
Violence Act, WD 1996-6e (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1996) at 1.

"lbid at 1. See also the VDVA, supra note 75, sections 3, 7 and 1 1.

The mandatory charging policy in the Yukon was dso recently reviewed. This polis,
evolved fiom a public statement issued by the Minister of Justice and the Solicitor General
in December of 1983. The purpose of the staternent was to initiate a directive that would
remove fiom the victims of domestic assault the responsibility for initiating criminal
charges and to ensure that both the police and the prosecutors would prioritize domestic
assault cases. Over a 12 month period, ending in December 1995, a study was conducted
to examine the "effectiveness and impact of criminal juslice interventions in spousai assault

cases, and the potentiai limitation of mandatory charge 1 pro-arrest policies" of a directive
initiated 1 1 yean earlier? The study involved a number of interviews with criminal
justice, social service and First Nations respondents, victims of domestic assaults and
domestic assault offenders. A primary concern for the organizers of the study was that it
should reflect a strong cornrnunity base. As a result, T. Roberts, the author of the report,
explained that the format of the study was:
not based on a quantitative analysis of al1 spousal assault cases over an extendecl
period of time, nor a tracking methodology, but rather on the subjective and
experience based responses of groups an individuals that have been involved with
the issues of spousal assaults in the Y u k ~ n . ~
With regards to the criminalization of domestic violence, al1 respondents supported the
concept of mandatory charging, based on the notions that there should be a clear message
sent to society that such behaviour is unacceptable and that victims of family violence need

'PT. Roberts, S p ~ s a Asundt
I
and M d t o r y Chatpitg in the Y h n : -riences.
Perspectives and Alternatives, WD1996-3e, Research, Statistics and Evaluation
Directorate (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 19%) at Wi.
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protection fiom their abusive partners. Yet, there was "considerable division" in those
polled over whether mandatory charges should necessarily lead t o the mandatory
prosecution of those charges." Victims in particular, wanted the criminaijustice system t o
"validate their perceptions, d u c e their isolation, and hear their needs?

It was the

perception of many of those that responded that these goals muld be accomplished
without a criminal trial and state sanctioning. Also, the study found that the mandatory
charging policy did very little to encourage the reporting of incidents. T. Roberts wrote:
Roughly 70 percent of community respondents feel the policy has been consistently
applied, although there is certainly evidence that discretion and inconsistency still
exist. Nonetheless, there is a strong consensus that the actual incidence o f spousal
assault remains considerably higher than the incidence of report, and two-thirds of
victims did not report earlier a ~ s a u l t s . ~
In the end, the report concludes that the e f f i of mandatory charging may in fact be

counter productive to the prirnary aims of the 11 year old directive, specitically the
removal of the responsibility tiom the victims of domestic violence for the initiation of
criminal charges.

Therefore, it is argued here that while al1 three of these studies are important, each of them

at 1 1 1. The conclusions of this study were based on the feedback fiom victims,
offenders, and community respondents interview4 fiom the time of an alleged incident
through the reporting, processing, enforcement up until the final outcome stages of state
response.
%id.

"Ibid. at 1 12. Note that the study dso addresses cultural issues (the differences between
First Nations and non-Fint Nations Respondents) and the disparity of resourçn, between
the larger and smaller communities.
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is very different fiom the others. Their methodologies, that set out t o increase society's

understanding of the domestic w o u l t problem and to hopefully improve the manner in
which the criminal justice system responds to this type of criminai offence, are as varied as

the initiatives they examined. To increase the studies value to the eradication of the
societal problem on a broader national level, a central specialized and highly skilled
resource centre could be used to both di-

and superimpose individual findings of these

types of studies on some of the common themes discussed in chapter three, such as the
causes and consequences of domestic violence. This would make a more efficient use of
the time and monies spent on researching domestic violence by individuai comrnunities by
avoiding duplication, building on the consistent findings and promot ing funher and longer
term studies on the inconsistent o r contrary findings?

(D) Conclusions

Two inequalities of the criminal justice system have been presented in this thesis. First, the
courts have failed female complainants of sexuai assault by balancing their Charter
" A n article written by L. MacLeod reviews some of the issues exrunined at a one-day
workshop on wife assault and the criminal justice system. It was held it Toronto on
November 25, 1994. Her article summarizes some of the findings fiom a number of recent
criminal justice responses, including the Winnipeg Farnily Violence Court and the
Saskatchewan Victims of Violence Act. See L. MacLed, "Expanding the Dialogue:
Report of a Workshop to Explore the Criminal Justice System Response to Violence
Against Women" in M. Valverde, L. MacLeod and K. Johnson eds., Wge AssmIt and the
Crimird Jt~sticeSystem: Iswes and Policies (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1995) 13
at 20 to 24.
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guaranteed right to equality before the law and their right to privacy below the right's of

an accused to full answer and defence. The reforms wggested here would have the effkct
of rebalancing these cornpethg interests by the reliance upon the doctrine of judicial notice
of the legislative fact of significant h m that flows fiom the opening of a complainant's
counselling records. Such a legal principle would not absolutely exclude the availabiiity of
a complainant's counsdling or therapeutic records in al1 ciraimstances. This reform would

work to avoid the h m that would flow, to the accuseci, fiom a miscarriage of justice
created by the possibili ty of relevant evidence being absolutely banned fiom access. Yet it
would, in effect, firmly place on an accused person the responsibility of presenting
evidence to establish that the record is likely relevant to an issue at trial and that the
production of the record is necessary in the interest ofjustice before such records are
opened and a women's right to privacy are trampled needlessly. The h o p is that such
reform would also open access to justice for women who have been sexually assautteci by
guaranteeing that their most private mental health files and records are not opened by an
accused on a violative fishing expedition.

Second, it has been argued that physically abused women have been denied real access to
a criminal justice by a system that has failed to appreciate the numerous causes and
consequences to domestic assault. In the reforms suggested for domestic assault, it has
been stressed that the key to making significant progress is a collaborative effort fiom al1
interested parties. The eradication of the problem will not come fiom one single reform
but rather fiom a series of initiatives that assess the real needs of abused wornen and the
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complex causes and consequences of the violent behaviour of their male partners. It has
been stressed that this type of assessrnent requires a contextualization of the violence
within the individual relationship as well as the accompanying broader societal issues. The
restorativejustice principles may very well play a role in the solution to this social
dilernma, but more research is needed before an abused woman's d e t y is placeci at risk.
The significance of this nsk presented itself twice during the preparation of this chapter.
On June 1 1, 1999, Ms. Samson was shot to death at a sheltet for abused women in
Quebec. Her estranged paner, Marcel Samson, set fire to the couple's home that they
shared for 20 years, then forced his way into the shelter, found Ms- Samson and shot her
seven times with a hunting rifle, as ten other women and children "cowered nearby." 1.
Peritz, a writer for the Globe and Mail, reported that, "only hours before her deaîh, she
tolc! staffers that she would not return home because she faireci for her life.""

On June

25, 1999, Rhonda Nickerson was shot and killed, by her estranged husband, in her parents

home on Cape Sable Island, Nova Scotia. Barry Nickerson had been released fiom
custody, pending the resolution of a number of domestic assault and uttering death threat
charges, laid in April of 1999 and alleged to have taken place back as far as 1983. At the
time he shot and killed his wife, he was enrolled in a male batterers counselIing program.
M e r killing Ms. Nickerson, he tumed the gun on himself and took his own life? These

"1. Peritz, The Globe and Mail, "Quebec Woman Shot to Death at Shelter for Battered
Women," 11 June 1999, A 2

86B.
Medel, The Mail-Star, "Murder-Suicide gun already in house," 28 June 1999, Al.
The article indicates that Mr.Nickerson was attending the "Men at Peace" volunteer-nin
program, in Yarmouth Nova, Scotia.

horrific stories not only depict the gravity of the potential consequemes of domestic

assault, but also emphasize the immediate ne& for workable solutions to this shocking,
shameftl and sometimes deadly behaviour- To expedite these reforms, it has also been
urged that a national research centre should be created so that solutions can be identifid
and efficiently implemented. As we have seen, human lives depend on effective initiatives
and answers.

CELAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
The concept of "equai" treatment that has been presented in this thesis has been adopted
fiom the Canadian jurisprudence. This theory of equality rejects the notion of the same
treatment for dl means equal treatment for everyone. It champions the realizations of
McIntrye J. that "identical treatment may fiquently produce serious inequalitf" and that
the essence of true equality is the ac«>rnmodations of differen~es.~
The key to deterrnining
what these differences are requires an analysis that is purposive and contextuai.' The
answer to assessing context is the identification of the interrelationships between social
variables and how these variables are linked to one another within the realm of law.

The disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's therapeutic or counselling records and
two recent criminal justice responses to the crime of domestic violence demonstrate the

complexities associated with the gender inequalities that exist in the Canadian criminal
justice system. The unequal treatment of these female complainants and witnesses has
been anchored in the criminal justice system's failure to appreciate the issues ~ ~ ~ e ctot e d
these dilemmas within their proper context. In other words, the criminal justice system has
failed to properly contextualize these gender specific issues.

'Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R.(4th) 1 (S.C.C.) at 10.

3Lawv. Millister of Htman Resources Developmen?, File No. : 25374, judgement March
25, 1999 (S.C.C.).
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A number of choices were made in this thesis about the terms used to discuss these topics.

It was admitted that the terms eventually selected were far fiom ideal and were iduenced

by the author's own gender and experiences, including those as a legal practitioner and
prosecutor. The t e m s used to discuss these issues and, most importanly, the process of
contextualizing them is a critical component of the exercise. Since these issues d'iectiy
impact women and because these women often fwl marginalized and ignored by the
criminal process, it is concluded that they should be given a voice in the debates regarding
these serious problems, their potentiai tragic wnsequences and their solutions.

The complexities of women's lives, specifically as complainants whose lives have been
af5ected by criminal violence, was highlighted throughout this work. The inequality of
women's treatment within the cnminal justice system was presented through the contlias
that arise between their interests, needs and rights and the rights of an accused person to
full answer and defence. To help understand these conflicts and the potential for refomu

to these problems, the procedural nature of a criminal trial was outlined. The concepts of
the litigation parties and due process were also explored.

The scope of the problern was discussed fiom the perspectives of tiequency and the
signifiant strife of female victims' under-reporting incidents of violence. It has been
estimated that approximately one third (29%) of Canadian women who have ever been
married o r lived in a cornmon law relationship have been physicaily o r sexually assaultd

by their partner at some point during the term of that relationship.' According to the

Homicide Surwey. in 1991, 270 women in Canada were murdered.' Investigative agencies
reported that of this number, 225 were classified as solved. From this category it was
determined that 2 10 of these murdered women were killed by men and 121 of these
victims were killed by their intimate partners. During the time it took this author to edit
and revise one chapter of this thesis, two more female victims were killed by their spouses

afier they tried to unsuccessfùlly end the violence in their homes that controiled their
lives!

For these women the tenn " s u ~ v o r "Mgs hollow. We as a society can no longer

debate policy. The number of lives that are affêcted by this type of dangerous and
potentially fatal conduct heightens the desperate need for changes. The under-reporting
exasperates this issue and presents a platform for denied access to justice is yet another
consequence of this form of gender inequality. The law must react quickly before more
lives are lost and destroyed. It is urged that the key to meaningfùl improvements is
contextualism as the standard of judicial analysis and protection through the equaiity rights

'Family Violence Initiative Program and Health Canada and Statistics Canada, as cited in
the F i m i Report. F m Rhetoric to Reaiïty E d i n g Domestic Violence in Nova Scotia,
Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, February 1995. See also K. Rodgers, "Wife
Assault: The Findings of the National Survey" Juristat, March 1994, Vol. 14, No. 9, Cat.
85-002.
'Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics
Canada, 1993).

n>e Homicide Surwy, f 991 (Ottawa: Statistics

61.Peritz, The Globe and Mail, "Quebec Women Shot to Death at Shelter for Battered
Women," 1 1 June 1999, A2; B. Medel, The Mail Star, "Murder-Suicide gun already in
house," 28 June 1999, Al.

'

guaranteed under section 15 of the Charter.

The law's current response to the issue of the disclosure of a sexual assauIt complainant's

therapeutic or counselling records was presented in a chronological manner. The courts'
response to the procedural and evidential issues was analyzed through a detailed review of
the O 'Connorcase' and the legislation, Bill C46,' that followed that decision. The cases,
particularly R v. Mills.1° that tested the constitutionality of the Bill C-46 were also
reviewed. The central theme in this component of this thesis was the courts' balancing of
the competing interests of the male accused and the female complainant. More specifically,
the recognition and treatment of the accused's Charter guaranteed right to fûU answer and
defence was compared to the complainant's right to privacy and equality before the law. It
is concluded that the effect of the courts' efforts to balance these competing interests

resulted in a hierarchy of rights, with those of women complainants balanceci below the
rights' of the male accused. Based on this, it is suggested that the reasons reiied on by the
courts to assess these conflicting interests often neglect the tme context of these records.
The courts have failed to recognize and weigh the impact that the opening and disclosing

these records, particularly to an accused person, had on a complainant. As well, the courts

'Canadian Charier of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Consiiution Act, 1982, king
Schedule B to the CCIIMdu Act, 1982 (U.K.),c. 11 [hereinafter " C h t e r " ] .
'R. V . O'Connor (1994), 89 C.C.C. (36) 109 (B.C.C.A.); (1996)' 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1
(S.C.C.); R v. O'Corrnor (No.2) (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (B.C.C.A).

'Criminal Code R.S.,c. C-46 [hereinafter Criminal Code].
''(1997)' 205 A.R. 321; 207 A.R. 161 (Q.B.),on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
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have failed to assess the consequences associated with such a breach of these extremely
private materials rnigiit have on other victirns' willingness to access justice in the criminal
courts. One additional issue presented in this work was the lever of recognition by the
courts of the complainant's rights. The evolution of these rights to Charter statu,
particularly an equality right, was achieved through an examination of the Supreme
Court's assessrnent of similar issues within the civil law context. As well, the Supreme
Court's deliberation of a class privilege for these types of records was looked at in the
case of L.L.A. v. BeharrieII." This assisted in the presentation of an argument that

supported that need for the courts to acknowledge victirns' rights as equally guaranteed by
the Charferas those of the accused.

In an effort to analyze some of its shortcornings, the crirninal justice system's foilure to

contextualize women's lives afler having been exposed to male violent behaviour was
revealed. At the core of these problerns is an unsuccessfùl appreciation of the context of
the issues, including the causes and consequences of this deplorabte criminal behaviour.
To begin to unravel these issues the theories of domestic assault were summarizeâ. Two
recent criminal justice responses to domestic violence were andyzed. The first initiative
was the "K Court" model commenced in Toronto. This program has been created, in part,

to improve the effectiveness of the criminal courts fact finding mission of a trial. It is
premised on a multi-professional cornmitment to the reformed treatment of domestic
assault charges. Police as investigators, Crown Attorney's as prosecutors and judges as

11(1

999, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.).
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trien of both facts and law were trsined to msure an appreciation of the complexities
connected with an assaultive domestic reiationship, including the phenornenon of a
recanting mmplainant. This is acknowledged as a positive aep towards a contextual
appreciation of the issues linked to domestic violence, but it is stressed that it has failed to
go far enough to truly impact the varied causes and consequences of domestic violence.

This response was compared to the plea and conditional discharge coun model,
implemented in a number of different juridictions throughout Ontario. This initiative
inchdes the court ordered treatment of accused persons through court mandated
counselling sessions for their abusiveness. Once completed the criminal justice system then
rewards the accused's acknowledgement of guilt and cornmitment to change with a
conditional discharge and perhaps some additional f o m of deterrence.

Related to the prosecution of domestic assault charges, a number of the cases that
addressed the treatment of a recanting complainant's evidence were examined. This
required an examination of the Supreme Court's creation and adaptation of a principled
approach to the admission of hearsay evidence for the truth ofits content. The leading
cases of R. v.

R

v. B.(K.G.),13
R v. Smith," and R v. L~.(F.J.)'~
were briefed and

"[1990] 2 S.C.R.53 1; 59 C.C.C. 92 (S.C.C.).
'3(1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
14[1992] 2 S.C.R.915; 75 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.).
lS(1995), 101 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).

259

their principles were applied to the issues oRen c o ~ e c t e dto the prosecution of domestic
assault charges. One case directly on point that was also scrutinized was R v. Mchmed l6
Ot her recent cases that addressed the issue of the admission of hearsay evidence in a
criminal trial were also presented. Of significance in these cases was the courts'
consideration of a statement's reliability and extemal guarantees of trustworthiness. It is
reasoned that a truly principled approach to hearsay refonn, combined with certain
fundamental evidence concepts and the context of domestic violence itseK require the
courts to consider al1 possible factors that support or detract fiom the reliability of a
recanting witness's original statement of cornplaint.

Moreover, in the analysis of these recent hearsay cases one other gender issue is revded.
SpecificaIly regarding equality, it would appear that a residual discretion exists with trial
judges to allow the necessity for f i I l answer and defence to trump the requirement for
reliability. It is emphasized that this right is the identical premise that is relied upon to
allow the rights of a male accused to be "balanced" above the rights of a female sexud
assault cornplainant to privacy and equality before the law.

To refom these failures it is urged that meaninfil changes require a contextuai
appreciation of the problems. To irnprove the equality rights of female complainants,
modifications to the criminai justice system are required. These modifications must
accommodate the gender differences linked with surviving violent crime. The failure to do

16[1
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so violates women's essential human dignity and fieedom, guaranteed to al1 citizens under

the Charter.

With regards to the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's therapeutic or counselling
records a reconstnicted approach to balancing the competing interests of a male accused
and a female complainant is suggested. fudicial notice of the significant harm that flows

fiom to a sexual assault complainant fiom either the delaying of treatment or the
interruption of her counseiling process is an alternative available t o the courts to avoid the
revictimization of a woman's integrity and human dignity. Support for this refonn can be
found in the wording and intent of Bill C-46. This legislation establishes both an onus on
the accused seeking the disclosure of these highly sensitive and personal records, as well

as a number of factors that cannot be regarded as sufficient for making the case for

disclosure. The codification also provides a Iist of permissible considerations that a judge
must contemplate when requested to determine the appropriateness of a disclosure
request. These provisions assist judges in resolving the conflict between the competing
interests and the judicial notice of the h m linked to this process. The doctrine of judicid
notice allows the courts to consider societal impact issues, including the chilling effect
that this type of privacy invasion may have on women's acKEs t o justice in the criminai
courts, within the classification of legislative fact. Support for this position is also
bolstered by academics' writing on the subject, some analogous case law deaiing with the
issue of the h m that flows fiom racism and /or a principled argument premised in
context.

26 1

Related to the dilernma of domestic violence the reforrns tabled in this work focussed on
the diversity of causes and consequences linked to the criminai behaviour. To start, it is
proposed that both of the recent Ontario initiatives, a rigorous prosecution mode1 and a
court mandated treatment based detenence approach, must exist together. A conviction
for a physidly abusive male at the end of the day without counselling retums a troubled
and physically dominating mais back into a repeating cycle of violence. This resu1ts in

great risk to his female partner and perhaps their children. Similarly, a lenient treatment
course, without the threat of other traditionai criminal punishments, including
incarceration, fails to provide for the possibility of a less than cornmitted maûe who drops
out of his counselling session. This male could then end up back in a home where he teels
invincible and continues to control his female partner with Unmunit.. Given the d a t i n g
nature of this form of violence both scenarios present unacceptable risks to an innocent
Party-

Regarding the contextualization of these initiatives it is concluded that because domestic
violence may have a nurnber ofdifferent causes and consequences, then a one size fits ail
treatment is less than an effective solution. It is emphasized that regardless of how a
batterer finds his way into a treatment program some expert form of assessrnent is needed
to properly channel his specific problems into a particular type of counselling. Also, other
options such as the cornmunity based restorative justice philosophy need to be explored.
The strengths and weaknesses of these alternatives must be assesseci with specïd attention
paid to the context of the cyclical nature of domestic violence. More research is needed

before women who have been manipulated by their male partners through the use of
physical violence are placed at the centre of any process established to terminate the
abuse. To avoid the same pitfalls associated with the conventional criminal justice system's
treatment of dornestic violence women's equality rights must remain the focus of this
reform. Policy advisors and politicians entrusted to protect the wlnerable in society must
not be distracted by issues of expense and efficiency if this problern is to be successflllly
battled.

This imperative for additional research l a d s to the conclusion that what is needed is a coordinated committee approach to creating and interpreting existing and fbture studies.
This could best be achieved through a national research centre, established to pool
information and make the most efficient use of the information that is available, planning

future studies and avoiding costly duplications. Three different progrms initiated in three
different parts of the country were examineci to help make this point. It is stressed that
domestic violence is a cntical problem with many complicated layers. It is time that we as

a society commit to ending the needless waste of precious opportunity and lives. More
than women's equality, essential humanity dignity and freedom is at risk-

Legislation

An Act to Amend the Cn'mimf Code (sexual assault), S C . 1 982, c.38.

Barristers andSoficitorsAct RS.B.C. 1979, c. 26.
Bill C46, An Act to amend the Crimimi Code @r&cfion of records in semai o&ce
proçeedings), S C . 1997, c.30.
Cana& Evidence Act, RS-C. (1985), c. C-5 .
Canada Pension Plan Act, RS-C., 1985, c. C-8.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, S. 7, Part 1 o f the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the C
d Act, 1982 (U.K.),1982, c. 11.

Criminal Code, R.S., c. C-46.
Jtdicattrre Act, R. S. A. 1980, c. J- 1.
Juries Act, R-S.O. 1990, c. J.3.
Lord'sDay Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. L.43.

Victims of Domestic Violence Act, S.S. 1994, v-6 -02.
Jurisprudence
A.(Z.L.) V. B.(A.) (1996), 44 C.R. ( 4 3 1 (S.C.C.).
A.M. v. Ryan [1997] 1 S.C.R 157.
Andrews v. Law Society of British Cofumbia(1989), 56 D.L.R. (4"') 1 (S.C.C.).

Baron v. Cana&, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416.
Brooks v. Canada Srifewqy Lld., [19891 1 S.C.R 1219.

264

Canadian B r d m î i n g Corp.v. Dogemis. [1994] 3 S.C.R 835; 94 C.C.C. (3d) 289.
Commomuealth v. SamueIs, 5 11 A.2d 22 1 (1986).
Commomueaith v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992).
Cronk v. Canadian Generol Innrronce Co. (1999, 128 D.L.R (4th) 147 (Ont. C.A).
Duncan v. Cammel, Laird & Co. [ 19921 AC. 624 (HL.).

Eclmonton Jourmi v. A

i

' (Attorney Gemrarl)(1 989). 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (SC.C.).

Eldige v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1997), 15 1 D.L.R. ( 4 3 5 77 (S CC.).
Hills v. Canada (Attorney GeneraI). [1998] 1 S C R 513.
I&ho v. Wright, 110 S . Ct. 3 139 (1990).
In re Robert H., 509 A.2d 475 (1986).
Jafje v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
Jones v. The Queen (1986). 3 1 D.L.R.(4") 569 at 594 (S.C.C.).

Law v. Minisfer of Human Resources Developrnent, File N o . : 25374, judgement Mach
25, 1999.

Malot v. The Queen ( 1 W8), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 456. (S.C.C.).
People v. Foggy, 52 1 N.E. 2d 86 (1988).

R. v. A t l q (1992), 70 C.C.C. (3d) 553 (B.C.C.A).
R. v. &(KG.), 119931 1 S.C.R. 740,79 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.).

R v. Bmsey, 119601 S.C.R.294, 125 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont.C A ) .
R v. Barbosa (1994), 92 C.C.C. (3d) 131 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
R v. Burden (1996), 90 O.A.C. 169 (Ont. CA).

R v. Beriault (1997), 6 C.R (5th) 382 (Que. C.A).

R v. B i g M h g M a r t ( l 9 8 5 ) , 18 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Blondheim (1980), 54 C.C.C (2d) 36.
R v. C m - b o(1982), 70 C.C.C. ( 2 4 498 (Ont. C-A).

R v. C M e y (1992), 72 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (B.C.C.A.).

R.v. Chase(1987), 64C.C.C. (3d)97(S.C.C.).

R

v. Clennont(1996), 150N.S.R. 264(N.S.C.A.).

R v. Cobham (1993), 92 C.C.C. (3d) 333 (S.C.C.).
R v. ComvqyandHusband(l998), 101 C.C.C. (3d) 397 (Ont. CA).

R. v. Cook(1985), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 18 (B.C.C.A).

R v. Curri, 119971B.C.J.No. 2367 (B.C.S.C.).
R v. Desairlrriers (1994), 93 C.C.C. (3d) 371 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refùsed (1994), 95 C.C.C. (3d) vi.
R v. Dickson (1973), 5 N. S.R. (2d) 240 (N.S.C.A).

R v. E H , [1998] O.J.No. 4515 (Ont. GD.).

R

v. E2hva~dsBooks&ArtLtd,

[1996] 2 S C R 713.

R. v. E i s e n h e r (1998), 14 C.R. ( 5 3 35 (N.S.C.A).

R v. Erven, il9791 1 S.C.R. 926; 44 C.C.C. (3d) 257.
R v. Finia (1994), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.).

R v. Folland(1999), 132 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (Ont. CA).
R. v. Gladue. [1999] S.C.J. No. 19.
R v. Graham (1 899), 3 C.C.C. 22 (Ont. H.C.).

R v. Gruenke (l991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at 315 (S.C.C.).

R v. HawkimandMorin (1996), 111 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.).
R v. Henrich (1996), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.).

R v.Hoopr, [1997] O.J. No. 5584 (Ont. G.D.).

R v. Htmie (1998), 12 C.R (5*) 180 (B.C.S.C.).
R v. Kalisa(1999),I30C.C-C. (3d) 121 (Que. C.A.).
R v. K m m g h (1955), 114 C.C.C. 378 (Ont. C.A).
R. v. Khsln (1990), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.).

R v.Koh(1999), 42O.R.(3d)668(Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Landry (1935), 64 C.C.C. 104 (N.B.S.C.).
R. v. Lavdee 119901 1 S.C.R. 852.
R. v. Lee (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 598 (Ont. C.D.).

R. v. M.(B.JJ (1998), 12 (C.R.) (5"') 168 (Alto. Q.B.).

R v. McMasler (1998), 122 C.C.C. (3d) 371 (Ont. C.A.).

R v. Mcli~tyre(1963), 2 C.C.C.380 m.S.C.A).
R v. Milguurd (197 l), 2 C.C.C. (Zd) 206 (Sask. C.A.), l a v e to appeal refûsed (1971), 4
C.C.C. (2d) 566n (S.C.C.).
R. v. Mills (1997), 205 A.R. 321; 207 A.R. 161 (Q.B.).
On appeal to the S.C.C.

R. v, Mohamed, [1997] O.J.No. 1287 (Ont. Prov.Div.).
R. v. Moreml (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 359 (Ont. CA.).
R. v. Morgentaler, [ 19881 1 S.C.R. 30.
R. v. Morris (1994), 87 W.A.C. 2% (B.C.C.A.).

R v. Morrisey (1995), 97 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. CA).

R v. N.J.M. (1997), 155 Nfld. and P.E.1.R 228.

R v. Oakes (1986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.); affirming (1983) 2 C.C.C. (3d) 339
(Ont. C A ) .

R v. O'Connor (1994), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 109 (B.C.C.A).
R v. O'Connor (No.2) (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 257 @.C.C.A).

R

v. O'Connor (1996), 103 C.C.C. (3d) I (S.C.C.).

R v. Osofin(1991), 86 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.).
R v. PanteIf (I995), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 83 (Ont. C A ) .

R. v. Park,[1995] 2 S.C.R. 836.
R v. P& (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to the S.C.C. retùsed
87 C.C.C. (3d) vi.

R v. Potts (1 982), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 2 19 (Ont. C.A).

R v. Regan, [1998] N.S.J. No. 356 (N.S.S.C.).
R. v. Rymt (1991), 69 C.C.C. (3d) 226.
R. v. Suhturo, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654.
R v. Scott (1990), 61 C.C.C. (34) 300 (S.C.C.).
R v. Seaboyer (1991), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).

R. v. Smith 119921 2 S.C.R. 915, 75 C.C.C. (3d) 257.
R. v. Stïnchcombe (1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).

R. v. Stromner, [1997] A.J . No. 872 (Alta. P.C.).
R v. TafudLong(1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.).

R. v. Tupin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 12%.

R v. (I.(F.J.), [1995) 3 S.C.R 764, 101 C.C.C.(3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
R v. K (IE), (1 994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 484 (Ont. C A ) .
R v. R?(S.) (1991), 6 C.R (4th) 373 (Ont. C.A.).
R v. Wnite (1994), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 336 (N.S.C-A).
R v. Whynof (1 983), 9 C.C.C- (3d) 449.

R

v. Williams (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 356 (Ont.C.A.).

R v. Wiiiiams (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.).

R v. Wiiiis (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 350 (Ont. CA).
R v. Woods (1897), 2 C.C.C. 159 (B.C.C.A.).
Re. Regha and O 'Connor (1994), 82 C.C.C. (3d) 495 (B.C.S.C.).
Reference re Alberta Statufes. 119381 S.C.R 100.
Smith v. Jones 119991 S.C.J.No.: 15 File No.:26500.
Vriend v. Alberta (1998), 156 D.L.R.(4th) 385.

Wawanesa Murual Insurance Co. v. Hanes 119631 1 S.C.C.3 2 1 ( S C C . ) .
Weatherall v. Ca&

(Attorney Generao, [ 19931 2 S.C.R. 872.

SECONDARY MATERIAI,
Books

Benjamin, J., n>e Bo& of Love: Psychmi'ysis, Ferninisin, and the Problem of
Domination (New York: Pantheon, 1988).
Black, D., 73e Behavimr of Luw (New York: Academic Press, 1976).

Braithwaite, J., and Daly, K., "Masculinitia, Violence and Cornmunitarian Contrai" in T.
Newbum and E. Stanko eds., Just Boys Doing Business: Men M m l i n i t y rmd Crime
(London: Routledge, 1994).
Counts, D., Brown, J., and Campbell, J., eds.. Sanctions d Smchrmy: CulîwaI
Perspectives on the Beating of Wiws(Boulder Colo. : W&ew Press, 1992).

-

Diagnostic and Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorders : DSM N,4th ed., (Washington

DC .: American Psychiatrie Association, 1994).
Downs, D., M m TkP, Victims;httered Women, Z k SyItliLome k i e t y a d t k Lmv,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 19%).

Dworkin, A., Pornography: Men Possessing Women (New York: Perigee / G.P.
Putnam's, 1981).
Eisentstein, H., Contemporary Feminist ntought (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1 984).

Ewaschuck, E., Crimiml Pleadings & Practice in C d ,2nd ed. (Aurom, Ont.:
Canada Law Book Inc., 1994).
Friedman, L., and Couper, S., The Costs of Domestic Violence:A Preliminary
Investigation of the FimnciaI Cod of Domestzc Violence ( New York: Victim Services,
1987).

Giles-Sims, J., Wije Battering: A System Theory Apprmch (New York: The Guilford
Press, 1983).
Giiligan, C., Itr a Dzflerent Voice PsychologicaZ Theory and Women's Development
(London: Harvard University Press, 1982).
Gondolf, E., Batfered Womenw Surviwrs: An Altermtiw to Treating Leamed
Helpleslnless (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988).
Gondolf, E., and Fisher, E., Battered Women as Swviwrs (Massachusetts: Lexington
Books, 1988).
Gorden, M., and Riger, S., The Female Fear (New York: The Free Press, 1989).

Herrnan, J., Trauma andRecovery: 7ne Aflermath of Violeme - From Domestic Abuse to
Political Terror ( New York: Basic Books, 1992).
Hi1ton N., Legal Resjponses to Wve Assault Current Trendr anû Edutiom (Newbury

Park, California: Sage Publications Inc., 1993).
Law Refonn Commission of Nova Swtia,Fimi Report,From Rhetoric to Realiiv M n g
Domestic Violence in Now Scotia, Law Reforrn Commission of Nova Scotia, Febniary
1995.

MacCrirnmon, M., and Boyle, C., "Equality, Faimess and Relevance: Disclosure of
Therapists Records in Sexual Assault Records in Sexual Assault Trials" in Canadian
Inst itute for the Administration of Justice, Filtering d Ambsing Evi&nce in an Age of
Diversity (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1993).

Masse, M., In the N m e of Love: Wmen,Masochim, cmd the Gothic (Ithaca NY:
Corne11 University Press, 1992).
Matoesian, G., Reprûducig Rapt?. h m i m t i o n through Taik in the Courtrwm (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1993).
National Research Council, Crowell, N., and Burgess, A-, eds., Undkrstding Violence
Against Women (Washington D.C.:National Academy Press, 1996).
Packer, H., me Limits of the Crimimai Sam:tion (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1968).

Paciocco, D., and Stuesser, L., 7he Law of Evihnce (Concord, Ont.:Invin Law, 1996).
Roach, K., Due Process and Victims' Rights: The N m Law and Poiitics of Criminal
Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
Schuiman, P., Mr. I., Commission of Inquiry into the Deaths of R h o h Lavoie and Roy
Lavoie, A Str@ of Domestic Violence d the Justice System in Manitoba, (Winnipeg:
Manitoba Governrnent Publications, 1997).
Sopinka, J., Ledeman, N.,and Bryant, A.,
Butterworths, 1992).

Ine Lmu of Evidence in C

d (Toronto:

h E ., et ai, Wve Abuse in the Medicai Setting: An Introductionfor Healrh Personnel
(1981), Domestic Violence Monograph Senes, No. 7 (Rockwell, Md. : National
Clearinghouse on Domestic Violence, 198 1).

St

Schiff, S., Evidence in the Litjgation Pruces, 3rd. ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) vol. 2.
St ienman, M., WomenBattering: Poiiq Reqmnses ( Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co.
and Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 1991).

Straus, M., and Gelles, R, "How Violent Are American Families? Estimates fiom the
National Family Violence Resurvey and ûther Studies" in M. Straus and R GeUes eds.,
Physicai Violence in Americon Families: Risk Factors and Adqptatim to Violence in
8.145 Fmilies (New Brunswick, N .J. : Transaction Publishers, 1990).
The Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, Changing t k Ludwqw: E d n g
ViolenceAchieving Equuli@ (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Senices Canada, 1993).
The National Research Council, Crowell N., and Burgess A, eds., Udrstanding
Violence Against W m e n (Washington: National Academy Press, 1996).
Thompson, J., Studies in the 7heory of ldeology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
Van Hasselt, V., et al., eds., Hm-k

of Frmriiy Violence (New York: Plenum, 1988).

Walker, L.. me Battered Women (New York: Harper and Row, 1979).
Watt, D., Watt 's M m e / of Criminal Evidençe (Scarborough, Ont.: Carsweli, 1999).

Webster 's New CoIIegiute Dictionmy. 8th ed., (Toronto: Thomas Allen and Son Limitecl,
1980).

Whalen, M., Coumeiing to End Viofe~~ce
Against Women: A Subversive M d e l
(Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996).
Yllo, K., and Bograd, M., eds., Feminist Perspectiws on Wve Abuse (Newbury Park,
Cal.: Sage Publications, 1988).
Articles
Adams, D., "Treatment Models of Men Who Batter: A Profeminist Analysis" in Mlo, K.,
and Bograd, M., eds., Feminist Perpctiws on Wfe Abuse (Newbury Park, Cd.: Sage
Publications, 1988).

Adams, G., "Dispute Resolution, the Legal System and Professional Responsibility:
Bargaining for Justice" [unreporteci] a paper presented at the Law, Justice and
Community: A Symposium in Honour of the Honourable Lorne O. Clark, Q.C., Dalhousie
University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, April 1999.
Archer, J., "The Influence of Testosterone on Human Aggression" (199 1), 82 British
Journal of Psychology 1.

Archibald, B., "A Comprehensive Canadian Approach to Restorative Justice: The
Prospects for Fair Alternative Measures in Response to Crime" in Stuart, D., et al., eds.,
Towards a C h and Just Crimiml L m : A Crimiml R e p t s Forum (Scarborough Ont. :
Carswell, 1999).
Archibald, B., "The Politics of Prosecutorial Discretion: Institutional Structures and the
Tension between Punitive and Restorative Justice" (1 998) 3 Can. Crim. L.R 69.
Astor, H., 'The Weight of Silence: Talking About Violence in Family Mediation' in
Thomton, M., ed., Fragile Frmtiers: Feminisr &&tes Around Public and Private
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Bakan, J., 'Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't Always Get What
You Want (Nor What You Need)' in R Devlin ed. C ' i m r Perspectives on Legal
Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 1991).
Bersianik, L., "Women's Work" in A. Dybikowski, V. Freeman, D. Marlatt, B. Pulling &
B. Warland, eds., In the Féminine: Women and Words /Les Femmes et les Mots
(Edmonton: Longspoon Press, 1983) at 157.
Berzins, L., '"Restorative' Justice on the Eve of a New Century: the need for social
context and a new imagination" ( April 1997) [unpublished, text delivered at the Canadian
Institute for the Administration Justice, Montreal].
Black, D., "Social Control as a Dependent Variable" in D. Black ed., Toward a Generai
Theory of Social Conrrol (New York: Acadernic Press, 1984).
Bograd, M., "Farnily Systems Approaches to Wife Battering: A Feminist Critique" (1984)
54 Amencan Journal of Orthopsychiatry 558.
Bond, S., "Psychiatric Evidence of Sexual Assault Victims: The Need for Fundamental
Change in the Determination of Relevance" (1 983) 16 Dalhousie L.J. 4 16.
Boyle, C., "A Feminist Approach to Criminal Defences" in R. D e v h ad. Canadian
Perspectives on Legai Theoty (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 1991).
Browne, A., and Dutton, D., "Escape fiom Violence: Risks and Alternatives for Abused
Women - What do we Currently Know?'in Roesch, R, et al., eds., Family Violence:
Perspectives on Treatment, Research rmd Policy ( B a d y B.C.:
British Columbia
Institute on Farnily Violence, 1990).
Burris, C., and I s e , P., ' W f e Abuse as a Crime: The Impact of Police Laying Charges"

(1 983) 25 Canadian J o u d of Crirninology 309.

Chapman, S., "Third Party Records" [unreportedl a paper presentd at the National
Criminal Law Program, University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C.,July 1998.
Davis, K., " Judicial Notice" (1955) 55 Coiumbia Law Rwiew 945.

DeKeseredy, W., and M a c m B., 'Xesearching Women Abuse in Canada: A Realist
Critique of The Conflict Scale" (1990) 25 Canadian Review of Social Policy 19.
Delisle, R., 'B.(KG.)
and It's Progeny" (1998), 14 C.R.(5th) 75.
Devlin, R-,"The Charter and Anglophone Legal Theory" (1997) 4 Review of
Constitutional Studies 19.
Dobash, R.E.,and Dobash, R, Women, Violence and Social Change (New York:
Routledge, 1992).
Dugdale, D., 'Against Oath Taking' [1985] N.Z.L.J. 404.
A Redefinition
Dutton, M., "Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic
of the Battered Wi fe Syndrome " (1 993), 2 1 Hofstra Law Review 119 1.

Dutton, D., and Painter, S., "Traumatic Bonding: The Development of Emotional
Attachments in Battered Women and Other Relationships of Intermittent Abuse" (1 983) 6
Victimology 139.
Eberts, M., "New Facts For Old: Observations on the Judicial Process" as cited in R
Devlin, ed. C d i m Perpctives on LeguI Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery
Publications Ltd., 199 1).

Farrington, D., "Childhood Aggression and Adult Violence: Early Precursors and LaterLife Outcomes" in Pepler, E.,and Rubin, K., eds., 7 k Development and Treabnent of
Childhood Aggrembn (Hillsdale N.J.: Erlbaum, 1991).
Gartner, R., and Macmillan, R-,"The Effect of Victim - Offender Relationship on
Reporting Crimes of Violence Against Women," (1995) 37 Canadian Journal of
Crirninology 393.
Gomme, I., 'Tem of Crime Among Canadians: A Multivariate Analysis" (1986), 14
Journal of Criminai Justice 249.
Gondolf, E., "Batterer Intervention: What We Need to Know" [unreportedl paper

prepared for the Violence Against Women Strategic Planning Meeting, National Institute
of Justice, Washington D.C., March 3 1, 1995. Mid-Atlantic Addiction Training fnstitute,
Indiana University of Pe~sylvania.
Greenblat, C., "Don't Hit your Wife...Unless: Preliminary Findings on Normative Support
For the Use of Physical Force by Husbands" (1985), 10 Victimology 221.
Gruznski, R, and Carillo, T., "Who Cornpletes Baîterer Treatment Groups? An Empiricai
Investigation" (1988) 3 Journal of F h l y Violence 141.
Firsten, T., "An Exploration of the Role of Physicd and Sexual Abuse for Psychiatridy
Institutionalizeâ Women" (1WO), [unpublished research paper] available fiom the Ontario
Women's Directorate.
Hamberger, L., and Hastings, J., "Counseling Male S p s e Abusers: Characteristics of
Treatment Completers and Dropouts" (1989) 4 Violence and Victims 323.
Hamberger, L.,and Hastings, J., "Court Mandated Treatment of Men Who Assault Their
Partner; Issues, Controversies, and Outcornes" in N. Hilton, ed., Legai Respomes to Wife
Assml,, Current Trends and Ewiuation (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, Inc., 1993).
Hart and McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law,D. Lemer ed., S. Schiff,
Evidence in the Litigation Process, 3rd ed., (Toronto: The Carswell Company Limited,
1988) vol. 1 at 9.
Hart, S., Dutton, D., and Newlove T., "The Prevalence of Personality Disorder Among
Wife Assauiters" (1993), Journal of Personality Disorders 7(4) 328.

Holmes, H., "Access to Third Party Records: Does R v. O 'Connor Occupy the Field?"
(1996), 44 C.R.(4.)

144.

Holmes, H., "An Analysis of Bill C-46, Production of Records in Sexual Offence
Proceedings", (1997) 2 Can. Crim. L.R 71.
J a e , P., el al "The Impact of Laying Charges" in N.Hilton, ed., LegaI Responses to Wije
Asscnrlt: Current Trends und EwIuution (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993).
JafKe, P., Wolf, D., Wilson, S., aiid Zak, L., "Similarities in Behaviour and Social
Maladjustment Among Child Victims and Child Witnesses to Family Violence" (1986), 56
American Journal of Orehopsychiatry 142.

Johnson, H., "Seriousness, Type and Frequency of Violence" in Wife AssmIt a d the
Criminal Justice System, M.Valverde, L.MacLeod and K. Johnson eds., (Toronto:

Centre of Cnrninology, 1995).
Johnson, H., and Sacco, V., 'Researching Violence Ag.inst Women: Statistics Canada's
National Survey" (1995) 37 Canadian Ioumol of Crirninology 28 1.
Joo, A., "Broadening the Scope of Counselor - Patient Pnvilege to Protect the Privacy of
the Sexual Assault Survivor" (1995), 32 H m . J. on Legis. 255; "Developments in the
Law - Privilege Communications" (198S), 98 Harv. L. Rw. 1450.
Kantor, G., "Redefining the Bnishstrokes in Ponraits on AIcohol and Wife Assaults" in
A IcoM md I n t e r p e r d Videme: Fastering Muitidisciplinmy Persipectiws NIAAA
Monograph 24, NM Publication No. 93-3496 (Rockville Md. : National Institute on
Alcohol and Alcoholism, National Institutes of Heaith, U.S. Department of Health and
Human SeMces, 1993).
Kulik, I., "Family Violence: A Statistical Profile 1997," Stats Canada Daily, June 11,
1999, available at Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics.
Lawrence, M., "Rape Victim-Crisis Counselor Communications: An Argument for an
Absolute Pnvilege" (1 984) 17 U.S. Davis L. Rev. 1213.
L Heureux-Dubé, C., "Re-examining the Doctrine of Judicial Notice in the Family Law
Context" (1 994) 26 Ottawa Law Review 55 1.
Lenton, R.,"Power Versus Feminist Theones of Wife Abuse" (1995) 37 Canadian Journal
of Cnminology 305.
MacLeod, L.,"Expanding the Dialogue: Report of a Workshop to Explore the Violence
Act" in Valverde, D., et al.,eds., Wve A~sscnrltandthe CtimimZJustice Sysern (Toronto:
Centre of Criminology, 1995).
MacKinnon, C., 'Teminist, Manrism, Method and State: Toward a Feminist
Jurispmdence," 1983, 8 Journal of Women in Culture and Society at 63 5.
Mahoney, M., "Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation"
(1990- 1991) 90 Mich. Law Rev. 1.
McInnes, J., and Boyle, C., "Judging Sexual Assault Law Against a Standard of Equality"
(1995) 29 U.B.C.L.J. vol. 2 341.
McKenry, P., Julian, T., and Gavazzi, S., "Toward a Biopsychosocial Model of Domestic
Violence" (1 999, 57 (May) Journal of Marriage and Family 307.

Mitchell, G., "Abuse of Process and the Crown's Disclosure Obligations" (1996), 44 C-R
( 4 3 130.

Mitchell, G., "R V. La: The Evolving Right to Crown Disclosure and the Supreme Court
Divided" (1 998). C R (5.) 179.
Monahan, J., and Waiker, L., "Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating and Establishg
Social Science in Law" (1986) 134 U. Pa. Law Review 477.
Monahan, J., and Walker, L., "Empincal Questions Without Empirical Answers" (199 1)
Wisconsin Law Revicw 569.
Neuhauser, M., "The Privilege of Confidentiality and Rape Crisis Counselors" (1985) 8
Women's Rts L. Rep. 185.
O'Leary, K., "Physical Aggression Between Spouses: A Social Learning Theory
Perspective" in V. Van Hasselt, R Morrison, and M. Hersen, eds., Handbmk ofFarni&
Violence (New York: Plenum, 1988).
O'Leary, K., et al., "An Empirical Cornpaison of Physical Aggression Couples Treatment
vs. Gender-specific Treatment, [unreported] paper presented at the 4th International
Family Violence Research Conference, Durham, New Hampshire, July 2 1 - 24, 1995,
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stuny Brook.
Paciocco, D. "Bill C-46 should not survive constitutional challenge", 3 Sexud Offences
Law Reporter 185.
f ark, R., "A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform" (1 987-88), 86: 1 Michigan
Law Review 5 1.

Peters, M., "Third Party Disclosure Under O'Connor, Defence Concems" (1996), 44 C-R
(4*) 179.

Pomerance, R., "Confionting the Hearsay Dangers: The Principles of Necessity and
Reiiability" [unreported] a paper presented at the 1997 National Criminal Law Program,
Criminal Evidence, at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1997.
Quincey, V., and Lalumiere, M., "Evolutionary Perspectives on Sexual Offending," (1995)
7(4) Sexual Abuse 30 1.
Robert, J., "Criminal Justice Processing of Sexual Assault Cases" (1994), 14 : 7 Juristat 3.
Saunders, D., "Husbands Who Assault: Multiple Profiles Rsquinng Multiple Responses"

in Hilton, N., ed., k g a l Responses to Wve Asault: Current Trends and Eduation
(Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993).
Saunders, D., and Parker, J., "Legal Sanctions and Treatment Foliow-through Among
Men Who Batter: A Multivarîate Analysis" (1989) September, Social Work Research and
Abstracts, 2 1.
Scanneas, C., "Rape Victim-Rapc Crisis Counselor Communications: A New Testimonial
Privilege" (198 1-1982) 86 Dick. L-Rev. 539.
Steinman, M., "Lowering Recidivism Among Men W h o Batter" (1990) 17 Journal of
Police Science and Administration 124.
Straus, M., "Measuring Family Violence. The Confiict Tactic Scale" (1979) 41 J o u d of
Marriage and the Family 75.
Stubbs, S., "'Cornmunitarian' Conferencing and Violence Against Women: A Cautionary
Note" in M. Valverde et al, eds., Wve Assclult and the C d i m Crimiml Juslice
System: Issues and Policies (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1995).
Stuesser, L., "Adrnitting Prior Inwnsistent Statements Where 'Adverse'
Evidence Act (Ont.)" (1962) 40 Can. Bar.Rev. 96.

- Section 24,

Sugunasiri, S., "Contextualism: The Supreme Court's New Standard of Judicial Analysis
and Accountability" (August 1998) [unpublished] available at Dalhousie University,
Halifax, Nova Scotia, and the forthwrning (1999) 22 Dalhousie Law Journal.

Stuesser, L., "Reconciling Disdosure and Privilege" (1994), 30 C.R.(4"') 67.
Tomkins, A., et al., "Self Defence Jury Instructions in Trials of Battered Women Who
I ~ ~ : Trends
Ki11 Their Partnef' in N. Hilton, ed., Legal Respoltses to Wve A S S Q LCurrent
and Evaluation, (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993).
Van Dieen, J., "A(L.L.) V. B.(A.): The Privilege Analysis" (1996) 44 C.R.(4"') 166.

Weisberg, R., "Defendant v Witness: Measunng Confrontation and Compulsory Process
Rights Against Statutory Communications Privilege" (1 977-78) 30 Stan L. R 93 5.
White, J., and Koss, M., "Adolescent Sexual Aggression within Heterosexual
Relationships: Prevalence, Characteristics, and Causes" at 182 in H. Barbaree, W.
Marshall and D.Laws eds., The Jlrvenile Sex Ofleder (New York: Guilford Press, 1993).

Williamson, K., "Confidentiality o f S e d Assault Victim - Counselor Communication: A
Proposed Mode1 Statute" (1 984) 26 Ariz. L.R 461.
Young, A, "When Titans Clash: The lirnits of Constitutional Adjudication" (1996) 44
C.R. (4.) 152.

Othtr Materials

Armstrong, J., et al. The Toronto Star (9 March) Al.
Armstrong, J., et al. "Hitting Back in San Diego" The Toronto Star (March 16) C 1.
Department of Justice Canada, Working Document, Prairie Research Associates Inc.,
Review of the Saskatchewan VictimsofDomesfic ViolenceAct, WD 1996-de (Ottawa:
Department of Justice Canada, 1996).
Department of Justice Canada, Working Document, Roberts, T., S p s a I Assmlt and
Mandatory Chargrng irr the Yukon: L.Jpetiences, Perspectives and Altermtzves,
WD 1996-3e, Research, Statistics and Evaluation Directorate (Ottawa: Department of
Justice Canada, 1996).
Department of Justice Canada, Working Document, Ursel, E., Wznnipg Family Violence
Court Evaluation, Research, Statistics and Evaluation Directorate, WD 1995-2e (Ottawa:
Department of Justice Canada, 1995).
Department of Justice Canada, News Release, June 12, 19%.
L. C. and Brian Mills and the Attorney General of Alberta and rhe A f f o m yGeneral of
C m a h , f i d a v i t of Catherine Kane, Supreme Court of Canada, File Number 26358.

-

Llewellyn, J., and Howse,R., "Restorative Justice A Conceptual Framework" online:
<http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/papersrhowse.
htmb
Medel, B., The Mail-Star, "Murder-Suicide gun already in house," 28 June 1999, Al.
Moore, D .,and McDonald, J., online: Transfomative Justice Australia
<http://www.tja.com.au/menu.htm>
Peritz, I., The Globe and Mail, "Quebec Woman Shot to Death at Shelter for Battered
Women," 1 1 June 1999,AS.

Region of Peel (Ontario) SexuaJ Assauit Emergency Response Protocol (October 1996)
[un published, availablc at the Rapt Crisis Centre, Mississauga, Ontario].

